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Abstract 
This thesis argues that the politics of the Assam 
Movement of the 1980's exemplifies the use of identity as 
a consolidating tool. Locating the Assam Movement within 
a broad-based historical perspective, the study examines 
theories of ethnicity but finds current explanations 
insufficient in explaining the mobilization of a 
particular Assamese cultural identity during this period. 
Current views of state and society within India 
argue that contemporary divisions derive from discourses 
and structures imposed by,. the British and the nationalist 
movement. The thesis argues that methods of governance, 
social conditions and economic structures within India 
have derived from, or have been manufactured in response 
to, British assumptions reflected in colonial methods of 
rule. This has encouraged the articulation and 
construction of localized identities in northeast India 
at the expense of a national homogenization. This is 
demonstrated through a study of social, political, 
economic and religious developments under colonial rule 
and their manipulation and justification by both Assamese 
and national Indian elites. 
The thesis will further demonstrate the manipulation 
of selective historical events to construct a 
contemporary Assamese community. Despite temporal and 
genealogical differences between the historical events 
and the contemporary community, this does not prevent 
myths relating to territory being used to consolidate a 
community inhabiting the same territory. 
Through examining this complex dynamic and the 
resultant accommodation and constraints enforced by the 
centre on the sub-nationalist identity, the thesis 
explains the rise of the Asom Gana Parishad and raises 
issues regarding the basis of nationalism within the 
Indian state, the possibilities of devolution and 
implications for political order within post-colonial 
states. 
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Note on Spellings 
Throughout the thesis consistency has been 
attempted, despite the spellings of some names changing 
during the periods under discussion. Thus Guwahati is 
used throughout the thesis, although the more anglicized 
Gauhati was officially used until 1979. Similarly 
Shankardeva, rather than Shankardeb or Shankardev, is 
used, although all three are used by different- writers. 
A thesis of this nature suffers from a major 
terminological problem relating to the terms Assam and 
Assamese. The term Assam generally refers only to the 
present-day state of Assam and the term northeast is used 
to refer to the states of Assam, Tripura, Arunachal 
Pradesh, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Manipur. 
However, the British used the term Assam to describe this 
region as a whole and discussions of the state of Assam 
under colonial rule reflect this. 
At risk of appearing tautological, the term 
indigenous Assamese refers only to the core Assamese 
group; those whose membership of the Assamese group is 
unchallenged. That is; Assamese speaking, Vaishnavite 
Hindus. Some early Muslim immigrants would also be 
included in this definition but specifically excluded are 
those whose membership varies temporally. Most important 
of these are tribals, tea plantation workers and Bengali 
Muslims and Hindus. 
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Introduction 
Since 1978, the state of Assam has experienced a near 
complete breakdown in ethnic accommodation. Political 
parties are seen to attract support on the basis of 
localized cultural allegiances at the expense of any 
inclusive state-wide, regional or national identity. This 
has resulted in excluded groups utilizing alternative 
cultural tools to construct opposing identities, 
reinforcing this polarization. 
This thesis argues that identity politics is 
predicated on constructing a difference with the other. 
The use of historic events, both to construct cultural 
groups and to justify relationships with alternative 
groups, encourages other groups to adopt similar methods 
for self-protection. The thesis will demonstrate the 
manner in which cultural artifacts have been used to 
construct and consolidate a specific Assamese identity. 
The object is to demonstrate the process through 
which cultural communities may be used by elites as the 
prime means of organization for, and the focus of, 
political demands. Furthermore, it will investigate the 
method by which cultural groups develop into "existence". 
That is, how they develop into a recognizable format with 
a self-identifying, stigmatized membership and shared 
ways of behaviour, such that they may be used as the 
channels through which political demands are articulated. 
Through examining the use of myth, the role of the 
Other and the political environment, the thesis will 
explore the construction of a specific Assamese identity, 
to the point at which a particular cultural elite is able 
to dominate the state apparatus. The power of this elite 
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derives from its claims to represent the Assamese 
community within the state structure and its attempts to 
extract resources from the centre and from other groups 
within the state for "its" community. 
It will be argued that the creation of the Assamese 
group involved the propagation of a particular conception 
of Assamese society by an Assamese elite. This conception 
focused on vague notions of the need to protect Assamese 
culture, primarily through reference to linguistic 
minoritization, but these ideas could only become 
dominant when more deprived members of the Assamese 
community felt that they too would benefit from 
articulating this identity. Thus the rise of the Assam 
Movement equally reflects the decline of Congress Party 
authority within the state. 
By definition the thesis is a historical work but it 
does not attempt to write a comprehensive and definitive 
history of Assam. Rather, it aims to focus on those 
"stories" whose re-articulation has acted as a catalyst 
for identity consolidation and which feature prominently 
both in contemporary literature and in public 
consciousness as "cultural markers" of the Assamese 
community. 
The implications of this work are twofold. Firstly, 
although "sons of the soil" movements in Assam are 
clearly related to territory, conceptions of being 
Assamese are justified using historical and cultural 
signifiers which do not require any "imagined" familial, 
blood relationship with those communities whose 
historical memories are articulated. The Assamese 
community utilizes historic myths related to the 
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territory of Assam, rather than necessarily imagining that 
their own ancestors were involved in these events. That 
is, that they share the territory is sufficient for the 
propagation of shared memories. 
The second implication is that cultural identities 
can never be removed as potential focal points for any 
sub-nationalist political movement. The representation of 
differing dialects, religious practices or social 
structures may, if these differences are portrayed as 
being historic, result in the division of a group 
previously assumed to be culturally homogenous. As long as 
any potentially stigmatizable cultural differences exist, 
given a conducive political environment, ethnic groups can 
be created, through appropriation of history to emphasize 
difference. 
It is important to note that this is in no way an 
ethnic "reawakening". Rather, it is an instrumentalist 
construction of a historically justified but politically 
new community. 
The elections of February 1983 witnessed widespread 
unrest throughout the state of Assam. Estimates of those 
killed vary between 3,000 (S. Baruah 1986: 1184), 4,000 
(Hazarika 1995: 145) and 7,000 (Hussain 1993: 10), 
although some commentators have placed the figures as high 
as 10,000 with hundreds of thousands (Rafiabadi 1988: 7) 
or even half a million (J. Singh 1984: 1066) losing their 
homes. This event marked the breakdown of any cultural 
accommodation that had previously existed within the 
state but which had gradually been eroded since the early 
1970's. The growth of a new militancy amongst and between 
almost all stigmatized communities within the 
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state was witnessed not just in relation to illegal 
immigrants but with regard to indigenous Assamese 
communities. 
The All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (All Assam 
Peoples' Struggle Council), or Assam Movement, formed in 
1979, entered into protracted negotiations with the 
centre with regards both to economic problems within the 
state and the flow of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. 
The resulting Assam Accord of 1985 paved the way for 
elections in the state Legislative Assembly which were 
convincingly won by the Asom Gana Pari shad (Assam 
Peoples' Council) (A. G. P. ), the party political wing of 
the Assam Movement. Corruption, inexperience and a 
hostile central government resulted in a return to 
President's Rule in 1989. Disillusionment with the A. G. P. 
enabled the Congress (I) Party to return to power in 
1991. 
Rising militancy from the United Liberation Front of 
Assam (U. L. F. A. ) and the clearly divisive policies of 
Congress (I) Chief Minister Hiteshwar Saikia's government 
in Assam enabled a more experienced A. G. P. to return to 
power in the Legislative Assembly elections of 1996 on a 
platform opposed to the Congress Party and immigration 
and supporting economic development within the state. 
Claims for Assamese independence exist but, as the A. G. P. 
has been better accommodated by the non-Congress centre, 
these have declined. The Assam Movement had achieved the 
only viable option available to it; state domination 
within the existing framework and a guarantee that 
culturally based politics would dominate the politics of 
the state for at least the foreseeable future. 
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This thesis explains these events as the result of 
an external environment conducive to the formation of 
cultural communities as the means through which political 
demands are articulated. The manner by which indigenous 
Assamese elites have used historic myths to construct and 
then consolidate a particular high-caste Hindu Assamese 
identity to the exclusion of more conciliatory and 
inclusive interpretations of Assamese identity will be 
demonstrated. 
This thesis seeks to locate the events in Assam from 
1978 to the present within a historical framework. 
Attempts to secure political goals and control over 
scarce social goods are liable to be made through the 
representation of cultural similarity, stressing 
linguistic and religious difference from outsiders, and 
consolidating this through the articulation of historical 
events. It will be argued that this has been encouraged 
both by British policies in the northeast and the manner 
of governance in the post-Independence Indian state 
stressing community rights, rather than notions of 
individual citizenship. 
Furthermore, this thesis will demonstrate how the 
concept of Assamese identity has been manipulated by 
elites for the purpose of resource allocation. Through 
basing economic demands on the grounds that the 
"indigenous" population, whose composition varies, have 
specific rights on the basis of territorial allegiance, 
they necessarily need to define this community through 
reference to other groups, thereby increasing division. 
Through an examination of the use of historical material, 
and the sub-texts and implications thereof, it will be 
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shown that debates regarding Assamese identity are 
conducted in large part through reference to historic 
myth and changing definitions of the Other. This in turn 
affects individual's self-perception. 
A distinction is assumed between politics within 
Assam before and after the A. G. P. gained control of the 
Legislative Assembly. The construction of the cultural 
identity can be manufactured in opposition to other 
political parties which are perceived to gain support 
from other communities but the point at which power has 
been achieved marks the stage at which the demands of 
rule, within a democratic state such as India, are such 
that new methods of maintaining support are necessary 
(see Mitra 1996: 31). 
This thesis is divided into three sections. The 
first two chapters outline the theoretical position taken 
with regard to identity creation, investigating ethnic 
identities and theories of the Indian state. The 
following three chapters examine the development of a 
specific Assamese cultural identity, through a 
demonstration of the imposition of cultural identities by 
the colonial administration and the articulation of 
historic differences by the contemporary Assam Movement. 
The final chapter contextualizes the particular political 
events from 1978 until 1997 in Assam. It demonstrates the 
"success" of certain non-inclusionary, localized 
identities and the consequent development of a 
particular, cultural, political party; the A. G. P.. 
Chapter One presents a comprehensive literature 
review regarding theories of ethnicity, tracing early 
anthropological accounts, the assumptions of 
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modernization theorists and Marxists and post-modern 
examinations of identity. This chapter will argue that 
many of the commonly-held assumptions regarding 
ethnicity, for example, that ethnic identities increase 
their salience in certain situations, that they can be 
managed or that national identities can co-opt trappings 
of ethnic identities, imply that ethnic identities are 
ever present, primordial features. 
Rather than assuming that, in certain circumstances, 
ethnic identities reassert themselves, this thesis will 
argue that if a group of people sharing certain 
characteristics, such as language, are exploited by a 
categorically different group, perhaps speakers of a 
different language, then the exploited group will 
articulate their grievances through the language of 
cultural difference. To consolidate this linguistically 
and spatially distinct cultural group, manufactured or 
selective histories can provide justification for 
organization around these stigmatizing features. It is 
therefore argued that the cultural traits exist before 
notions of the cultural community but that their 
expression as cultural markers of a community reflects a 
political project. 
Chapter One concludes with an examination of two 
features necessary to "create" an ethnic community; a 
stigmatizable Other and myths available to be articulated 
to consolidate this difference. 
Chapter Two explores theories of Indian nationalism 
and assesses the relationship between secularism and 
religion in India. Despite the tradition of state 
involvement in religious affairs, dominant notions of 
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secular democracy after Independence represented a 
qualitative shift. The utilization of Hindu icons by the 
Congress Party from the late 1970's and the growth of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (B. J. P. ) demonstrate the failure 
of secular ideals in a predominantly Hindu democracy. 
This questions both indigenous Indian interpretations of 
Hinduism and western notions of secularism. 
The articulation of over-lapping identities, which 
have clearly not disappeared through "modernization", 
recurs as caste and linguistic cleavages are dealt with 
through the management and preferment of political, 
social and economic rights. This confusion over the 
nature of citizenship in India is reinforced by rights 
given to certain groups within the secular state. For 
example, the arbitration of personal law disputes by 
religious elites was legitimized by the state, whilst 
tribal groups were given preferential treatment on the 
basis of community membership. 
The granting of rights on the basis of cultural 
stigmas has enabled various particular localized 
identities in Assam to be reinforced by the very measures 
which were intended to reduce their importance. Caste, 
tribal, linguistic and religious identities co-exist in 
the northeast as nowhere else in India and the argument 
that Assam is a microcosm of Indian society (see section 
5.4), is increasingly discredited. The virulence of the 
claims of difference within the region implies a major 
failure of the national identity to reinforce itself 
through difference. Furthermore, the system of governance 
implies that other parts of society need to be accepted 
by others as a community to gain political and social 
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rights. For example, if statehood is desired, language 
must be emphasized, if reservations, then backwardness 
must be stressed. 
Clearly other political systems may well have 
produced similar outcomes. However, it is the argument of 
this thesis that the continuing emphasis on groups, 
rather than individuals, within a liberal political 
framework, has failed to produce an indigenous form of 
nationalism that could act as a primary identity. Nor has 
the Indian state been fully able to regard its citizens 
as individuals rather than as members of a cultural 
group. Instead, in large part through necessity, 
paradoxically the state has been forced to adopt a 
framework inherited from British rule as a means to 
eliminate the inequalities of colonial rule. 
Thus, despite being explicitly opposed to the Indian 
state, the growth of the Assam Movement was implicitly 
encouraged by the state. Furthermore, much of the 
language of the Assam Movement is synonymous with the 
language of the Indian nationalist movement. If the 
origins of the present Indian state can be seen in pre- 
Independence debates, the failure of the national 
identity to consolidate itself in the northeast can be 
argued to derive from the region's transitory involvement 
in the Independence struggle which in turn resulted from 
the prevailing method of colonial rule. 
Chapter Three will highlight certain historical 
metaphors which have been utilized to suggest that the 
Assamese are separate from mainstream Indian culture. The 
co-opting of Ahom history as the history of the early 
Assamese will be demonstrated and this reflects the 
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argument that the truth of various claims is less 
important than their popular acceptance. 
The fact that, for example, early immigrants to 
Assam are argued to have adapted to Assamese culture, 
when articulated by contemporary elites, clearly 
contrasts with later migrants who are not perceived to 
have "adapted". This general construction allows the 
Assamese group to be (relatively) open. Groups which are 
seen to adopt Assamese culture and support Assamese 
elites, such as tea garden labourers, can be accepted as 
being Assamese. If these groups later appear too 
powerful, as with Bengali Muslims, then the definition of 
the Assamese community can be altered by Assamese elites 
to exclude them. 
Thus, despite a changing membership, it will be 
argued that leadership of the Assam Movement is in the 
hands of certain indigenous Assamese elites, who have the 
power to define membership through articulating specific 
myths. 
Chapter Four continues this examination of myths 
utilized by the Assam Movement but, given the 
continuities between methods of governance before and 
after Independence, begins to trace the processes which 
led to these myths being articulated in the 1980's. 
Colonial observations of the inherent traits of the 
Assamese affected Assamese self-perception and agency. 
Attempts to repudiate certain ideas, such as Assamese 
indolence, were hindered by the colonial imposition of 
structures based on the "truth" of cultural stigmas. Thus 
British impressions enforced a different distribution of 
power within the state. For example, Assamese economic 
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power was reduced through the introduction of large-scale 
immigrant labour whilst political power was reduced by 
the use of Assam as a bulwark against the Bengali 
nationalist movement. 
Chapter Five will examine the situation after 
Independence in Assam and the increasing articulation of 
cultural signifiers by Assamese elites. The emphasis on 
language as the main marker of the Assamese community 
allows economically weak migrants, who are more likely to 
adopt the language, to join the Assamese group. 
Simultaneously, those migrants who are economically 
powerful are much less likely to give up their language 
and are thus excluded. 
The focus upon the cultural difference of the 
northeast from the rest of India provides the basis for a 
particular geographical identity based upon allegiance to 
the land, rather than shared cultural traits. This 
specifically excludes Bengalis and Marwaris who are 
perceived to have an extra-territorial attachment to 
Bengal, Bangladesh or Rajasthan. Suggestions that the 
Bengalis would be accepted if they renounced their extra- 
territorial ties can be made in the knowledge that simply 
by being defined as "Bengalis" recognizes and implies 
that there is a potential extra-territorial affiliation. 
State reorganization allowed certain Assamese elites 
to assert their political hegemony within what they 
perceived to be a linguistic state. However, their 
inability to achieve economic dominance was highlighted 
by this new dichotomy. The manner of Congress Party rule 
in Assam, relying on a coalition of Bengalis, Muslims, 
tea garden workers and rural areas, supported by votes 
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from illegal immigrants with occasional sweeteners to the 
indigenous Assamese, considerably increased resentment 
towards the Congress Party. Due to the heterogeneity of 
the various constituencies, this resentment could not be 
converted into electoral success by the early Assamese 
political parties. 
Chapter Six will assess the growth of the Assam 
Movement and its development into a party political form; 
the A. G. P.. It will be argued that notions of identity 
and myth were vital to the success of this localized 
cultural movement. The simultaneous rise of the United 
Liberation Front of Assam will be attributed to the same 
causes; decades of socialization and elite emphasis on 
indigenous Assamese difference. 
Through this perspective, it will be argued that 
culture is itself political; expressions of cultural 
difference are neither "false consciousness" nor 
primordial traits. Instead, they are politically 
motivated and understandable through an assessment of 
forms of governance within the region, which have 
encouraged political claims to be made through the 
articulation of community membership. 
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Chapter One 
The Study of Ethnicity and Identity 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides the framework within which the 
thesis as a whole is located. It establishes the specific 
theoretical problem to be addressed and explains the 
methodology to be used. It then turns to specific 
literature reviews concerning, firstly, approaches to the 
study of ethnicity in general before, secondly, more 
detailed explanations of the value of examining "historic 
myths and memories" and notions of the Other in the 
specific case of Assam. The third feature to be 
addressed, the political and institutional framework of 
the Indian particular, is examined in Chapter Two, which 
reviews theories of Indian nationalism and the Indian 
state and locates these in terms of the general review 
regarding ethnicity and nationalism in this chapter. 
The initial examination of the secondary literature 
regarding ethnicity and identity will attempt to answer 
two basic questions; firstly, what is ethnicity and; 
secondly, what, if anything, distinguishes ethnicity from 
other forms of political mobilization? The approach 
taken, derived from the literature review, will be 
utilized throughout the thesis with reference to the 
Assam Movement. This will explain the method by which a 
particular name, Assam or Asamiya, has developed from a 
description of a geographical area into a representation 
of a particular ethnic category, utilized for political 
purposes, ascribing cultural values and defining 
membership of this group. 
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Section 1.2 explores the role of the other in 
identity creation, assessing a diverse but complementary 
range of material including work by Edward Said and 
Ronald Inden. From this review, it will be argued that 
without a stigmatizable other there is neither a purpose 
nor a possibility of consolidating any specific cultural 
identity. 
The second feature of identity in Assam is the 
articulation by political elites of historic "myths and 
memories". Through a study of relevant literature, 
particularly the Myth of the State by Cassirer and 
Hobsbawm and Ranger's analysis of the Invention of 
Tradition, section 1.3 will argue that without these 
signifiers it is impossible for any cultural community to 
be consolidated. Conversely, if a political movement has 
a popular purpose, the usage of forgotten events to aid 
the construction of a community is possible. 
1.1 Ethnicity, Nationalism and Identity 
Through a historical account of the development of 
thought regarding ethnicity, this section will outline 
the different conclusions reached by various theorists. 
Throughout, the focus will be on the usefulness of the 
different views in providing a generic analytical 
category. 
The relationship between ethnicity and nationalism 
is theoretically contested. Whilst some writers have 
argued that nationalism attempts to justify its existence 
through ethnic markers, others have assumed that whilst 
national identity is in some manner the "correct" form of 
allegiance, ethnicity is a bastardized, localized or 
backward version of this. This dichotomy recurs 
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throughout this thesis since the articulation of a sub- 
nationalist identity implies a failure of the national 
identity to secure acceptance. 
Theories regarding ethnicity can broadly be placed 
within three intellectual traditions, although clearly 
some approaches do not fit neatly within such a 
classification. "Traditional" anthropological accounts 
have suggested a primordial basis for ethnic attachments, 
primarily supposing a racial, genetic basis for 
difference. The second approach, loosely termed 
modernity, includes both liberal modernization theorists 
and Marxists. The shared assumption is that development, 
in whatever format it takes, will lead to a decline in 
ethnic attachments. More recent approaches to 
nationalism, although coming to different conclusions, 
can also be placed in this school. As Gellner, Anderson 
and Smith, for instance, have argued, nationalism is a 
product of modernity in Western Europe and a reaction to 
this in the post-colonial world. The third approach, 
post-modernity, criticizes the previous meta-narratives, 
arguing that identity is contextual and more localized. 
It further argues the impossibility of fact and the 
consequent importance of representation as a 
consolidating feature of identity. ' 
It is the argument of this thesis that each of these 
views has something to offer the study of identities. 
1 This categorisation of the literature is not 
original. For example, Rogers (1994) defines 
primordialist, modernist and post-orientalist schools 
whilst Manor (1996) divides the literature between 
primordialist, instrumental ist and post-modern 
approaches. 
18 
However, through description and analysis of a 
comprehensive and representative sample of theories, it 
will be argued that questions relating to the salience of 
an ethnic identity or of problems at the boundary of a 
group's membership, explicitly suggest a primordial basis 
for the group's core. When this is not the case, the term 
ethnic loses any analytical utility. 
Until relatively recently the study of ethnicity 
has, by and large, been ignored by social theorists 
outside of anthropology. As societies developed, it was 
assumed by both dominant schools, Marxism and liberalism, 
that "modern" culture would diffuse into all societies 
and that residual loyalties would be subsumed by class or 
national allegiances. 
The term ethnicity was first used in 1953 by 
American sociologist David Riesman (Eriksen 1993: 3) but 
this usage derived from earlier investigations of 
identity and particularity within the social sciences, 
particularly anthropological investigations into tribal 
and racial characteristics. The term itself derived from 
the Greek ethnos, in turn derived from ethnikos (Eriksen 
1993: 3). 
The Greek meaning implied; 
a sense of a number of people living together and 
acting together, though not necessarily belonging to 
the same clan or tribe... In other words, ethnos 
would appear to be more suited to cultural rather 
than biological or kinship differences. (A. D. Smith 
1986: 21) 
New Testament writers used the term "ethnic" to 
refer to Gentiles (A. D. Smith 1986: 21) and it was in the 
sense of heathen or pagan that it was used in English 
from the mid-fourteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. 
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Walker's dictionary of 1888 defines ethnick as "Heathen, 
Pagan, not Jewish, not Christian" and, although it began 
to refer to racial characteristics (Eriksen 1993: 4), 
even in 1933, the Oxford English Dictionary defined 
ethnic as "Heathendom, heathen superstition" (Quoted in 
D. P. Moynihan 1993: 11). 
It is largely due to the anthropological method of 
analysis that recent writings on ethnicity in the social 
sciences have generally regarded ethnicity as something 
tangibly different from nationalism. 
Whereas the Enlightenment encouraged ideas of human 
development, the early nineteenth century witnessed the 
growth of examinations of the progress of "civilisation", 
a much more Euro-centric notion. Anthropologists' 
assumptions were conditioned by ideas of; 
non-European "savages", who defined "civilisation" 
by contrast; ideas about the physical nature and 
differentiation of man, which raised the problem of 
universality, ideas about the nature of social 
order, which defined the specific content of 
civilisation. (Stocking 1987: 9) 
These factors, the expansion of colonies and the 
resulting public interest in the well-being of indigenous 
people (Burton 1992: 181), particularly in Africa, 
coupled with Darwinist notions which were easily adapted 
to provide an justification for the apparently natural 
supremacy of certain "racial" groups over others, 
established the ground rules under which early 
anthropologists worked. Their focus thus encouraged a 
static view of their subjects of investigation which were 
invariably so-called "primitive" peoples. 
Thus different groups were thought to possess 
different inherent traits. Groups could be classified 
scientifically and placed on an evolutionary scale. It 
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was this focus that guided anthropologists well into the 
twentieth century. 
The backgrounds of early practitioners of 
anthropology provide a further context to the assumptions 
made. Many early studies were initiated either by 
missionaries2 or by colonial administrators. 3 When the 
intended "modernizing" reforms of missionaries or 
officials failed, it is perhaps unsurprising that they 
characterized their subjects as both unchanging and 
unchangeable. 
These primordial traits were seen to reveal 
themselves in physical artifacts, examinations of which 
legitimized claims made regarding the group as a whole. 
Tylor, for example, wrote in 1871; 
Just as the catalogue of all the species of plants 
and animals of a district represents its Flora and 
Fauna, so the list of all the items of the general 
life of a people represent that whole which we call 
its culture. (Tylor 1920: 8) 
Furthermore, culture was accepted as a given. The 
culture of a group could be derived from its particular 
circumstances but, once classified, legitimized the 
individuals as members of a particular group with certain 
4 inherent traits. This enabled colonial powers to 
2 For example, Thomas Williams' study of Fiji in 1859 
(cited in Stocking 1987: 87-92). 
3 Numerous examples- include the investigation of 
Polynesian Mythology by Sir George Grey (cited in 
Stocking 1987: 81-87) and Mills' work on the Rengma Nagas 
(J. P. Mills 1937). 
4 The British notion of the existence of criminal 
castes, for instance. In the words of one official; 
"crime is their trade and they are born to it and must 
commit it" (Metcalf 1997: 122). 
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institutionalize these differences through granting 
political and economic rights on the basis of difference. 
Thus, even if the perceived traits were originally false, 
once imposed, the new discourse enforced them as "truth". 
Anthropologists were able to make such claims 
primarily due to their focus on the physical aspects of a 
people which assumed linkages between culture and race. 
Thus, if the Assamese were perceived as being lazy due to 
their use of opium (see section 4.2), this was presumed 
to be a racial trait. Different tribes were seen to be at 
different stages of the evolutionary scale; hunter- 
gatherers, pastoralists and so on. Not until Richard 
Burton's work in the 1880's did cultural anthropology 
start to be seen as an important part of the discipline, 
capable of taking anthropology past anthropometry, the 
crude measurement of features of individuals (Inden 1986: 
61-62), or photographing representative members of each 
tribe and classifying groups from this (Metcalf 1997: 
117). Yet ideas of preserving tribal societies remained 
within both social and cultural anthropology due to the 
general empathy gained through field work. 
Through this analysis ethnicity, in the form of 
tribalism, is tautologically seen as a pre-modern, racial 
structure, as distinct from nationalism, which is 
perceived to be a feature of modernity. Contemporary 
theorists are still unclear of links between race and 
ethnicity. Arguments have been made that race is a 
particular type of ethnicity (e. g. Van den Berghe 1983) 
or that it is one of a number of ascriptive categories 
which may, or may not, hinder group acceptance, in the 
same manner as command of a language (Eriksen 1993: 5). 
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Alternatively, Banton argues that the two are 
theoretically different; whereas race refers to the 
categorisation of people by outsiders, ethnicity refers 
to self-identification (Banton 1983: 106). 
Studies of the structures of societies allowed for a 
shift from physical anthropology but the relationship to 
change within societies was still unclear. To what extent 
were the structures of groups traditional and to what 
extent were they constructed? Writing in 1923, Kroeber, 
one of the most important figures in American 
anthropology, gives an offensive description of this 
newly discovered difference, between social and physical 
anthropology; 
To the question why a Louisiana negro is black and 
thick-lipped, the answer is ready. He was born so. 
As dogs produce pups, and lions cubs, so negro 
springs from negro and Caucasian from Caucasian. We 
call the force heredity. The same negro is lazy by 
repute, easy going at his labour. Is this too an 
innate quality? Off-hand most of us would reply: 
Yes. He sings at his corn-hoeing more frequently 
than the white man across the fence. Is this also 
because of his heredity? "Of course: he is made so, " 
might be a common answer: "Probably: why not? " a 
more cautious one. But now our negro is singing 
Suwanee River, which his great-grandfather in Africa 
assuredly did not... At these points heredity is 
displaced by tradition, nature by nurture. (Kroeber 
1923: 2-3) 
Indeed, colonial powers found it useful to 
characterize tribal ethnic groups as backward and 
unchanging. Early cultural anthropologists were torn 
between their education in the field of physical 
anthropology and their recognition that traits which 
suggested permanence were in fact newly created. 
Intrinsic differences, defined by "race", gave the 
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colonial powers a moral justification for their rule, 
preventing conflict between opposing groups and 
attempting to raise the morality of "primitive" races. 
Colonialism created a context in which perceived racial 
differences became institutionalized within political 
structures. 
It is interesting to speculate whether... with 
British control gone and its immediate memory 
forgotten, the speakers of some at least of the many 
vernaculars of the Indian Empires would not in 
due time develop a nationalism of their own in 
relation to their neighbours, especially if they 
were faced by attempts to impose a single vernacular 
as the official language or by decisions of a 
central government which seemed to impose unfair 
local disadvantages in the economic sphere. 
(R. I. I. A. 1939: 146) 
Thus the colonial powers regarded themselves as 
adjudicators between intrinsically opposed groups which, 
given the "correct" guidance, might eventually develop 
into nationhood. Early anthropological writings supported 
this assumption. That early anthropologists were 
generally in service to colonial governments was no doubt 
an important factor and Curzon for one felt that 
anthropologists were an intrinsic part of the colonial 
system, indeed, part of the "furniture of the imperial 
mind" (Hewitt 1997: xvi). 
The relationship between anthropologists and the 
colonial powers is disputed. Van den Berghe argues that 
through treating Africa as a "vast ethnographic garden of 
Eden" (quoted in Brown 1973: 174) and an implicit 
commitment to maintain the status quo, anthropologists 
legitimized colonial rule. However, a revisionist 
argument has been made arguing that anthropologists links 
with both capitalism and colonialism have been over- 
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emphasized, at least in the twentieth century. Brown 
(1973) argues that an examination of the Rhodes- 
Livingstone Institute, at which most of the Manchester 
School writers began their careers, suggests that it 
developed into a surprisingly independent centre of 
learning, despite being financed by the colonial 
government and copper companies (see also Burton 1992). 
Primordialist, racial explanations have little 
salience with regard to the Assamese case since the very 
heterogeneity of the region means that the inhabitants of 
Assam are all, to a greater or lesser extent, migrants at 
some point in the past. The indigenous Assamese, in as 
much as they exist, are, by definition, a mixture of many 
older groups. As will be demonstrated throughout the 
thesis, notions of being Assamese have been constructed 
in response to particular events and cannot be claimed to 
represent primordial sentiments. It was similar 
observations that changed the perspective of 
anthropologists throughout the twentieth century. 
The "Manchester school" of anthropologists initially 
assumed that ethnic ties would decrease as modernity 
intensified. Wilson (1941-1942), for example, examined 
the effect that urbanization, in the form of a move to 
mining barracks, was having on the villagers it was 
affecting. He argued that a process of detribalization 
was taking place. This approach gave theoretical 
justification to later modernization theorists. 
Furthermore, the acceptance that identities can change 
began the process away from ideas of primordialism. 
Conversely, the later Manchester School writers 
witnessed the persistence of tribal loyalties. Mitchell 
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(1956) examined the Kalela dance; a "cultural marker" 
unnecessary in ethnically homogenous villages. In a mixed 
urban setting, again mining barracks, it became more 
important to make one's group membership clear. Thus 
rather than detribalization, Mitchell argued that 
modernization was encouraging a process of 
retribalization. The main achievement of the Manchester 
School was that it started the trend to break away from 
the grand narrative based on modernization, implying that 
tribal ties would be replaced by allegiance to the 
nation-state and instead moved towards a system of 
personal experience through field work (Khokeid 1992). 
This major anthropological development enabled a broader 
contextual perspective to be taken in relation to 
ethnicity. 
The "Chicago School" of American anthropologists 
focused on the issue of acculturation into the society of 
the United States in the 1920's and 1930's. The questions 
raised by Robert Park and his associates related to the 
issue of how different ethnic groups remained distinctive 
over time. Park argued that an individual could attain 
many goals through his or, her ethnic ties but to advance 
through the system as a whole required "an adoption of 
the white-English speaking majority's values and ways of 
life" (Eriksen 1993: 19). 
Park's general conclusion, that identities were 
fluid, provided a further move away from primordialism, 
in regarding attachments as dynamic. However, in his 
analysis Park assumed that, although it may well take a 
few generations, individuals would eventually become 
loyal to the nationalism of the state, that is, towards 
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the U. S. A.. Thus, the developmental bias still existed, 
with the culture of the U. S. A. being perceived as more 
advanced than that from where immigrants came, primarily 
since civic allegiance was assumed to be "higher" than 
blood relationships. Older cultures were expected to 
merge into newer, "modern" cultures defined by territory 
and citizenship. Although Park's summary could certainly 
be used to explain the continuation of ethnic 
attachments, this was by no means the expected outcome; 
the ease and rapidity with which aliens, under 
existing conditions in the United States, have been 
able to assimilate themselves to the customs and 
manners of American life have enabled this country 
to swallow and digest every sort of normal human 
difference, except the purely external ones, like 
the colour of the skin. (Park 1950: 206) 
As with investigations of tribal identities, later 
anthropological works attempted to explain ethnic 
longevity and the apparent failure of acculturation. In 
1938, Hansen wrote that it is an "almost universal 
phenomenon that what the son wishes to forget the 
grandson wishes to remember" (Quoted in Petersen 1979: 
4). Hansen argued that when immigrants moved to the 
United States, the first generation still spoke their 
mother tongue and kept their native customs. The second 
generation attempted to become American, dropping old 
customs, speaking English and so forth (Hansen 1940: 93). 
The third generation, however, feel lost, having no deep 
roots in the United States, and this reawakens an 
interest in the traditions of their grandparent's mother 
country which they may indeed reinvent, based on 
assumptions of their original traditions. The use of 
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archaic terms and dialects by immigrant Norwegians 
exemplifies this (Hansen 1940: 82). 
This idea is the precursor of contemporary 
literature regarding diaspora communities. These groups 
have often constructed cultural markers based upon, but 
different from, traditions practised within their 
"homeland". As with Mitchell's work, emphasis upon 
cultural difference is only necessary to accentuate 
division from other communities. 
These early works suffer from two major failings. 
Despite recognising that identities change and are 
articulated dependent upon the context, developmental 
assumptions remain; certain identities are perceived to 
be more evolved than others. This leads to a perception 
that identities are primordial. That is, that ethnic 
identities are genealogically determined and represent 
what individuals intrinsically are. 
Thus explanations of ethnic revivalism were less 
common than expectations of ethnic "acculturation" and 
this approach was reflected in both Marxist and 
modernization theories of ethnicity. 
In some measure both cause and consequence of 
anthropological research, both dominant ideological 
discourses, Marxism and liberalism, assumed that ethnic 
attachments would fade over time. Marxist theories 
assumed that since nationalist, and thus ethnic, 
sentiments were types of false consciousness, both would 
wither as "true" class consciousness increased. The 
Communist Manifesto argues that; 
The working men have no country. We cannot take from 
them what they have not got. Since the proletariat 
must first of all acquire political supremacy, must 
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rise to be the leading class of the nation, must 
constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself 
national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the 
word. (Marx and Engels 1888: 20) 
Lenin developed this further, distinguishing between 
a short-term need for nationalist movements as an anti- 
imperial measure, and longer-term internationalism; 
If a Social-Democrat belonging to a great, 
oppressing, annexing nation, while advocating the 
amalgamation of nations in general, were to forget 
even for one moment that "his" Nicholas II, "his" 
Wilhelm, George, Poincare, etc., also stand for 
amalgamation with small nations (by means of 
annexations) ... such a Social-Democrat would be a 
ridiculous doctrinaire in theory and an abettor of 
imperialism in practice... On the other hand, a 
Social-Democrat belonging to a small nation must... 
fight against small-nation narrow-mindedness, 
insularity and aloofness, he must fight for the 
recognition of the whole and the general, for the 
subordination of the interests of the particular to 
the interests of the general. (Quoted in Stalin 
1945: 66-67) 
National affiliations were represented as 
meaningless to Marxists, since the state represents 
bourgeois interests, and an individual's "true" identity 
is class-based. 
... those who are critical of existing 
inequalities 
and who operate within the Marxian tradition tend to 
write off what people perceive as their relationship 
to each other - when not conceived in class terms - 
as of secondary importance to their "real" class 
relationships. (McAll 1990: 7) 
The nationalist movements of 1848, which 
particularly influenced Marx, were seen as part of a move 
towards a different stage of society; the move from 






This approach has affected Marxist interpretations 
of ethnic identities. As Eriksen reports, during the 
1970's; 
numerous well-researched studies were published on 
classic "plural societies"... Many of these studies 
seemed to show unequivocally that ethnic conflict 
and ethnic identity were surface phenomena which 
were ultimately determined by domestic class 
relations or by international imperialism, Few would 
argue in the same manner twenty years later. 
(Eriksen 1993: 161) 
Ethnic feelings, along with national feelings at the 
"wrong" stage of history, were seen to mask an 
individual's real attachments. For example, a member of 
the English working-class; 
feels himself a member of the ruling nation and so 
turns himself into a tool of the aristocrats and 
capitalists of his country against Ireland, thus 
strengthening their domination over himself... The 
Irishman pays him back with interest... He sees in 
the English worker at once the accomplice and the 
stupid tool of English domination in Ireland. (McAll 
1990: 73) 
Cultural factors are thus seen as part of a 
"superstructure", attempting to subvert an individual's 
true attachment to a material reality determined by class 
affiliation and relationship to the means of production. 
Gramsci explains these notions of false consciousness 
through his critique of Italian nationalism but, as 
Ranajit Guha argues; 
Unfortunately, Gramsci too occasionally falls into 
the false objectivism of believing that such a 
consciousness is mere imagination, failing to note, 
against the grain of his own thought, that such 
imaginings - encrusted, crystallized, entertained 
for a long enough time - would produce the 
"objectively" or naturally existing consciousness. 
(R. Guha 1992: 9) 
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Thus although Marxists were too dismissive of ethnic 
attachments and self-perception of identity, their 
approach enabled the deconstruction of identity creation 
to occur. Investigations of the role played by elites 
helped continue the trend traced above through which 
identities are recognized as malleable. However, those 
Marxists who have attempted to correct the failing have 
generally been unsuccessful due to the incompatibility of 
the two notions of identity. 
Liberal modernization theorists similarly assumed 
ethnic affiliations to be a part of an individual's 
traditional pre-industrial allegiances. In the free 
market there would be no place for these sentiments. Free 
movement of labour, improved communications, trades 
unions and so forth, resulting from the centrality of the 
market, would all serve to break down old ties .5 The 
earlier anthropological research provided a major 
theoretical basis for these assumptions, which were 
developed by sociologists, political scientists and 
development economists in their specific contexts. 
For example, Hechter and Levi argued that as 
migration occurred, the geographical concentration of any 
one ethnic group would be reduced and a more generic 
social order brought into being (Hechter and Levi 1979: 
5 Many proponents of the "globalization" thesis (for 
example, Hannerz 1993) return to the assumptions of 
modernization theorists, suggesting that economically 
successful individuals will be able to ply their trades 
world-wide and thus their attachment to an individual 
nation will decline, being replaced perhaps by loyalty to 
companies. However, it is recognized that those 
individuals left out of this process may well react by 
emphasising localized ethnic attachments. 
31 
266). From increased social interaction the social 
structure of the centre would diffuse into the periphery. 
Birch similarly argued that ethnic ties, residual 
loyalties from an earlier, pre-modern era, would be 
displaced by economic rationality as an individual's 
prime motivational force (Birch 1978: 325). 
In practice, neither liberal nor Marxist viewpoint 
has been proved correct. As states have "modernized", 
increased mobility and socio-economic change has often 
increased, rather than decreased, the articulation of 
ethnic identities and the resulting ethnic tensions. 
There is an obvious discrepancy in both traditional 
Marxist and modernization theories over the relationship 
between ethnic and national feelings. Marxists have 
simply seen ethnicity as a localized version of 
nationalism, both being types of false consciousness. 
Modernization theorists argued that although nationalism 
was an integral part of the world order, ethnicity was 
simply a bastardized and inferior localized version of 
this. Thus, it was assumed simultaneously that a nation 
somehow represented the natural order to which 
individuals can and should be loyal, whilst ethnic 
movements, which justify themselves using cultural 
markers in the same manner as nations, were seen as 
backward. To some extent this can be explained by the 
nature of international relations and the resulting 
dominance given to state-level politics, the intellectual 
hegemony of Marxist and liberal dogmas, as well as the 
method by which anthropological research implied links 
between non-nationalist identities and backwardness. 
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These assumptions had the effect of removing 
ethnicity from mainstream academic enquiry. It was not 
until the 1960's when it became clear that acculturation 
within individual nation-states was not occurring that 
the problems of ethnicity were examined from a number of 
perspectives. Even then, Connor noted that in a sample of 
ten classic works on integration theory; "none of the ten 
dedicates a section, chapter, or major subheading to the 
matter of ethnic diversity" (Connor 1972: 319). 
Crawford Young agreed, writing that; 
of the first wave of classic nationalism monographs, 
only the Coleman study on Nigeria (1958) directly 
addressed, in extenso, the ethnic issue. (Crawford 
Young 1986: 441) 
The failure of many post-colonial states to remove 
tribal divisions, coupled with the perpetuation, or 
apparent re-awakening, of ethnic conflict in the 
"developed" world, led -to increasing investigation and 
explanation of ethnicity. The post-colonial states were 
less prone to accept anthropological surveys of "native" 
subjects, in part due to the perceived close links 
between colonial rule and anthropological investigation. 
This led to more sociological studies, sociologists 
asking similar questions to anthropologists but with 
regard to more "advanced" societies. 
For example, Rogowski and Wasserspring attempted to 
explain ethnic resurgence through reference to ascriptive 
criteria, arguing that ethnic ties are reinforced at the 
expense of, perhaps, class, occupational or political 
allegiances; 
Increased rates of social interaction do not 
increase the "cognitive problem" uniformly; rather 
they crowd out ascriptive criteria with high costs 
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of information... There remain criteria with quite 
low costs of information... And interaction would 
have to become very hectic indeed to prevent actors 
noticing readily (and hence perhaps acting upon) 
criteria of this kind. (Rogowski and Wasserspring 
1971: 9-10) 
Another explanation for ethnic conflict is put 
forward by Horowitz. Ethnic divisions can exist in two 
fundamental forms; ranked and unranked. In ranked systems 
ethnicity coincides with social structure, giving the 
impression of obvious inequity. A patron-client 
relationship exists with the dominant ethnic group 
providing security, and receiving from the sub-ordinate 
group services, loyalty and so on (Horowitz 1985: 26). 
Horowitz uses this framework to explain the existence of 
obvious inequities in many African societies. 
Horowitz further suggests that, as modernization 
occurs, it becomes profitable for the dominant group to 
switch production towards more profitable goods, such as 
cash-crops, to the extent of failing to provide the 
requisite level of protection for the subordinate group. 
When this occurs, the latter have nothing to gain by 
accepting the protection of the dominant group (Horowitz 
1971: 236). 
Unranked systems are therefore more likely to 
survive dislocations since, within each group, there are 
opportunities for individuals to move upwards. According 
to Horowitz, when conflict does occur in unranked 
societies, it is more likely to take the form of a 
separatist revolt attempting to return to some homogenous 
past rather than a social revolution (Horowitz 1971: 
235). 
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The "ethnic competition" model (Banton 1983) 
however, suggests the opposite outcome. In unranked 
systems, individuals compete for the benefits of 
modernization. However, as these benefits are relatively 
scarce, ethnic groups become more salient as 
organizations through which benefits can be channelled 
(Nielsen 1985: 142). 
Hechter's "internal colonialism" model concerned; 
the persistence of separate ethnic identity in the 
Celtic regions of the British Isles, Wales, Scotland 
and Ireland during a century of rapid social change. 
(Hechter 1977: 11) 
Hechter's work starts from two premises. Firstly, 
that there is a "cultural division of labour", such that; 
individuals are assigned to specific types of 
occupations and other social roles on the basis of 
observable cultural traits and markers. (Hechter 
1974: 1154) 
If a culturally distinct periphery perceives itself 
as being exploited by the core, this economic difference 
can reinforce ethnic ties. Thus the subordinate group 
undergoes what Nielsen refers to as "reactive ethnicity" 
(Nielsen 1985: 133). 
Secondly, Hechter argues that; 
the spatially uneven wave of modernization over 
state territory creates relatively advanced and less 
advanced groups. As a consequence of this initial 
fortuitous advantage, there is a crystallization of 
the unequal distribution of resources and power 
between the two groups. (Hechter 1977: 9) 
Although this thesis is concerned with the manner in 
which the communities were constructed in the first 
place, the emergence, rather than the persistence, of 
ethnic identities, the internal colonialism model 
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provides an important insight into the process by which 
these existing ties can be reinforced. 
Yet, as with so many of these models, the initial 
construction of ethnicity is accepted, along with the 
fact that ethnic groups are ranked or unranked, which is 
itself a social and cultural construct liable to change, 
like the ethnic identity itself. 
Brass applies the internal colonialism model to 
South Asia and, agreeing with Hechter, argues that since 
the benefits of development are unequally distributed 
between ethnic groups, economic scarcity will reinforce 
cultural identities around differing signifiers; 
Every nationalist movement has justified its demands 
in terms of existing or anticipated oppression and 
in terms of perceived inequalities between itself 
and another group. However, the mere existence of 
inequality is not sufficient... What is required is 
unevenness in the distribution of ethnic groups in 
the division of labour in a society. (Brass 1976: 
233) 
Brass also highlights strategic issues; political 
organization, government response and the political 
environment, as affecting ethnic salience, particularly 
in terms of votes within the democratic framework. 
If it is accepted that traditions are constructed, 
based upon perceptions of older cultural markers, then 
Hechter's assumption of ancient ethnic sentiments 
persisting despite English imperialism, surely misses the 
point that Celtic ethnicity has increased due to a 
perception of internal colonialism! Indeed the internal 
colonialism argument is often used to explain why a sub- 
ordinate group rediscovers its ethnic roots, yet there is 
a strong argument that this is an entirely created 
ethnicity. Lakshmanan, for example, argues that Tamil 
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ethnicity stemmed not from any internal colonialism, but 
instead as a response to political mobilization by the 
majority Sinhalese community (Lakshmanan 1986: 9-20). 
The fundamental problem with most of these analyses 
is that although they may acknowledge that ethnicity is 
socially constructed, the explanations for its salience 
treat it as if it were a fixed attachment. Certain 
factors are seen to affect the utility of articulating an 
ethnic identity within the political structure but 
ethnicity is still seen as a residual loyalty which can 
be awakened if certain economic, political or social 
conditions prevail. An implicit assumption is that 
ethnicity is something which can be regulated, controlled 
and sanctioned within the present nation-state system, 
suggesting that it must be a permanent feature within an 
individual's make-up. 
A further intellectual development has been enabled 
by Marxist analysis, arguing that national identities are 
themselves constructed and are in no way real, allowing 
for the investigation of the relationship between these 
two "imagined" communities. 
The modernist approach argues that ethnic 
nationalism is both a necessary and unavoidable 
construction of modernity, born out of particular 
political and economic circumstances in Europe and 
utilized as a means of resistance to colonial rule in the 
developing world. As Gellner puts it; 
A man must have a nationality as he must have a nose 
and two ears; a deficiency in any of these 
particulars is not inconceivable and does from time 
to time occur, but only as a result of some 
disaster... All this seems obvious, though, alas it 
is not true. But that it should have come to seem so 
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true is indeed an aspect, or perhaps the very core 
of the problem of nationalism. Having a nation is 
not an inherent attribute of humanity, but it has 
come to appear as such. (Gellner 1983: 6) 
What is the specific relationship between 
nationalism and ethnicity? Crawford Young sums up the 
general position arguing that, although both justify 
themselves using signs and symbols, there is a 
theoretical difference; 
Both are... "imagined communities"; they are 
socially constructed ideas of common identity. The 
critical difference lies in sovereignty, or the 
claim to it; nations are, in the contemporary world, 
indissolubly associated with states - or assertion, 
through the doctrine of self-determination, to the 
right to sovereign statehood. (Crawford Young 1986: 
440) 
Giddens takes this point even further; 
A "nation", as I use the term here, only exists when 
a state has a unified administrative reach over the 
territory over which its sovereignty is claimed. 
(Giddens 1984: 116) 
Hence the terms nation and state can be used 
interchangeably, with little thought, but an ethnic group 
can only be called nationalist if it makes a claim for 
statehood. 
There are complex dynamics in the relationship 
between the two "imagined communities" but the obvious 
links are now being recognized. Hobsbawm, for example, 
argues that; "the basic characteristic of the modern 
nation and everything connected with it is its modernity" 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1990: 14). 
Nationalism is merely a form of state organization, 
developed in western Europe over the last two centuries, 
in which an individual's primary loyalty should be 
towards that state of which they are citizens, as opposed 
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to pre-modern norms in which an individual's allegiance 
is to some form of localism. Eriksen argued that a nation 
merely represents an ethnic group which has achieved 
statehood; 
Weak nations, as in Africa, fail to convince their 
members of their common destiny (very often such 
nations cannot be based on existing ethnicities but 
seek to invent it); strong nations, conversely, have 
succeeded in convincing their members that they are 
indeed "the same kind of people" - they identify 
with the nation-state. (Eriksen 1992: 220) 
Given that ethnicity is a social construct, 
nationalism is either a reflexive form of ethnicity, or 
the outcome of a previous ethnic movement. In post- 
colonial states, for example, nationalism is expressed 
both through de jure statehood and an attempted 
amalgamation of previous ethnic ties into a new identity. 
That ethnic groups which have, or aspire to have, 
statehood are regarded as in some way modern, whilst 
other ethnic attachments are regarded as traditional 
allegiances which will dissolve as modernization 
advances, is a theoretical anomaly. 
The construction of nationalism is such that it 
implies an overlapping of state boundaries and an 
individual's primary identity. Yet if a sub-nationalist 
ethnic group remained and achieved its own state, 
minority problems would not be solved. Unless all 
potential stigmatizing features are shared (language, 
race, religion and so forth) the potential for a cultural 
claim of separateness is always available. The potential 
Tamil state of northern and eastern Sri Lanka, 
constructed in opposition to the Sinhalese, for instance, 
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could face further religious ethnic conflict between 
Muslims and Buddhists. 
In distinguishing between the "origin myths" of 
France and Germany, Calhoun inadvertently highlights the 
terminological problem with ethnicity. He argues that the 
former emphasizes the role of the citizen in founding the 
French nation, whilst "Germanness" is seen as much more 
of a blood relationship. German nationalists; "have 
emphasised ethnic rather than "political" or "civic" 
criteria for inclusion in the nation" (Calhoun 1993: 
221). 
Yet ethnicity, as with nationalism, requires 
acceptance by others of an individual's group membership. 
Although an imagined blood relationship may well be part 
of this, it is in no way necessary for ethnic acceptance. 
For example, tribal groups change their membership and it 
takes time for newcomers to gain acceptance into any 
ethnic category. There is nothing more ethnic about an 
imagined blood relationship than there is about sharing 
similar civic beliefs as long as both lead to acceptance 
by other members of the group and a perception from 
outsiders that the individual is indeed a member of that 
group. 
This perhaps shows the major problem associated with 
ethnicity since it has developed into a concept that is 
more "real" than nationalism, in that it is seen to be a 
clannish, blood relationship. Yet ethnicity, like 
nationalism, requires the articulation and manipulation 
of cultural signs and symbols. 
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Anthony Smith attempts to overcome this semantic 
problem through the use of the term ethnie (Smith 1991) 
but this approach has been criticized since; 
The connotations of ethnie ("ethnic group") in 
French are sometimes uncomfortably close to obsolete 
notions of race or reifying notions of "cultures". 
(Eriksen 1993: 161) 
This trend away from primordial notions developed 
further through the post-modern critique of western 
thought. This has, in general terms, involved a revision 
of accepted interpretations through fragmentary 
perspectives. As Partha Chatterjee argues; 
By now knowledgeable people all over the world have 
become familiar with the charges levelled against 
the subject centred rationality characteristic of 
post-Enlightenment modernity. The subject-centred 
reason, we have now been told, claims for itself a 
singular universality by asserting its epistemic 
privilege over all local, plural and often 
incommensurable knowledges. (Chatterjee 1993: xi) 
The general theme of the Frankfurt school focuses 
upon the prevalence of western universalist biases and 
assumes that the original ideals of the enlightenment 
have been undermined by "technical progress". 
Post-orientalist viewpoints contend that ethnic 
identities were by no means unavoidable, instead arguing 
that colonialism; "first created and then imposed ethnic 
and cultural identities on those under its rule" (Buck 
1994: 4). 
Nationalism is thereby attacked as an intrinsically 
western development that the colonized elites had to 
utilize as a strategy to gain independence. The entire 
artificiality of any nationalist notions in the colonized 
world, coupled with the imperial powers' ability to 
divide and rule, explains much of the ethnic "revivalism" 
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of the past thirty years. The ability of "sub- 
nationalist" ethnic elites to use cultural markers 
against existing national authority is seen as a 
demonstration of the inability of nationalism, as an 
ethos, to be externally imposed. 
To this end, these viewpoints have encouraged 
subaltern studies, examining smaller, more fragmented 
movements, rather than accepting the broad "meta- 
narrative" of nationalism. Identities, as Lakshmanan 
argued, are seen to be constructed in opposition to other 
identities. Examinations of the role of the elite, 
developed from the writings of Gramsci and expanded by 
Raymond Williams, in particular, in affecting 
consciousness, have been particularly influential. 
Gramsci argued that civil society was itself 
contested, and was the outcome of the dominance of 
certain groups. Ensuring order required the hegemony of 
certain ideas; 
consciously and programmatically (as in the early 
stages of such a process of hegemonic construction) 
or increasingly as the "natural" and unreflected 
administration or reproduction of a given way of 
doing things. (Eley 1994: 324) 
Williams describes this hegemony as; 
not only the conscious system of ideas and beliefs 
but the whole lived social process as practically 
organized by specific dominant meanings and values. 
(Quoted in Eley 1994: 321) 
This focus on hegemony has been reflected in studies 
of identity. For example, Abner Cohen, arguing that 
ethnic claims are solely made for political purposes, 
argues that culture is in itself irrelevant to ethnicity. 
It is the articulation of cultural differences, which is 
constructed, that is important in terms of social 
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relationships. It is for political, rather than cultural 
purposes that cultural differences are articulated. 
This position enables him to claim that City of 
London elites may be said to be ethnic, being endogamous 
and having a shared identity (Cohen 1974b: 101). Cohen 
further claims that; 
There is ethnicity and ethnicity... I think that it 
is common sense that the collectivity that manifests 
itself in the form of an annual gathering of a few 
of its numbers to perform a dance or a ceremonial is 
different from the ethnicity manifested by, say, the 
Catholics in Northern Ireland. (Cohen 1974a: xiv) 
This is the inevitable outcome of situationalist 
arguments. Is there any purpose in using the same 
analytical term to refer to completely different 
political situations? If the difference between 
nationalism and ethnicity is the claim of the former to 
statehood, then what, if anything, is the meaning of sub- 
nationalism? 
There is a concern that assumptions of voluntarism, 
the ability to pick and choose communal allegiances, have 
gone too far. Ajit Danda argues that; 
ethnicity as a concept, without the prejudice 
ordinarily assigned to it, should not be anything 
much different from what is understood by political 
mobility. (Danda 1989: 218) 
If there is nothing inherent about ethnic 
identities, what does this mean about its use as an 
analytical category? If we are to accept any community 
which shares certain cultural values is an ethnic group, 
any descriptive use is lost. Communities may more 
accurately be described as cultural groups, a term which 
allows more easily for blurring at the boundaries of a 
community and for the integration of new members, 
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recognizing that cultural traits can be adopted to gain 
group acceptance. 
Without clarification, debates on ethnicity will 
involve different writers describing completely different 
notions. If we are to agree with Hettne, that "ethnicity 
is necessarily an elusive concept" (Hettne 1993: 125), 
then it should at least be clear under what ground-rules 
it operates. The shift of emphasis from structure to 
agency reflects the dynamic nature of identity more 
accurately, but implies that a term which derives from 
structural thinking is now obsolete. 
It is for these reasons that throughout this thesis 
the Assam Movement will be referred to as a cultural, 
rather than an ethnic movement. The Assam Movement is 
ethnic, and "Assamese" is an ethnic category, using broad 
tautological definitions of ethnicity, but it is 
primarily political. As Cohen argues, the political 
claims come first but they are articulated through 
cultural (ethnic) allegiances. That is, the cultural 
similarities which are articulated are only utilized for 
a political purpose and not for their own sake. 
This point is accepted in much of the recent 
literature regarding ethnicity but the intellectual 
tradition, or baggage perhaps, implies that ethnicity 
does require an (imagined) blood relationship, and the 
popular usage of the term reflects this. 
The major question for social theorists is how, why 
and with what effect cultural groups have been created as 
channels of political or economic patronage. Ethno- 
genesis cannot occur without some notion of what 
distinguishes an X from a Y. To this end there has to 
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have been some distinctive cultural signs and symbols and 
some other in opposition to which allegiances have been 
necessary. Over time, the internal and external depiction 
of a group reproduces itself, long after the original 
justification for this type of behaviour has passed. 
Cultural identities are available to all 
individuals. Tribes, languages, religious practices, 
territories and nations can all provide the basis for a 
claim. These identities are not primordial, nor are they 
ancient, as Smith claims, although ancient events, 
Calhoun's "origin myths" (Calhoun 1993: 221), may well be 
used to justify the existence of a particular group. If 
there is no notion of what being Assamese is, then one 
cannot belong to the Assamese group. 
Conversely, if there are no benefits, whether 
economic, social or political, to an individual by being 
Assamese, and acting in ways that validate their 
Assameseness, 6 then the group will lose its political 
salience. This is neither a short-term voluntarism nor a 
long-term primordialism, but an ever-present political 
process. The necessary element of negotiation within the 
process demonstrates the utility of the post-modern 
approach; unlike nationalism, ethnicity is not a feature 
of modernity, since the desire to live in a community has 
ever been a source of strength and, by definition, 
division, for individuals. As Worsley argues; 
6 Moerman, examining the Lue, was unable to find any 
cultural distinctions between the Lue and their 
neighbours. He concluded that "someone is a Lue by virtue 
of believing and calling himself Lue and of acting in 
ways that validate his Lueness" (Moerman 1965: 1222). 
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Cultural traits are not absolutes or simply 
intellectual categories, but are invoked to provide 
identities which legitimize claims to rights. They 
are strategies or weapons in competitions over 
scarce social goods. What is mistakenly often seen 
as tradition - attachment to the past as a value in 
itself - is better viewed as a way of maintaining 
title to power, wealth and status in the present. 
(Worsley 1984: 249) 
This is neither Hansen's quest for nostalgia, nor 
Hechter's internal colonialism, but a more generic self- 
evident truth; that individuals will utilize whichever 
identity they are able to, and in which they are 
accepted, to protect themselves from unwanted and 
perceived harmful change. If elites are able to persuade 
individuals that through articulating an Assamese 
identity they will benefit in some way, the likelihood of 
individuals articulating this identity will increase. As 
will be demonstrated throughout this thesis, specific 
conceptions of being Assamese have only led to political 
power if enough marginal members have joined this 
community. 
1.2 The Other 
The most important development in theories regarding 
identity is the shift in belief from thinking that 
identities are inherent, and as such can be reduced to 
some essence, to the idea that they are contextual and 
thereby constructed in opposition to other groups. This 
idea, articulated by Mitchell in 1956, is now accepted, 
whether or not one believes that identities are 
primordial or constructed. Even if identities are thought 
to be inherent, their articulation arises due to a 
relationship with a different group. 
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Although the focus of much of the work on ethnicity 
has suggested that it is the salience of an existing 
ethnic identity which increases due to an iniquitous 
relationship with another group, more theorists, such as 
Lakshmanan, now argue that it is a newly constructed 
identity constructed around cultural markers in response 
to a stigmatized and classifiable Other. As Kaviraj 
argues; 
Any conception of community is based on an idea of 
identity, which is predicated in turn on some 
conception of difference. (Kaviraj 1992: 20) 
Throughout this thesis concepts of Assamese identity 
will be examined with reference to the dominant Other 
against which it has been constructed. This Other has 
varied between the British, Bengalis in general, Bengali 
Hindus, Bengali Muslims, Muslims in general and 
indigenous tribals. The construction of an Assamese 
identity in opposition to different groups can be 
attributed to the articulation of different myths, a 
changing external environment and internal aims. 
This section will briefly trace the origins of this 
school of thought, before turning to the more direct 
implications in the study of South Asia. The application 
of notions of the Other developed through Edward Said's 
work when examining the discourse of colonial powers. 
Many scholars have particularly applied this in a South 
Asian context, analyzing the British construction of 
communities. This implies that constructed groups can 
themselves construct interpretations of each other, in 
part based on British conceptions and reinforced through 





It is often implicitly assumed that through the 
portrayal of a group as possessing certain inherent 
traits these will become self-perpetuating. Waldron 
(1990) uses the example of the Great Wall of China to 
demonstrate the manner in which a feature originally 
regarded only by western observers as a defining 
characteristic of China, eventually became recognized as 
such by the Chinese themselves. Theoretically, the 
ascription of cultural values in the same manner as 
physical artifacts would seem a compatible extension of 
Waldron's original argument. 
The effects of being classified by an Other are 
dependent upon the power relationship with the different 
group. As Waldron suggests, it can lead to an adoption of 
the trait by the group to define themselves. For example, 
the notion of the Gurkhas as a martial race, discussed 
below, may or may not have been internalized by the 
Gurkhas but through the institutionalization of army 
recruitment the idea became, in this case, willingly 
accepted. The same argument could be made regarding the 
over-representation of upper-caste Bengalis in the Indian 
Civil Service. 
Alternatively, many of the British assumptions about 
groups were highly derogatory; 
Gujars, for instance, were described as "given to 
indiscriminate plunder in times of disturbance", 
while Banjaras had "a reputation for perfect 
honesty". (Consistency, however, was always elusive. 
for the Banjaras were later classified as a 
"criminal" tribe. ) (Metcalf 1997: 119) 
The denial of these claims, by the groups 
themselves, may lead to the construction of alternative 
myths, and Chapter Four demonstrates the different 
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approaches taken by the present-day Assamese in response 
to claims made by the British. The problem with this 
approach, particularly under colonial rule, was that 
governance and administration were organized around the 
"fact" that the group possessed whichever trait. Thus, 
for example, the Bengalis were privileged with regard to 
positions in the Indian Civil Service, Sikhs and Gurkhas 
with regard to opportunities in the Indian Army, and 
Marwaris as traders. 
These first two scenarios both assume that the group 
classifying is in a position of power with regards to the 
group being classified. Thus British claims regarding the 
cultural attributes of groups could be accepted or denied 
but the ability of, for example, the Assamese, to deny 
the right of the British to classify them was negligible. 
Indeed, the fact that the Assamese were classified at 
all, however disdainfully, gave certain rights to the 
elite of that group, given the British attempt to deal 
with the leaders of each community. ' 
Foucault argued that the ability to classify is in itself 
a manifestation of power; 
There is no power relation without a correlative 
body of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power 
relations. (Foucault 1977: 27) 
Once this initial classification has taken place, 
these traits become internalized, whether accepted or 
rejected. However, this affects the perception of the 
Although, as Bayly has argued, British policies did 
much to alter, or at least speed up, changes which were 
already occurring amongst the elite (Bayly 1990: 150- 
155). 
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groups by other, politically more equal, groups. Thus 
Bengalis, for example, began to perceive Assam as a land 
of opportunity in part because the Assamese were thought 
to be indolent. In turn the Assamese and Bengalis 
constructed more virulent stereotypes of each other based 
on the earlier British constructs and assumptions. In 
this third situation then, the power relationship between 
groups to make claims is less clear-cut and the 
expectation is that each will attempt to gain the 
necessary political power to validate their claims. 
Said's investigation of Orientalism provided a major 
development in the studies of non-western communities. 
Said argues that Orientalism "suggests both an enduring 
Oriental reality and an opposing but no less enduring 
Western essence" (Said 1995: 333). Said argues that the 
construction of the "Orient" and the West in opposition, 
with pre-eminence given to the western construction of 
the "Orient", created false dichotomies and masked 
localized differences. 
Said's work raises a fundamental issue regarding 
how, if at all, one can "know" the Other. Said opposes 
the idea that only self-representation is possible 
although he accepts that the emphasis on the local and 
fragmentary are in danger of; 
slipping into a kind of "possessive exclusivism" 
which holds that the only valid kind of 
representation is the self-representation of 
insiders. (O'Hanlon and Washbrook 1992: 157) 
As Turner argues, "deconstruction as a technique 
merely identified the problems of representation without 
offering many solutions" (Turner 1994: 6). 
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One of the first applications of this type of 
analysis in the South Asian context is Inden's Imagining 
India, derived in part from Orientalism, which argues 
that the study of India has attempted to emphasize 
essential notions, in particular caste, at the expense of 
human agency. Furthermore; 
[The Indological text) functions to depict the 
thoughts and institutions of Indians as distortions 
of normal and natural (that is, Western) thoughts 
and institutions. it represents them as 
manifestations of an alien mentality. (Inden 1986: 
411) 
The deconstruction of these essences demonstrates 
that the effect of human agency is as important in India 
as in the West, but that assumptions and stereotypes 
distort, rather than enlighten, academic discussion. The 
problem with this deconstructive approach is how to 
replace the gaps created, and Inden's "reconstructions", 
in part based upon the reports of Arab travellers (Inden 
1992: 213-217), lays open to the same charge as that made 
against Said and the Subaltern Studies school (see 
section 2.2); 
One is tempted to ask whether his own imagination is 
any less suspect than those he castigates, or indeed 
whether he is not indulging in a kind of inverted 
intellectualism by privileging medieval travelogues 
over the voluminous administrator scholarship of the 
British and... later generations. (Quigley 1991: 
405) 
Other research has examined more specific case- 
studies. Caplan argues that the stress on difference, 
that is usual in orientalist discourse, is lacking in 
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descriptions of the Gurkhas. Characterisations of their 
bravery and loyalty were justified through their 
possession of British traits; honesty, doggedness, a good 
sense of humour and independence, for example (Caplan 
1991: 591) . In this 
instance, representations of the 
Other are actually more concerned with representations of 
the self, or alternatively, of justifying, and thereby 
constructing, differences between Gurkhas and other 
Indians. 
Peers' investigation of the notion of martial races 
explains why the British perceived of the Bengalis as 
being a non-martial race. This idea was used to explain 
the decline of the Army of the Bengal Presidency from 
being one of the linchpins of British control. Peer's 
argues that the categorisation derived from strategic 
factors, particularly the poor performances in the 
Burmese Wars which were actually due to poor (British) 
leadership. However the notion that the Bengalis were not 
a martial race survived substantially intact until the 
1971 Bangladesh War. Again, it seems clear that these 
representations of the Other owe more to notions and 
conceptions of self, rather than any comprehension of the 
Other, yet through their imposition they become accepted 
as truth. 
The control the British held over communities in 
India enabled them to represent themselves as the epitome 
of a successful people and this became justified through 
reference both to the Roman Empire, of which the British 
thought themselves the true descendants (Metcalf 1997: 2- 
3) and through growing reference to racial superiority 
(Metcalf 1997: 55). This engrained Darwinian notion 
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allowed groups to be described only through British 
characteristics; when a people possessed "good" 
characteristics it was due to their sharing certain 
British traits, when these were absent, in, for example, 
the "criminal castes", this was due to their lack of 
British virtues. As Inden argues (Inden 1992: 23) this 
feature of colonial rule removed the ability for agency 
from the actions of Indian subjects. 
For example, the Gurkhas may have been similar to 
the British but there is no way in which they were, or 
could ever be, British. The portrayal of Assam reflects 
this paradox. The Assamese laziness is seen more as 
schoolboy waywardness, due to their adoption of 
Brahminism and other corrupting influences, than anything 
inherent, although the damage done by this was too much 
for the British to be expected to remedy. 
The ambiguities of anthropological practice and the 
use of these constructs by the colonial power, resulted 
in some traits becoming accepted in popular perception. 
The colonial powers were able to enforce their 
perceptions through the creation of structures suited to 
the groups, as they were perceived. In the Assamese case, 
this led to the encouragement of migration from Bengal, 
thereby reinforcing the original claims. Through these 
perceptions, which perhaps demonstrate more about the 
British colonial officers than the indigenous groups, 
forms of governance, economic rights and political power 
were allocated, and strictures put in place which have 
remained, perpetuating the earlier myths. 
Through the genealogy presented in this thesis, the 
role of differing Others will be examined, with an 
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implicit assumption that much of what is said by members 
of the Assamese community regarding Bengalis, reflects as 
much on the speakers' view of the Assamese community as 
the Bengali. 
1.3 Myths and Memories 
The belief that a shared history is necessary, if 
insufficient, for the consolidation of an ethnic identity 
is well-established (for example, Smith 1991: 21, Calhoun 
1993: 221). Furthermore, the work of Hobsbawm and Ranger 
(1996) has led to a conventional acceptance that these 
traditions are constructed. 
However, despite countless examples in practice, 
there are few theoretical explanations of the 
interpretation of history as a tool, rather than as a 
mirror reflecting reality. Foucault explains the creation 
of myths by arguing that control of a discourse empowers 
elites; 
The exercise of power in society thus presupposes 
new forms of scientific discourse through which 
deviant and marginal groups are defined and 
controlled. (Turner 1994: 20-21) 
Foucault's critique of scientific knowledge implies 
that non-scientific myth similarly represents a power- 
relationship. However, the best account of the acceptance 
of these myths is still provided by Ernst Cassirer 
(1946). 
Cassirer argues that simple "primeval stupidity" 
(Cassirer 1946: 4) is an unsatisfactory explanation of 
the prevalence of myths which apparently oppose Western 
scientific logic. Instead, he argues that the desire of 
peoples to classify their surroundings; 
express the same desire of human nature to come to 
terms with reality, to live in an ordered universe, 
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and to overcome the chaotic state in which things 
and thoughts have not yet assumed a definite shape 
and structure. (Cassirer 1946: 15) 
Cassirer argues that this use of myth achieved its 
highest pinnacle under the Nazi Party in Germany. The use 
of language "to produce certain effects and stir up 
certain emotions" (Cassirer 1946: 283) and the 
articulation of the future as scientifically ordained 
(Cassirer 1946: 283), enabled the use of "primitive" 
myths to be believed in a "civilized" society. The actual 
myths used were well established; "Carlyle's theory of 
hero worship and Gobineau's thesis of the fundamental 
moral and intellectual diversity of races" (Cassirer 
1946: 277). Equally important was the internal political 
environment in Germany after World War One which was 
fundamentally different to that which had preceded. 
The international, the social, and the human 
conflicts became more and more intense. They were 
felt everywhere. But in England, France and North 
America there remained some prospect of solving 
these conflicts by ordinary and normal means. In 
Germany however the case was different... The 
leaders of the Weimar Republic had done their best 
to cope with these problems by diplomatic 
transactions or legislative measures. But all their 
efforts seemed to have been in vain. In the times of 
inflation and unemployment Germany's whole social 
and economic system was threatened with a complete 
collapse. The normal resources seemed to have been 
exhausted. This was the natural soil upon which the 
political myths could grow up and in which they 
found ample nourishment. (Cassirer 1946: 277-278) 
The use of myth by the Assam Movement, although not 
suggesting scientific inevitability, has similarly relied 
on the use of well-established myths and has flourished 
in a not dissimilar environment to that of inter-war 
Germany. For example, the articulation of the role of 
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Lachit Barphukan at the Battle of Saraighat (see section 
3.2) bears resemblance with the Nazi Teutonic knights, 
both in revisiting past grandeur, and in suggesting what 
can be achieved if the "nation" acts together with a 
singular purpose. The belief that economic stagnation is 
due to some economically powerful outside group exists in 
both Assam (Bengali Hindus, Marwaris) and existed in 
inter-war Germany (Jews). 
Cassirer's work has provided the basis for further 
studies of the construction and use of myth, of which the 
Invention of Tradition is perhaps most useful and 
relevant. Hobsbawm and Ranger's work (1983) provides a 
deconstruction of certain "ancient" traditions, 
demonstrating that they are in reality relatively recent 
inventions. Cohn, in his assessment of British rule in 
India, argues that both the Imperial Assemblage (durbar) 
of 1877 and Gandhi's request, during the First Non- 
Cooperation Movement, for all Indians to return honours 
granted them by the British, exemplify the importance to 
the British of legitimizing their rule through reference 
to ancient power structures and to Gandhi of creating and 
representing "new codes of conduct based on a radically 
different theory of authority" (Cohn 1983: 209). 
That British interpretations of past governance 
might be, at best, inaccurate, was irrelevant once, 
through their political control, they could articulate 
their own representation of history. Gandhi, conversely, 
attempted to deny British legitimacy through reinventing 
indigenous power structures. 
This use of myth by British and Indian elites is 
able to "pervade the whole of man's cultural and social 
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life" (Cassirer 1946: 298) in part because human nature 
wishes to explain its environment. Equally importantly, 
the acceptance of certain myths as explanatory of 
societies has implications for governance. In Cohn's 
example, those tangible and intangible parts of culture 
the British attributed to India, durbars (tangible) and 
deference (intangible), led to an emphasis on the former 
to ensure the latter. Even though the original trait may 
have been misconstrued, through the establishment of 
certain concrete methods of rule, it will eventually be 
created. 
Although the Assam Movement articulates many ideas 
which date back hundreds of years, many of these myths 
have only been used as signifiers for an Assamese group 
for a much shorter space of time. It is the use of these 
traditions in a political context which is important in 
examining the consolidation of a particular Assamese 
group by the contemporary Assam Movement. 
Anthropologists, through tracing folklore and 
customs, have often highlighted those specific myths 
important to group identity. But the use and content of 
these myths itself implies vital information as to the 
recommended behaviour of the group. For example, Datta 
has argued that many tribal origin myths in northeast 
India do not solely relate to one particular tribe but 
instead explain a relationship with neighbouring tribes 
and with the plains Assamese (Datta 1994: 27-29). Thus 
the tribals' environment is implicitly recognized to be 
part of a relationship with other groups. 
The importance of myth in a south Asian context is 
particularly reflected in the debate regarding pre- 
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colonial communal tension. If it existed in a similar 
form to that which exists contemporarily (Bayly 1985), 
then any degree of human agency, that human beings 
"derive their meaning from the political, economic, 
social and intellectual circumstances in which they are 
placed" (Pandey 1990: 15) is lost. Thus control of the 
discourse, even by "impartial" academics, is a vital part 
of the political process. 
The criticisms made by the Subaltern Studies school 
of the dominant nationalist historiography of south Asia 
(see section 2.2) have led to major reinterpretations of 
the nationalist movement. However, the post-modern 
emphasis on representation rather than truth has meant 
that attempts to prove the construction of myth are much 
easier that establishing fact. That is, it is much easier 
to deconstruct than reconstruct. Attempts to reconstruct 
have led to criticisms that equally invalid new essences 
are being created (for example, Quigley 1991 criticizes 
Inden 1990, O'Hanlon 1988 criticizes Subaltern Studies). 
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Chapter Two 
The Institutional Framework of the Indian State 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter will argue that the nature of governance in 
the post-Independence Indian state tends to give 
prominence to cultural or communal groups at the expense 
of individuals, as implied by the dominant secular, 
liberal, Nehruvian discourse. Despite this overtly 
secular ideology, the Indian state, as it developed since 
Independence, is also the product of certain "subaltern" 
discourses. Through providing a number of rights on the 
basis of community membership, the Indian state 
encourages this form of political organization, rather 
than individual notions of citizenship, for subsequent 
demands. 
It will be argued that the response of Assamese 
elites to economic and political problems was influenced 
by the prevailing form of governance which was perceived 
to implicitly encourage the construction of a specific 
cultural identity. Thus the self-identification of the 
supporters of the Assam Movement has been constructed 
retrospectively. That is, certain, generally higher 
caste, Assamese-speakers developed a specific conception 
of "their" community through reference to historic events 
and political developments to enforce a particular 
hegemony over the conception of being Assamese. 
The manner by which this was achieved relates to the 
general mode of governance within the Indian state. The 
perception that certain social rights were removed from 
political control led to the development of an arena of 
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public space in which new sub-nationalist identities 
could attract support, given the liberal ideology which 
tried to recognize division in an attempt to reduce 
cleavages in the longer-term. As Jalal argues; 
The Janus-faced stance of the Indian political 
centre - formally secular in orientation while 
increasingly relying surreptitiously on communal 
ideologies - in order to claim national legitimacy 
in the face of narrowing regional bases of support 
has imparted an important dimension to movements of 
regional dissidence not only in the Punjab but also 
in Assam and Kashmir. (Jalal 1995: 228) 
It is the argument of this thesis that this 
"surreptitious" use of communal ideologies occurs not 
only when support is mobilized within the democratic 
process but is built into much resource allocation within 
the Indian state and, particularly, between the centre 
and the states. 
The chapter begins with an assessment of the Indian 
nationalist movement and the liberal, secular, Indian 
state, as envisaged by Nehru and as propagated by the 
1950 Constitution. The Nehruvian nation-building project 
attempted to create an inclusive Indian identity in a 
state in which divisions had been created, consolidated 
and enforced by the previous method of governance. The 
nation-building project, as perceived in the post- 
colonial world, was seen to require, firstly, an a priori 
basis for the state, that is some historical linkages to 
justify the nation and, secondly, a supposition that the 
de jure existence of an independent state would itself 
compound these sentiments. 
This section will also examine certain features of 
the 1950 Constitution which apparently appear to dilute 
the original liberal/secular tenets. In particular, the 
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expected and actual development of communal personal 
laws. These contradictions will be assessed in terms of 
the prevailing ideology, under which it was perceived 
that removing, for example, social religious practices 
from "political" discussion would consolidate notions of 
unity through diversity, upon which Indian statehood was 
to be based. 
The chapter then turns to critiques of the Nehruvian 
model, both in theory, with regards to notions of 
secularism, and in practice, suggesting that the 
implementation of various policies constituted a trend 
away from, rather than towards, the original 
ideal. 
The theoretical criticisms relate to the suitability 
of the Nehruvian version of nationalism to the Indian 
particular. Other forms of nationalist thought existed 
which implied a departure from the liberal model (for 
example, Subhas Chandra Bose) or a re-conception of the 
meaning of secularism within Hindu society (for example, 
M. S. Golwalkarl). The existence of these divisions 
suggests that although the Nehruvian model triumphed, the 
nationalist movement was by no means monolithic. Marxists 
(for example, M. N. Roy2), although supporting the secular 
liberal ideal, believed that religious affiliations 
prevented its existence in practice. Brass and Washbrook 
1 The second leader of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 
(National Volunteer Corps) (R. S. S. ). 
2 Until he was expelled from the Comintern in 1929, 
Roy was a prominent Communist leader. "Thereafter Roy 
launched out on an intellectual quest which ultimately 
led him to his own synthesis of materialism and liberal 
humanism" (D. E. Smith 1963: 156). 
61 
have been accused of similarly underplaying the effect of 
human agency (Hardiman 1982) by arguing that the 
"faction" provides a useful analytical category with 
which to examine the workings of the Indian state. Others 
argue that the liberal/authoritarian dichotomy of the 
Indian state is insufficient and ignores other important 
actors within the Indian polity, such as the state as a 
"self determining third actor" (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987: 
400), or the entrenchment of certain pre-Independence 
elites particularly within the civil service and in the 
large public sector (Frankel 1978). 
The argument of the Subaltern Studies school, that 
the dominant retrospective nationalist historiography 
ignored localized subaltern anti-colonial movements, is 
of particular relevance to the Assamese case, given the 
peripheral involvement of Assam with the mainstream 
nationalist movement. This position recognizes the 
difficulties of imposing a top-down nation-building 
project. The accepted notion that nationalism arose from 
specific spatial and temporal conditions, namely, 
industrialization and modernity within the West, implies 
an unsuitability for the nationalist project within the 
post-colonial world and perhaps the falseness of the 
Nehruvian ideal. 
Kaviraj makes a broader claim regarding state and 
society in India. Western theories of the state require 
linkages between "impersonal governance" and society and 
assume that the state can only exist within a "civil 
society". However, Kaviraj argues that; 
to analyze the relationship between state and 
society in India, it could be argued, is impossible 
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because they do not exist in India. (Kaviraj 1991: 
72) 
The third section will elaborate on the previous 
arguments, through an assessment of a sample of policy 
developments after 1950; personal law and the Shah Bano 
case, the Fifty-Third Amendment and state reorganization. 
Over time, communal rights appear to have increased, 
rather than declined. These policies can be located 
within the nationalist movement itself and the resulting 
Congress Party hegemony, empowering elites at the expense 
of a homogenized citizenry. State reorganization proved 
to be a vital part of the development of a chauvinistic 
high-caste Assamese identity in the late 1970's (for 
specific details see section 5.2). Again, the theoretical 
premise behind the move was to modernize administration 
and reduce feelings of difference but the effect proved 
to be the reverse, strengthening linguistic and 
geographical identities at the expense of a homogenous 
Indian identity. 
The fourth section presents case studies of the two 
most important features of this trend, at least in regard 
to the Assamese case; reservations policy (reserving 
opportunities for certain specified backward groups) and 
the Sixth Schedule. Just as state reorganization was 
expected to reduce linguistic cleavages, so reservations 
and the Sixth Schedule were expected to reduce caste and 
tribal divisions, through empowering these groups to 
raise themselves politically and economically and 
overcome long-term discrimination. In the short-term 
however, the effect was to enhance, rather than reduce, 
these "primordial" differences. 
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Throughout this thesis it will be argued that the 
power of the high-caste Assamese, whether in terms of 
social influence, economic power or political control, 
has been eroded since the onset of British rule. These 
two policies directly removed some economic power, 
through reservations, and political and social influence 
over the tribal areas under the Sixth Schedule (for 
further discussion of the tribal relationship with the 
Assamese, see sections 3.4 and 5.2). 
2.1 The Indian National Congress and the Indian 
Constitution 
The development of the Indian polity can be traced 
through an assessment of the preceding nationalist 
movement, the leaders of which institutionalized 
particular western concepts of secularism and liberalism 
as the hegemonic discourse upon which nationalism was to 
be based. The adoption of this language is important as 
its suppositions have dominated elite thinking, 
particularly in the dominant Congress Party and the 
bureaucracy, since Independence. 
Before examining the specifics of this discourse and 
its implementation in the 1950 Constitution, the question 
arises as to why it was western, rather than indigenous, 
ideas which provided the dominant discourse of the Indian 
nationalist elite. The answers stem from the same source; 
British intellectual and political power. Thus, the usage 
of certain ideas was either caused by, or was adopted in 
response to, British control. That it was a direct cause 
64 
can be seen by the educational background of the Indian 
elite, particularly the Indian National Congress. 3 
Indirectly, and more importantly, is the manner in 
which British rule, vaguely predicated on assumptions of 
home-rule and self-determination, required nationalist 
elites to respond using the discourse of nationalism 
(Flint 1983: 391-2). Adopting more "indigenous" ideas 
would lead to claims by the British that Indian elites 
were not yet ready for self-government. As Said argues, 
the colonial power was able to enforce its view of 
political development, as scientific truth on the 
colonized. Thus that Nehru believed that "primordial" 
forces could be -countered by western secularism is 
undoubted but the point is that he had no choice in this, 
were he to gain independence. Indeed, British rule 
privileged Nehru's position within the nationalist 
movement at the expense of more fragmentary religious or 
radical anti-British voices. 
That the Subaltern Studies critique of this elitist 
historiography did not arise in the first generation 
after Independence suggests the hegemony both of the 
Nehruvian model and simultaneously of the Congress Party. 
After Independence, the relationship between the Congress 
Party and the nationalist movement led to a situation in 
which criticisms of the Congress Party implicitly 
suggested support for colonial rule, the leaders of the 
3The founding generation of which consisted primarily 
of western educated lawyers, journalists and other 
modern professionals familiar with the evolution of 
constitutional government in the British metropolis 
and in the white settler colonies. (Moulton 1988: 
22) 
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Independence struggle generally being synonymous with the 
leaders of the Indian National Congress. 
The Indian Constitution of 1950 can be seen as an 
outcome of the varying, and at times contradictory, 
themes of the 1935 Government of India Act, the 
nationalist movement and the legacy of partition. But if 
the outcome was ambiguous, it is the ideas of secularism 
and liberalism that most clearly underpin the whole. 
The Government of India Act provided 250 out of 395 
Acts in whole or part of the Indian Constitution and 
continued the trend, initiated by the Simon Commission 
and the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, of creating a 
liberal, Westminster style parliamentary system. Yet, as 
Jalal argues, in practice; 
the very bureaucratic "steel frame" of the British 
Raj that had been the bete noire of Indian 
nationalists, was adapted to serve as the 
constituent framework... the bureaucratic 
authoritarianism inherent in the colonial state 
structure remained largely intact. (Jalal 1995: 18) 
That this was so can be placed in the context of the 
upheaval of partition and the structure of the 
nationalist movement. The use by the Indian National 
Congress of regional power bases and its need to present 
itself as representative of the whole of India encouraged 
the creation of a composite nationalism, conducive to the 
federal system suggested by the British reforms but held 
back by the strong residual powers held by the Viceroy. 
Partition and the resulting communal tensions, the need 
to incorporate the Princely states into Independent India 
and a belief that a strong state would encourage economic 
development (Hewitt 1987: 76) led to a more whole-hearted 
adoption of the tried and tested colonial system as 
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against other models (see section 2.3). Thus both the 
strong centralizing powers, held by the President, and 
the "steel frame" of the Indian Civil Service, 4 remained. 
This centralizing tendency recurs, not just with 
regard to Presidential powers vis-a-vis state/centre 
relations, but in the actual location of central power. 
That is, the primacy given to Parliament, and more 
specifically to the Cabinet. Despite this, there was a 
liberal separation of powers, in part between centre and 
states but, primarily, at the centre between Parliament, 
the President and the Supreme Court, underpinned by a 
Bill of Rights, the last elements deriving from Western 
constitutional practice. 
The preamble to the Indian Constitution defines 
India as a "Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic 
Republic". 5 The constitution guarantees fundamental rights 
to its citizens and contains directive principles, 
outlining the manner in which India was expected to 
develop. These, however, are only guidelines and cannot 
be enforced. 
At the apex of the liberal model lies the concept of 
individual citizenship, gained through birth rather than 
by religion and thereby a primary allegiance to the 
nation-state, rather than any religious authority. This 
system of rule envisages the government as a neutral 
4 Renamed the Indian Administrative Service after 
Independence. 
5 Amended by the Forty-Second Amendment of 1977 to 
"Sovereign Democratic Republic". 
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umpire protecting the rights of individual citizens and 
thus assumes a clear distinction between the secular and 
the religious, despite the manner in which pre-colonial 
rulers in India, whether Hindu or Moghul, had arbitrated 
in caste disputes. 
The East India Company and the British Government 
guaranteed to continue "all the rights, privileges, and 
immunities which had been enjoyed under the previous 
Hindu or Muslim ruler" (D. E. Smith 1963: 72). Quigley 
argues that political legitimacy was given to the 
resolution of caste disputes under colonial rule. 
Although the British did not directly intervene in caste 
disputes, considering this to be the preserve of priests, 
arguments were generally resolved by civil servants who 
were, in the main, Brahmins by caste (Quigley 1993: 124- 
125). 6 This inevitably involved the British in the 
"traditional" kshatriya principles of kingship. 7 
Within the post-Independence Indian state, attempts 
to raise backward groups through, for example, 
reservations policies were expected to be withdrawn after 
an initial ten year period, as institutionalized 
inequalities were removed. This would occur both through 
6 Cohn supports this approach through reference to the 
first census (in 1871) which attempted to categorize 
Indian subjects within the four varnas or as Outcasts or 
Aborigines. Any disputes were to be resolved through 
reference to a list made by; "the outstanding Indian 
Sanskrit scholar of the time" (Cohn 1988: 245). 
See Quigley (1993) for a revisionist interpretation 
of the caste system, basing it upon Hocart's notions of 
Kingship rather than Dumont's purity. 
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political incentives and, more generally, economic 
advancement, based upon a socialist scientific model. 
Nehru's views on backwardness, as well as religion, 
conform to the ideas of modernization theorists assuming 
that, being the natural world order, allegiance to 
nations would, over time, replace what was seen as 
primordial attractions to tribe, caste or ethnic group. 
Nehru's "secular modernist construct" (Inden 1990: 192) 
of Hinduism was based upon western ideas regarding the 
separation of Church and state and a resulting divergence 
between public and private spheres. Religion in India was 
held to be synonymous with "social backwardness, gross 
superstition and fanaticism" (D. E. Smith 1963: 152). 
Jawaharlal Nehru's secularism rested on the notion 
that religion is an erroneous view of the cosmos 
that will yield to more rational understanding as 
scientific thinking and economic growth advance. 
(Madan 1987: 747) 
But although Nehru's personal philosophy was 
completely secular, he was not intrinsically opposed to 
religion. His vision of India was one in which the 
religious and the non-religious would equally be able to 
achieve their aims. Thus, secularism in the Indian 
context was simultaneously argued to be a positive 
indigenous attitude, based upon Hindu notions of 
tolerance, as well as on the more neutral western 
concepts of equalitarianism, the separation of church and 
state and the primacy of the latter. Radhakrishnan8 argued 
in 1955 that; 
Secularism here does not mean irreligion or atheism 
or even stress on material comforts. It proclaims 
8 Hindu philosopher, Ambassador to Moscow and later 
President of India from 1962 to 1967. 
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that it lays stress on the universality of spiritual 
values that may be attained by a variety of ways. 
(Quoted in D. E. Smith 1963: 147) 
Thus all religions are true and enable an 
individual's personal spiritual realization. The Indian 
Constitution therefore expounded a positive version of 
secularism, supporting all faiths, rather than negating 
their importance. 
The assumption that Indian nationalism could be 
inclusive to many different communities, based on 
territorial boundaries and administrative apparatus, 
rather than on notions of Hindu society, is often 
contradicted in the Constitution. Despite the overtly 
secular ideology, there are many features of the Indian 
Constitution which imply social benefits to group 
membership. 
The debate regarding cow protection is one example 
of the articulation of the Hindu/Indian dichotomy, 
whereby religious affiliations are justified through a 
secular discourse. 9 Article 48 of the Constitution, one of 
the Directive Principles, states that; 
The state shall endeavour to organize agriculture 
and animal husbandry` on modern and scientific lines 
and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving 
and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the 
slaughter, of cows and calves and other milch and 
draught cattle. (The Constitution of India: Article 
48) 
During the Constitutional Assembly debates, Mohammed 
Saadulla, Muslim League Chief Minister of Assam until 
9 And also perhaps of the role of myth: There is 
"absolutely no Vedic authority" for the sanctity of the 
cow, this belief stemming from the Mahabharata, in the 
fourth century A. D. (D. E. Smith 1963: 484). 
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1946, argued that he would have no objection to cow 
protection being contained in the constitution if its 
proponents admitted that the basis was religious, rather 
than economic (D. E. Smith 1963: 485). That religion was 
clearly the basis for this Directive Principle is clear, 
yet its articulation through economic rationality implies 
perhaps that, even at the conception of the Indian state, 
the secular, democratic discourse was being used by 
default to promote the interests of the Hindu majority. 
The division between public and private spheres was 
adopted by the westernized elite as a necessity for 
India's secularism. Yet in large part, this was a 
response to British attitudes which, in an attempt to 
comprehend Hinduism, focused upon features comparable to 
Christianity such as the "ancient Sanskrit texts" 
(Metcalf 1997: 11) and the role of Brahmins as spiritual 
leaders (Quigley 1993: 83). The assumptions the British 
held regarding nationalism and the primacy of national 
identity over other . allegiances required Indian 
nationalist leaders to separate public and private 
spheres. Through both the Constitution and in the years 
thereafter, this resulted in the empowerment of religious 
elites as their remit was seen to include certain spheres 
which were defined as private. 
The retention of personal law1° as an arena to be 
dealt with by religious authorities, rather than the 
state, dates from pre-British rule. Upon annexation of 
new territories, the East India Company assured its 
subjects that rights and privileges held by the previous 
lo For example, laws regarding marriage, divorce and 
inheritance. 
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rulers would be perpetuated. The religious functions 
performed by the old rulers were therefore continued by 
the British (D. E. Smith 1963: 72). 
Interference with religion only occurred on 
humanitarian grounds and, although British policy was not 
always consistent, personal law was generally left to 
religious authorities. 
The Fourth Law Commission reported in 1879 that 
since this law was mingled with religion for the 
great mass of the people, no further codification 
was advisable. (D. E. Smith 1963: 276) 
The Indian Penal Code (Sections 295-298) of 1860 
restricts the freedom of religion when this affects 
public order, morality or health. Thus, for example, sati 
(widow-burning) could be opposed on humanitarian 
grounds. " Yet at Independence, there were three different 
and distinct laws regarding marriage, divorce, 
inheritance and succession. 
Article 44 of the Directive Principles of the Indian 
Constitution states that; "The state shall endeavour to 
secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout 
the territory of India" (The Constitution of India: 
Article 44). 
The Special Marriage Act of 1954, based in part on 
the act of the same name of 1872, was the first step 
towards this agenda; if marriage occurred between two 
people of different faiths neither personal law could 
apply, thus the act provided for "legal provision of 
11 The Moghuls attempted to prevent sati on similar 
grounds. The Sultans of Delhi introduced a licensing 
system, whilst Akbar appointed officials to ensure no 
compulsion was brought to bear on widows (Saxena 1975: 
77-83). 
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marriages celebrated in repudiation of personal laws" 
(D. E. Smith 1963: 278). But this act was voluntary and 
only affected a very small percentage of the population. 
As Smith argues, before any uniform civil code could be 
drawn up it was necessary to codify Hindu personal law. 
The passage of bills regarding Hindu Marriage, Hindu 
Succession, Hindu Minority and Guardianship and Hindu 
Adoptions and Maintenance in 1955 and 1956 followed 
fifteen years of debates regarding their substance (D. E. 
Smith 1963: 280-281). This required the law minister in a 
secular state arguing for changes in religious law based 
on ancient Sanskrit scriptures. 
N. C. Chatterjee, leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, 
argued that this codification was in itself communal; 
... why 
is this attempt to change the personal laws 
confined to Hindu society alone? Is not this 
communal legislation repugnant to the clear 
directive principles of the Constitution that there 
should be a uniform civil code for all the citizens 
of India? (Quoted in D. E. Smith 1963: 286) 
Similar arguments were given from the opposite end 
of the political spectrum. Acharya Kripalani of the Praja 
Socialist Party, for example, argued that the 
introduction of laws for just one community was itself 
undemocratic. (D. E. Smith 1963: 286) Despite these 
criticisms, the Guardian of Madras justified the changes 
thus; 
While Pakistan is reforming secular law to conform 
to traditional religion, India is legislating 
traditional practices to be brought into keeping 
with a modern progressive outlook. (Quoted in D. E. 
Smith 1963: 291) 
That all these views are in some sense reflected in 
the constitution, through the Constituent Assembly 
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debates, suggests a degree of ambiguity regarding the 
meaning of India's secularism. These criticisms, along 
with further policy developments, will be assessed in the 
following sections. 
2.2 Critiques of Nehruvian Nationalism 
It is clear that the Nehruvian secular liberal model was 
the dominant force behind the Indian nationalist movement 
and the -resultant Indian constitution but other strands 
of thought existed, criticizing both the theoretical 
basis and the implementation of the Nehruvian model. 
Criticisms of Nehruvian nationalism on the grounds 
that it is ill-suited to the Indian polity have been made 
from various differing standpoints. Re-constructions of 
the role of secularism in the Indian state and consequent 
re-definitions of Hinduism in terms of Hindutva; Hindu 
society or Hinduness, can be seen in the strand of 
thinking running from Golwalkar and the R. S. S., through 
the Jana Sangh, to the present-day Bharatiya Janata Party 
(B. J. P. ). 
Golwalkar exemplifies the notion that Indian 
nationalism derives from, and is a product of, Hindu 
society. The R. S. S. interpretation of Hinduism relies 
less on Hinduism as a religion per se, than on an image 
of a Hindu society. Golwalkar aimed to expand the Jana 
Sangh, the party political wing of the R. S. S., to; "... a 
stage when the Sangh and the entire Hindu society will be 
completely identical" (Quoted in Jaffrelot 1993: 126). 
This then raises two important questions regarding 
nationalism and religion; who can be a Hindu and what is 
the relationship between Hindu society and Hindu 
religion? Golwalkar argues that; 
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The Hindu... has ever been devoted to Bharat and 
ready to strive for its progress and uphold its 
honour. The national life values of Bharat are 
indeed derived from the life of the Hindus. As such 
he is the "national" here. (Quoted in Pandey 1993: 
251) 
Savarkar, the father of Hindu nationalism (Varshney 
1993: 230), similarly, claims that; 
A Hindu means a person who regards this land... from 
the Indus to the Seas as his fatherland as well as 
his Holyland. (Quoted in Varshney 1993: 230-231) 
This definition explicitly excludes Muslims, 
Christians and Communists, whose allegiance lies extra- 
territorially (Pandey 1993: 253). Conversely, it can 
provide national membership to other groups whose 
religious identity originated in India, specifically 
Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains. This territorial, 
genealogical and religious (Varshney 1993: 231) 
definition of Hindutva assumes that; "Ethos/spirit is at 
the heart of Hinduism, which is at the heart of... Hindu 
culture... which is at the heart of the Hindu nation" 
(Vanaik 1997: 151). Given that the national identity is 
constructed, Vanaik argues that there is no essential 
national identity; "What it is and will be is what we 
fight to make it to be" (Vanaik 1997: 151). 
Conversely, Varshney argues that different versions 
of nationalism are at issue. Indian secular nationalism 
could exist in conjunction with other affiliations 
(Varshney 1993: 230). However Hindu nationalism, as 
articulated by Savarkar and Golwalkar, is separate, 
distinct and in opposition to a secular Indian identity. 12 
12 The implications of this relationship are important 
for the international relations of South Asia. As Embree 
argues; 
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Given these restrictions on citizenship, what would 
have been the attitude of a Hindu nationalist, rather 
than Hindu extremist, Indian state towards minorities? 
Varshney argues that the basis for Muslim citizenship 
revolves around assimilation on four counts; 
1) accept the centrality of Hinduism to Indian 
civilisation; 2) acknowledge key figures such as Ram 
as civilizational heroes... 3) accept that Muslim 
rulers... destroyed the pillars of Hindu 
civilisation; and 4) make no claims to special 
privileges... (Varshney 1993: 231) 
If the basis of Indian nationalism for Golwalkar and 
Savarkar derived from a particular conception of Hindu 
society, for Gandhi it derived from the innate 
spiritualism of India. Although this "romantic idealist" 
conception (Inden 1990: 72) has not affected the 
constitutional structure of Indian political activity, 
particular movements both before and after Independence 
have utilized, and been derived from, this particular 
anti-western, anti-scientific discourse. 
Gandhi explained India's subjugation as a result of 
attempts to copy western materialist culture, rather than 
emphasize India's innate spirituality (Chatterjee 1986: 
85-86). This led Gandhi, for example, to criticize 
industrialization since; "above a certain level [physical 
... the pervasiveness of Indian (and here Hindu can 
be allowed as a synonym for Indian) culture tends to 
make Indians see the, people of the subcontinent as a 
commonality, providing linkages at every level of 
life, while the other nations detect cultural 
imperialism in the Indian perception. (Embree 1974: 
5) 
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harmony and comfort] becomes a hindrance instead of help" 
(Quoted in Chatterjee 1986: 87). 
Gandhi believed that economic and political issues 
needed to be subordinated to a higher moral community. 
His critique of the legal system, in which lawyers 
advance quarrels rather than repress them, replicates the 
ability of the colonial state, through appearing neutral, 
to actually increase division (Chatterjee 1986: 91). 
This view of morality was based upon an 
understanding of religion which Inden has described as; 
"a pluralist position that was... also religious and 
traditionalist in its orientation, but more innovative" 
(Inden 1990: 192). 
Gandhi argued that; 
After long study and experience I have come to these 
conclusions, that (1) all religions are true, (2) 
all religions have some error in them, (3) all 
religions are almost as dear to me as my own 
Hinduism. My veneration for other faiths is the same 
as for my own faith. (Nehru 1946: 365) 
Thus the Gandhian perspective suggested that, rather 
than attempt to replicate more advanced states, India 
needed to recognize its own essential spirituality. Just 
as he ascribed imperialism on the desire for greater 
economic prosperity, so political life needed to be 
subsumed to a communal morality rather than dominated by 
economic materialism. This theme recurs through the 
peaceful protests of the nationalist movement and later 
13 through Jayprakash Narayan and the "J. P. Movement". 
13 The all-party movement, started in Bihar, opposed 
to the alleged corruption of Indira Gandhi from 1974- 
1975. 
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Vallabhbhai Patel espoused a more conservative 
economic and political approach than Nehru, accompanied 
by the use of Hinduism to justify these ends. Rather than 
devoutly believing in Hinduism, Patel used Hindu 
traditions; "as much out of convenience as out of 
conviction" (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987: 71). Hinduism was, 
to Patel, a consolidating feature about which the nation 
could be constructed and thus the accommodation to 
Muslims which was evident from Nehru and Gandhi was less 
apparent from Patel. At a speech in Lucknow questioning 
why Indian Muslims had not criticized the Pakistani 
invasion of Kashmir after partition, Patel stated; 
It is your duty now to sail in the same boat 
together. I want to tell you very frankly that you 
cannot ride two horses. Select one horse. Those who 
want to live in Pakistan go there and live in peace. 
(Gandhi 1990: 461) 
M. N. Roy argued that Indian society needed to 
eliminate its religious outlook completely were a truly 
secular state to be created. Thus, in the Marxist view, 
not only should religion be excluded from the state 
apparatus but only with the exclusion of religion from 
any part of human consciousness could true freedom occur 
(D. E. Smith 1963: 156). 
Critiques of the Nehruvian approach were derived not 
only from the dichotomy between the religious and the 
secular but in whether a liberal or more authoritarian 
form of rule was preferable for the Indian context. If 
the liberal model provides one notion of governance in 
India, another is that of the all-powerful sovereign, 
derived from Moghul and previous Empires such as those of 
Ashoka and the Guptas. 
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In this model the role of the supreme ruler; Shah- 
an-Shah, Raja Dhiraja or King of Kings, has been to 
adjudicate between competing groups. This viewpoint has 
appeared in the writings of Bengali nationalists in the 
nineteenth century, is reflected in the ideas of Subhas 
Chandra Bose and can be seen in justifications of the 
Emergency as necessary to maintain order and work against 
opposition attempts to incite rebellion and destabilize 
the unity of India (Government of India 1975). This view 
represents India as a combination of groups and factions, 
rather than individuals, in which governance is more 
clearly hierarchical and the divergence between high and 
low politics is greater than in western European 
societies. 
This authoritarian, secular ideology is perhaps best 
represented by Bose and, had he lived after 1945 and 
established his Indian National Army on Indian soil 
during World War Two, the Indian state may well have 
developed differently. 14 Bose represented; "the 
realpolitik and extremist versions of Indian nationalism 
that flourished in Bengal and Maharashtra" (Rudolph and 
Rudolph 1987: 70). 
Writing in 1942 his state model was clear; 
There will be a strong Central Government. Without 
such a Government, order and public security cannot 
be safeguarded. Behind this Government will stand a 
well organized, disciplined all-India party which 
will be the chief instrument for maintaining 
national unity. (Bose 1997: 290) 
14 This would obviously have strengthened Bose's 
position. It could also have strengthened the position of 
the Communist resistance. 
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As Nehru, Bose favoured rapid economic development 
(Bose 1997: 207-208,294), the perpetuation of 
Hindustani, written in the Roman script, as the national 
language (Bose 1997: 206) and the relegation of religion 
to an individual's conscience (Bose 1997: 290). 
Bose's position has been undermined, to some extent, 
by both the dominant Nehruvian historiography and his 
relationship with Germany and Japan during World War Two. 
However, given the broad typography used here to 
exemplify differing strands of debate, his version of 
Indian nationalism is useful in demonstrating that 
opposition to Nehruvian notions did not only come from 
non-secular writers. Rather than the liberal model, Bose 
alludes to more ancient power structures. The supreme 
ruler was the predominant power in Moghul and Gupta 
Empires and in his proclamation of the Provisional 
Government of Azad Hind, Bose claims; 
the names of Sirajuddoula and Mohanlal of Bengal, 
Haider Ali, Tippu Sultan and Velu Tampi of South 
India, Appa Sahib Bhonsle and Peshwa Baji Rao of 
Maharashtra, the Begums of Oudh... among others - 
the names of all these warriors are for ever 
engraved in letters of gold. (Bose 1997: 296) 
The vision of the state as a combination of factions 
can be seen as a development of this interpretation. 
Factions link low-level communities, through intermediate 
classes, to parliamentary elites. As Brass argues; 
factional loyalties provide the link between the 
parochial units of Indian society - family, village, 
caste - and the political parties.... It is 
something "more" than parochial politics... and 
something less than party politics. (Brass 1965: 
114) 
Washbrook has supported Brass' argument through an 
examination of politics in Madras in the late nineteenth 
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and early twentieth centuries. Washbrook suggests that, 
as political powers were transferred to Indians, certain 
local elites were able to dominate these structures. 
Thus, the limited introduction of a democratic process 
entrenched certain localized elites (Washbrook 1973). 
However, the "attempted reduction of all South Asian 
politics - communalist, nationalist or other - to the 
play of self-interest and faction" (Pandey 1990: 14-15) 
has been criticised by Hardiman (1982) as being 
analytically weak and factually inaccurate, deriving from 
older orientalist discourses. Through concentrating on 
the elite, it ignores the subaltern. As a comprehensive 
theory of the state, the faction is far from complete but 
it does provide a useful analytical tool, demonstrating 
the importance of vertical links, especially in 
localities, and thereby a method by which hegemony can be 
enforced. 
These debates are important given the perpetuation 
of India's democratic framework. The importance of 
nation-building in post-colonial states often resulted in 
one party rule, allowing the elite to enforce the 
official nationalist myths. In India, despite Congress 
hegemony, the existence of different ideologies amongst 
the "Founding Fathers" led to contested notions regarding 
the basis of Indian nationalism remaining within the 
political arena. 
Furthermore, the Nehruvian version of Indian 
nationalism was not wholly predictable, but came to 
prominence in part due to the early deaths of the 
proponents of alternative models, Bose in 1945 and Patel 
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in 1950, and the legitimacy given by the British to this 
method of rule. 
Many of the critiques of the Indian state derive 
from these earlier debates. Madan, for example, has 
argued that the usage of secularism in India has been 
misinterpreted and that religion takes on a completely 
different role in India than in Protestant western Europe 
where the idea of separation of church and state 
originated (Madan 1987: 754). Varshney however asserts 
that Madan's view of secularism fails to distinguish 
between types of secularism within the polity and that 
Rajiv and Indira Gandhi perverted the original Nehruvian 
interpretation (Varshney 1993: 247). 
The Subaltern Studies critique argues that the 
prevailing elite nationalist discourse ignores, or 
distorts, many other forms of anti-colonial protest. 
Indian "nationalism" was much more of a mass movement, 
containing many different strands to those alluded to by 
Nehru and the westernized elite. The dominant 
historiography, derived from Nehruvian notions, has 
attempted to reconstruct both the story of the 
Independence Movement and previous Indian history, to 
provide a continuity between past civilizations and the 
contemporary Indian nation-state. 
The nationalist historiography of India's elite is 
argued to bear little semblance to the experiences of the 
vast majority of India's population. Attempts to gain 
independence required the elite to adopt the language of 
the British to be recognized as able to govern 
themselves. As such, they failed to attract the support 
of the "masses". In other words, the notion of India as 
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recognized by the West, and indeed by India's elite, is 
derived from a western discourse and has therefore been 
unable to take root as the focal point of an individual's 
primary loyalty. 
The necessity for this usage of western concepts has 
been explained by the feeling of the colonized that only 
through adopting the language of the colonizers would 
their demands for autonomy be heard. The problem, 
highlighted by the Subaltern Studies group, is that this 
elite historiography, whether Indian or British, has been 
adopted with differing emphases by academics both in 
India and Britain (R. Guha 1982: 1). 
More than this, they argue that the accepted 
historiography reduces the role played by, or indeed 
fails to mention, movements of the "masses", instead 
describing decolonization either as a movement by which 
an "elite [led] the masses from subjugation to freedom" 
(Guha 1982: 1) or as a stimulus-response between the 
colonial and Indian (westernized) elites. Through 
empowering subaltern voices, agency is returned to 
individuals. One of the major causes of this type of 
analysis is the British assumption that, whereas European 
liberal democracies are based on rational individuals, 
India was perceived to be a land of spiritual holistic 
communities. This dichotomy undermines many of the 
assumptions made by westernizing nationalists with regard 
to India's nationhood. 
Indeed, despite a common belief that political 
realities in India are different from those in the West, 
the framework within which politics takes place is based 
upon western concepts. In an attempt to counteract this 
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historiographical problem, attempts have been made to 
empower subaltern groups, enabling a post-modern critique 
that through imposing agency onto subaltern groups, it is 
almost impossible to avoid creating new essentialist 
notions (O'Hanlon 1988). 
Partha Chatterjee's critique derives from the above 
debates and argues that nationalism was a natural 
development in the West but has no such intrinsic basis, 
and as such is unsuited, to the post-colonial World. 
Whereas in the West nationalism developed "naturally" 
through capitalist development (for example, Hechter 
1977, Worsley 1984) or language and "print-capitalism" 
(Anderson 1991) in colonial states it was constructed as 
a language through which elites could take power from the 
colonial rulers, without those pre-conditions which 
existed in the West. 
Chatterjee argues that enlightenment ideas, 
including the concept of nationalism, were introduced 
into the colonies through force. The combination of 
science, modernization and nationalist thought have led 
to the formation of nation-states in the Third World 
which have no real historical basis, leading to ethnic 
movements that, whilst being anti-state, also appear to 
be anti-modern and anti-capitalist. (Chatterjee 1986: 
150) 
Chatterjee cites the example of Bankimchandra 
Chattopadhyay (Bankim) "one of the first systematic 
expounders in India of the principles of nationalism" 
(Chatterjee 1986: 54). Bankim's attempts to construct and 
reify an Indian/Bengali culture and even his critique of 
western knowledge, argues Chatterjee, demonstrate his 
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adoption of certain western rational biases (Chatterjee 
1986: 58). 
This resulted in a massive degree of elitism within 
his arguments. If India's power stemmed from a synthesis 
of western scientific knowledge and indigenous spiritual 
awareness, then the "project of national-cultural 
regeneration" (Chatterjee 1986: 73) would involve the 
intelligentsia leading, and the nation following. 
Said has argued that the assumptions of difference 
held by the colonial powers with regard to subject 
peoples were enforced through their political and 
intellectual power. This is epitomized by Bankim 
privileging certain western intellectual approaches over 
indigenous Indian traditions . 
15 
Present debates about Indian nationalism stem from 
this dichotomy. Indian nationalists are divided between 
those, like Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose, who believed 
that nationalism was a universal modernizing force and 
that its application in the form of secular political 
structures in India would lead to progress, and those who 
have argued that nationalism developed as it did in the 
West out of the indigenous features of the West. In 
India, different features should lead to a different type 
of nation. If the "essence" of the West was science, 
rationality and a resultant secularism, the essence of 
India was its spirituality. This then suggests that the 
is Conversely, many of the modes of British rule were 
modelled on the previous Moghul forms of governance, 
particularly in relation to tax collection. The 
implications of this are particularly relevant to ideas 
of separateness in the northeast which never fell under 
direct Moghul rule. 
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basis for any sustainable nationalist project in India 
leads to a very different type of progress. Developed 
from this stands the viewpoint of those, such as Partha 
Chatterjee, who have argued that nationalism per se is 
western and therefore the actual nationalist project 
itself is unsuitable for India, there being no indigenous 
basis. 
An assessment of these positions locates the sub- 
nationalist debate in northeast India in terms of an 
nationwide concern regarding the basis of Indian national 
identity. In particular, it implies the role of sub- 
nationalist developments with regard to notions of "unity 
through diversity". This recognition, and to some extent 
institutionalization, of difference provided the 
justification for Indian nationalism. However, the 
emphasis on difference was expected to decline through 
modernization, according to the Nehruvian model. 
2.3 Communal Tendencies after 1950 
That Nehruvian notions of secularism were not fully 
escribed onto the political system at Independence has 
been demonstrated. Although it was assumed that cultural 
divisions would decline over time as economic advancement 
occurred, many of the attempts to reduce differences 
through rights have either remained intact, or indeed 
increased in importance, since 1950. The scope of this 
development is wide-ranging and is demonstrated by, for 
example, the expansion of reservations policies and the 
enforcement of the provisions of the Sixth Schedule, both 
expected to decline over time (see section 2.4), and the 
coalition politics of the Congress Party. This section 
will examine how modernizing policies have resulted in 
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opposite outcomes, taking the examples of the Shah Bano 
case, the Fifty-Third Amendment and state reorganization. 
That the 1950 Constitution contained certain 
collective rights based on group membership was clearly 
recognized, yet these were presumed to disappear after 
they had served their purpose and, through prescription, 
removed those inequalities for which they had been 
introduced. After Independence, separate personal laws 
for religious communities were expected to disappear as 
soon as acceptable common civil codes were available. Yet 
Acts of Parliament and specific events not only 
institutionalized these existing differences but in 
reality created more lines of division, at least in the 
short-term. 
The causes of this trend are three-fold. Firstly, 
these policies were introduced to eliminate the handicaps 
of certain groups and abolishing them before they had 
achieved any notable results was clearly unlikely. 
Secondly, removing beneficial rights based upon group 
membership would prove detrimental to the electoral 
opportunities of the party so doing. Thirdly, the nature 
of governance, particularly under the Congress System, 
emphasized the position of elites within localized 
societies. The benefits to elites from their control over 
personal laws, political rights and defining group 
membership meant that they would oppose any attempted 
changes. 
This consolidation of difference, although part of a 
long-term movement to the point at which common 
citizenship rights could be exercised, in the short term 
resulted in a position at which common citizenship 
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appeared to be more elusive. Over time, policies to 
prioritize backward groups have become more important 
than the ends for which they were originally intended. 
The difficulties of establishing a common civil code 
in a democracy dominated by communal elites, particularly 
by a party relying on electoral support from those 
elites, was shown in the Shah Bano case. The Supreme 
Court's judgement in this case was that a divorced Muslim 
woman was entitled to support from her husband, against 
orthodox Muslim opinion in which a husband's financial 
responsibilities end after divorce. Coming soon after a 
court ruling that Ayodhya was a temple, not a mosque, the 
killings of Muslims at Nellie in Assam, and the Assam 
Accord, which threatened to deprive thousands of Muslims 
of their Indian citizenship, this ruling appeared to do 
more to fracture, rather than consolidate, citizenship of 
Muslims and Hindus. 
As bye-elections showed a continuing shift of Muslim 
support away from the Congress (I) Party, Rajiv Gandhi 
passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) 
Bill in 1986, which reversed the Shah Bano judgement and 
maintained Muslim personal law. Gandhi argued that it was 
not the duty of the government to arbitrate between 
Muslims (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987: 44-45). 
Again, as in many other cases, the divergence 
between the liberal aims of non-interference with 
religious matters and the consequent effect of giving 
rights to certain groups, in a democracy, has led to 
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elites of groups ensuring the perpetuation of their 
rights . 
16 
The notion of allowing religious authorities to 
legislate with regards to social issues which, in a 
western secular state would generally be left to 
politicians, can be applied to the tribal regions. The 
manner in which certain areas are allowed separate social 
legislation is applied to tribal groups, as well as 
Hindus and Muslims. 
The Fifty-Third Amendment, for example, gained 
Presidential Assent on 14 August 1986. This prevented the 
application of any Act of Parliament in Mizoram which 
affected the religious and social practices of the Mizos. 
It further sanctioned the continuation of the Mizos' 
customary law and procedure. The administration of civil 
and criminal justice and decisions affecting land 
transfer could only be applied if a resolution was passed 
in the Mizoram Legislative Assembly. Other states and 
autonomous districts in the northeast were given similar 
rights, 17 further consolidating notions that tribals were 
16 Eriksen provides evidence of the difficulties 
involved in imposing relativist, rather than universal, 
social values. In Norway, Gypsies were not forced to 
attend school as it was seen to be "in conflict with 
their culture". In 1990-1991 an illiterate Gypsy took the 
government to court, blaming them for his illiteracy 
(Eriksen 1993: 143). 
17 In 1962 the Thirteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution invoked Article 371A to provide similar 
rights for the Nagas. The Twenty-Seventh and Fifty-Fifth 
Amendments provided other specified rights to tribals in 
Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh respectively. 
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being privileged and that through a portrayal of 
backwardness, benefits would be forthcoming. 
State reorganization recognized the necessity of 
multiple identities in India; Nehru's unity through 
diversity. Yet through granting rights on the basis of 
language, rather than need as was the intention with 
reservations, a new usage for these identities was 
created. Liberal supporters argued that it was a further 
modernizing step, rationalizing administration through 
the use of common state-wide languages, yet support also 
came from groups wishing to monopolize their control of 
state power-bases. 
In a region so linguistically diverse, the use of 
language as an ideological tool has a long history. It 
was seen in the attempted imposition of Urdu and Hindi as 
national languages in Pakistan and India (Jalal 1995: 
225). The attempted transition from Hindi and English to 
solely Hindi as official language failed when the 
Official Language Commission reported that the present 
situation could not be improved. The Commission was 
established in 1955, at the same time as regional 
languages were gaining support through representations to 
the State Reorganization Commission. As Jalal argues; 
language presented itself as a useful mobilizing 
symbol transcending caste, clan and even class-based 
interests. It enabled social groups with privileged 
access to literacy and education to represent 
regionally defined interests. (Jalal 1995: 226) 
Even under British rule, the state of Orissa had 
been created as a response to internal linguistic 
demands. The pre-Independence Congress Party, although 
committed to an Indian nation, was organized on 
linguistic lines, as opposed to official governmental 
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divisions, implying a reorganization of states upon 
achieving power (Morris-Jones 1967: 46). Yet in the name 
of national unity this did not occur (Jalal 1995: 224). 
After Independence, protests by Telugu-speakers, 
Maharashtrans and speakers of Malayalam and Tamil led to 
the establishment of a committee comprising Jawaharlal 
Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel and Pattabhi Sitaramayya which 
argued against linguistic states on the basis that 
national unity would be jeopardized. Protests in Andhra, 
about which the report had conceded a case could be made, 
led to the creation of Andhra Pradesh in 1953. To prevent 
further protest the States Reorganization Commission was 
established. This recommended the division of southern 
India, but neither Bombay and the Punjab18 nor the 
northeast. 19 Protests in Bombay, the war in Nagaland and 
more peaceful protests in the Punjab led to the division 
of Bombay into Maharashtra and Gujarat in 1960, the 
separation of Nagaland from Assam in 1963 and the 
division of the Punjab into Punjab, Haryana and Himachal 
Pradesh in 1966. 
Groups which are perceived to have benefitted within 
the Indian state, gaining statehood or reservations 
policy, have done so on the basis of shared cultural 
characteristics. Thus claims made for economic 
improvement are based upon highly stigmatized traits; 
language or caste, rather than less stigmatized 
18 On the basis that there was opposition from 
linguistic minorities within the proposed new states. 
19 The report recommended the unification of the 
northeast on the grounds that the small states were 
unviable (see section 5.2). 
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ideologies. As discussed in Chapter one, the articulation 
of cultural identities requires the existence of an other 
against which group membership can be judged and will 
therefore increase division, as against creating unity, 
as perceived by Nehru. 
Notions of Assamese identity were encouraged by many 
of these developments, as the other against which the 
Assamese would be defined, were themselves consolidating 
their membership due to these policies. Thus Muslims and 
tribals were perceived to be able to emphasize their 
identities for economic, political and social gain and by 
so doing underlined their differences from the Assamese. 
This further increased the impression of politics and 
resource allocation as a zero-sum game. 
2.4 Consolidating Difference? 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
The effects of the various measures which aimed to remove 
communal divisions through the granting of benefits and 
rights on the basis of group membership are disputed. The 
basic premise for reservations policy is; "that 
persistent and cumulative caste related inequalities need 
to be corrected through compensatory discrimination" 
(Guhan 1992: 1657). Upper-caste Hindus, who have most to 
lose from preferential policies have exaggerated the 
costs of preferential policies, belittled caste division 
(Guhan 1992: 1657) and generally focused on the apparent 
unfairness and inequity of discrimination. It is also 
argued that the benefits of reservations have gone to 




resources to take advantage of opportunities available, 
20 
or even to upper castes attempting to "de-Sanskritize" by 
adopting the names of lower castes (Guru 1986: 33). 
It is further claimed that reservations policy has 
institutionalized certain caste divisions, an argument 
which Mitra believes demonstrates insufficient 
understanding of the nature of caste (Mitra 1994: 64). 
Even if only one member of a backward group advances 
through reservations, the effect is "to sever the link 
between jati and occupation" (Mitra 1994: 64) and refute 
notions of destiny manipulated by some oppressing groups. 
However, as with state reorganization, personal laws 
and so forth, reservations policy implies privilege on 
the basis of cultural group membership. Although often 
apocryphal, the idea that it is more advanced backward 
castes which benefit from reservations, intensifies other 
individuals' desire to articulate a cultural identity to 
gain social, economic or political benefits. 
All the restrictions enforced on the liberal model, 
reservations and so on, were expected to disappear and as 
such were initially introduced provisionally for a ten 
year period only. Their continuous reapplication suggests 
that they have not solved the problems as intended but 
meanwhile have led to the institutionalization of 
important political power-bases and as such cannot be 
removed. 
The ideal of removing difference through benefitting 
less privileged groups is most clearly witnessed in the 
reservations policy for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled 
20 The "lion's share" problem (see Gallanter 1984: 
270) . 
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Tribes and Other Backward Castes. The Indian Constitution 
itself presents reservations as one of the major blocks 
upon which it is based. Articles 330 to 334 provide that 
seats in both national and state assemblies be reserved 
for scheduled castes, tribes and Anglo-Indians. Article 
335 allowed for reservations to occur in government 
service as long as administrative efficiency was not 
affected. Reservations were not to exceed 22.501. Articles 
15 and 16 both guarantee equality by the state, but both 
contain riders; 
Nothing in this article... shall prevent the state 
from making any special provision for the 
advancement of any social and educationally backward 
classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and 
the Scheduled Tribes. (Constitution of India: 
Article 15) 
Nothing in this article shall prevent the state from 
making any provision for the reservation of 
appointments or posts in favour of any backward 
class of citizens. (Constitution of India: Article 
16) 
Article 17 abolished untouchability and banned its 
practice, making any implementation of untouchability an 
offence. (Constitution of India: Article 17) 
The inevitable outcomes of this set of policies are 
twofold. Firstly, if opportunities are increased through 
classification as "backward", groups will attempt to 
prove themselves backward to gain greater resources. 
Furthermore, any attempt to abolish communal divisions, 
whilst simultaneously supporting those groups through 
positive discrimination, will inevitably give the 
divisions a greater political significance, particularly 
in a democratic framework. In Assam, despite a vast 
94 
backlog in employment for tribals and scheduled castes in 
state employment, the; 
Asamiya bourgeois press has been largely successful 
in grossly distorting the situation by creating an 
image of "privileged" tribals in state employment. 
(Hussain 1993: 178) 
It has further led to claims of rights on caste 
status by other religious groups. 21 As the Report of the 
Backward Classes Commission in 1955 observed; 
The Government of India recognized certain castes 
among the Hindus as backward and offered special 
scholarships, concessions and privileges to those 
communities. This led the Muslims and Christians 
also to assert that although their religions were 
fundamentally different and that theoretically it is 
(sic) opposed to caste, in practice their society 
was more or less caste-ridden. (Report of the 
Backward Classes Commission 1955: vi) 
The numbers involved give some credence to the fact 
that reservation policy will be a popular vote-winner. It 
is also clear that this is extremely divisive. Backward 
and scheduled castes and tribes account for around 70% of 
the population, Muslims a further 11% (The Economist 8 
October 1994). Forward castes, "Brahmins, Thakurs and a 
handful of others" constitute about 17.6% of the 
population (Jalal 1995: 204). In the south of India only 
3% of the population are Brahmins. The fact that under 
V. P. Singh's implementation of the Mandal Commission 
Report reservations only apply to new recruitment in 
government service, excluding promotion and the armed 
forces, the actual gains for backward classes, and losses 
21 Despite the Constitution being avowedly secular, 
religious affiliation has been used as a qualification 
for preferential treatment (Gallanter 1984: 305, D. E. 
Smith 1963: 322). 
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for others, are almost trivial, 22 was overshadowed by the 
upper-caste response. 
Secondly, because so much is at stake for 
individuals basing claims on their caste/tribal identity, 
the courts have been placed in their "traditional" 
position (Quigley 1993: 93) acting as arbiters in caste 
disputes. Their approaches have varied between what 
Gallanter calls the "pragmatic or empirical" method, 
recognizing that multiple identities can occur, and a 
"formal or fictional" approach, assuming that groups are 
"mutually exclusive and hierarchically ranked" (Gallanter 
1967: 119). The latter method, following the British 
interpretation of Indian society, suggests a further 
departure from a secular ideal. 
Furthermore, the actual purpose of Reservations 
Policy was contradictory. Verrier Elwin, anthropologist 
and Chairman of the Commission on Scheduled Castes, aimed 
to maintain the distinctiveness of tribal groups and 
privilege them through Scheduled Tribe Status to enable 
this to be achieved. For Elwin, certain areas were to be 
kept separate for the Tribals to maintain their ancient 
existence. In his work on the Baiga, Elwin argued that 
without maintaining separateness, the Baiga; 
... will become indistinguishable from ordinary 
villagers! Their fine physique will be sapped by the 
introduction of child-marriages... they will sink 
from their proud office of lords of the jungle to 
the very bottom of the social scale; half-way 
between civilization and an emasculated tribal life, 
22We can estimate the current O. B. C. share in central 
government to be 15%... if staff strength grows at 
1% per annum, a prospective 27% reservation will 
improve it... to 18% in 30 years. (E. P. W. 1-8 August 
1992) 
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they will practice the worst features of both. 
(Elwin 1939: 519) 
The area needed to be controlled by a Tribe's 
Commissioner, an expert, acting as an intermediary 
between the tribal headman and the legislature. Despite 
the general support for "isolationism" amongst the 
British, upon Independence the prevailing view was for 
these tribes, through reservations, to be brought within 
the mainstream of Indian nationalism. As Vallabhbhai 
Patel commented; 
Mr Jaibal Singh has apprehensions that the present 
laws which afford protection and security to the 
tribal people will be removed. I do not see why 
there should be any such apprehension. ... I think 
that it should be our endeavour to bring the tribal 
people to the level of Mr Jaibal Singh and not keep 
them as tribes, so that, 10 years hence, when the 
Fundamental Rights are reconsidered, the word 
"tribes" may be removed altogether when they come up 
to our level. It is not benefitting India's 
civilisation to provide for tribes. (Constituent 
Assembly Debates Volume III: 456) 
Reservations policies derived in large part from 
Colonial attempts to rationalize the caste system through 
the Census, resulting in stricter stratification, as 
census "supervisors were supposed to instruct the 
enumerators in how to classify responses" (Cohn 1988: 
244). Yet the British 'belief that caste relationships 
held India together (Metcalf 1997: 119) had the effect of 
dividing groups along caste lines. This created a 
framework through which, to gain resources from the 
23 state, cultural group membership has been necessary. 
23 In response to British stratification, the Indian 
census does not contain caste information in order not to 
exacerbate caste differences. But, as Guhan argues, 
preferential schemes cannot be accepted unless they are 
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In the northeast, a further hindrance to 
assimilation was provided through the Sixth Schedule of 
the Indian Constitution (see also section 5.2). This 
allowed for separate District and Regional Councils for 
certain tribal areas, with the ability to regulate money- 
lending, trading and property ownership. It allowed the 
Governor of Assam to set up Commissions to investigate 
the development of the areas and provided financial 
resources from the centre to any state with Scheduled 
Areas. Again, this was attacked from both sides. Some 
criticized the Sixth Schedule for not going far enough, 
ignoring tribals in the plains and the tea gardens. 24 
Others, such as Kuladhar Chaliha, a veteran Assamese 
Congressman, argued that it went too far; 
I think we are heading to a difficult situation, and 
if the Tribes cause disturbance to us we have to 
thank ourselves. But there is one redeeming feature 
and that is paragraph 21 of the Sixth Schedule 
[which leaves the power to amend the Schedule at any 
time to Parliament].... Therefore we should be very 
careful and it should be amended at the first 
sitting of parliament; otherwise we would be heading 
towards ruin and there will be so many pockets, so 
many Ulsters where there will be trouble. 
(Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume IX: 644-645) 
Ghurye argues that it is not only the British 
influence in treating Tribals differently which resulted 
in these policies, but their misunderstanding of the 
based on reliable data and reliable data cannot be 
collected for fear of exacerbating caste feelings (Guhan 
1992: 1659). 
24 For example, Scheduled Tribal Commission Member 
Basumatari (see Ghurye 1980: 353). Basumatari also 
opposed the state reorganization of the 1970's on the 
same basis (see section 5.2). 
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nature of Hinduism, which was reflected in the ideas of 
India's Founding Fathers. Whilst the British believed 
that the Tribals were non-Hindu, Ghurye argues that they 
were generally, save in parts of Assam, 25 gradually 
adopting Hindu customs and as such were slowly becoming 
integrated into the Indian mainstream and that Scheduled 
Area policies prevented the creation of an Indian 
national identity. 
With regards to Assam, he argues that; 
... Assam stands poised for a break-up on the score 
of the Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes much 
greater than was sanctioned by the Constitution. And 
the ball, it must be firmly borne in mind, was set 
rolling by the special treatment given to the Nagas 
and the Scheduled Tribes of the North East Frontier 
Tract. The embryo-force of the movement was... 
provided by the District and Regional Councils for 
Assam tribal areas sanctioned in the Constitution. 
(Ghurye 1980: 345-346) 
These policies of reservations and protection for 
both caste and tribal groups encouraged a feeling of 
communality rather than integration, which in northeast 
India was vital given its peripheral position with 
regards to the rest of the state. Whereas previous 
divisive policies could be blamed on the British, their 
consolidation through the new state sent conflicting 
messages. The ability of tribal groups to emphasize 
difference was constitutionally sanctioned and the 
resulting state reorganization was encouraged by this. 
Policies towards tribal groups were predicated upon 
varying impressions and assumptions. The first view, as 
expressed by Elwin in particular (for example, 1939), is 
25 The idea that Assamese tribes were in some ways 
different and more backward is debatable (see below). 
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based upon relativist assumptions that the tribals, or 
aborigines, should be protected and their traditional 
customs maintained. This view has influenced policies 
through the maintenance of separate tribal laws and 
territorial protection through, for example, Inner and 
Outer Line policies and latterly in the Sixth Schedule 
and the granting of statehood for various tribes in the 
northeast . 
26 
The 1931 Census was the first to enumerate the 
"primitive tribes", But throughout the colonial period 
the British had treated certain areas differently. In 
1782, the Rajmahal Hill district was removed "from the 
jurisdiction of ordinary courts" (Ghurye 1980: 71). The 
Santal Parganas District was similarly treated after 1855 
and these disparate provisions were enshrined in the 
Scheduled Districts Act of 1874. In the 1919 Government 
of India Act these regions became Backward Areas, in 1921 
the Line System was introduced27 and in the 1935 
26 Policy with regard to the Inner and Outer Line 
districts was summed up by Lord Hardinge thus; 
Our policy in regard to these tribes has hitherto 
been of non-interference, except in cases of (a) 
outrages on British subjects; (b) violation of the 
"Inner line"; and (c) danger to the interests of 
people dwelling inside the British border by reason 
of the proximity of disturbances outside. (Letter 
from India to Crewe 21 September 1911, Quoted in 
Mehra 1979: 29) 
27 The Line System was divided, in Assam, into the 
Outer Line, comprising the areas now forming Arunachal 
Pradesh, then the North East Frontier Agency, and the 
Inner Line, comprising the tribal hill regions of the 
northeast. 
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Government of India Act the regions became Excluded and 
Partially Excluded Areas. 28 
These actions were justified both for administrative 
efficiency (Ghurye 1980: 70) and to protect tribals from 
"exploitative or demoralizing contact with more 
sophisticated outsiders" (Gallanter 1984: 147). In Assam, 
the Legislative Assembly Council elections of 1939 were 
largely fought on the basis of the perpetuation of the 
Line System. This was advocated by Saadulla's Assam Union 
Muslim League and opposed by the Congress Party; 
... Maulavi Mannawar Ali's resolution on the "Line 
System" which Government had evolved to control 
unrestricted settlement of immigrants from Eastern 
Bengal mainly with a view to avoid friction and 
clashes with the indigenous people. The resolution 
demanded abolition of thissystem. (Assam Assembly 
Congress Report 1949: 10) 
Whereas the theoretical purpose of the Line System 
was to protect tribals from "corrupting" influences, in 
Assam these corrupting influences came to be synonymous 
with East Bengali Muslim immigrants. The scale of 
migration was scarcely affected by partition and because 
of the line policy immigrants were channelled into 
specific areas, particularly the Brahmaputra Valley, into 
which immigration was sanctioned. 
The second view is that through their contact with 
British colonial rule, the tribes had already been 
28 The Excluded areas, contemporary Arunachal Pradesh, 
Naga and Lushai (Mizo) Hills and North Cachar Hills, were 
directly controlled by the Governor. Partially Excluded 
Areas; Garo Hills, Mikir Hills, Sibsagar and parts of 
contemporary Meghalaya all had some representatives in 
the State Assembly but legislation regarding them was 
passed only at the Governor's discretion. 
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affected, thus any customs that were to be maintained 
were not the "essential" features of the tribes, these 
having already been corrupted. 
This approach, as argued by Ghurye and Assamese 
elites, for different reasons, suggests that there is no 
core set of tribal values which could, or should, be 
perpetuated. All the tribes have interacted both with 
other tribes and with non-tribal groups. As Ghurye argues 
with respect to the Sanskritization of (non-Assamese) 
tribals, so Assamese elites argue that the tribals of the 
northeast have developed as they have due to interaction 
with the Assamese. This approach implies that the 
backward position of the tribals is a result of being 
"protected" from modernization and interaction by British 
colonial rule. Less protection would enable them to 
develop. This universalist argument forms the basis for 
reservations policies for tribal groups, advancing them 
through mainstream Indian society. 
Both views are criticized by Majumdar, who believed 
that the development of "civilization", as well as the 
right to cultural choice, were essential. Thus, tribes 
required assistance to enable them to withstand cultural 
invasion; 
For him, Verrier Elwin's crusade in favour of 
leaving the tribes alone and G. S. Ghurye's counter 
campaign to treat them as indistinguishable from 
backward Hindus represented a Rousseauan romanticism 
on the one hand, and a political posture on the 
other. (Madan 1995: 27) 
Despite being intrinsically contradictory, these 
policies result in a necessary classification of 
membership of tribal communities, and definition of their 
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"culture" with the intention of removing or continuing 
perceived difference. 29 
These policies have encouraged a chauvinistic 
Assamese identity to develop in response to the transfer 
of certain political and economic powers from the 
Assamese to the tribal community. The corresponding 
articulation of tribal identities to secure these rights 
contrasted their tribal identities with those of the 
plains Assamese. This emphasized and helped produce a 
more distinct Assamese identity. 
29 The difficulties of defining such a culture are 
fraught with difficulties. See Gallanter (1984: 293), for 
example, over the debate regarding the status of a tribal 
who adopts Christianity. 
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Chapter Three 
The Construction of Assamese Identity; 
From the Mahabharata to the Burmese Invasion 
3.0 Introduction 
The historical period examined in this chapter has 
provided specific events, such as the attempted Moghul 
invasions, and general trends, such as immigration, which 
have been utilized by the contemporary Assam Movement to 
define membership of the Assamese community and ways of 
behaviour for that community. -The Assam Movement argues 
that these events provide the origins of the notions of 
Assamese kinship and identity; what could be called, 
retrospectively, the ethnogenesis of Assamese 
nationalism. Consequently, these events are examined and 
utilized by political actors to provide metaphors for the 
contemporary situation in Assam. 
This section will analyze those metaphors most 
commonly used to provide justifications for the ways in 
which the Assamese should act. It will assess the impact 
of these ideas, and examine the manner in which 
historical artifacts, Hobsbawm and Ranger's "invented 
traditions", have been used. Thus the aim is not to 
provide a complete history of Assam; rather to examine 
those ideas which are seen to provide historical 
precedents for ways both of interpreting and of acting in 
the present. Through an understanding of the dominant 
discourse, some sense of the nature of the construction 
of what it is to be "Assamese", in the opinion of 
present-day Assamese elites, will be realized. 
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Through the analysis of events which occurred prior 
to British colonization, this chapter may appear to be 
endorsing the primordial view of ethnicity; describing 
those events which stirred Assamese group consciousness 
in "pre-modern" times. Contemporary Assamese nationalists 
would certainly argue that their community derives 
directly from these ancient groups' but it is the argument 
of this thesis that there was no definable Assamese group 
during this period. Instead, it will be argued that 
events during this period have been used retrospectively 
to provide a historical basis for the membership and 
behaviour of a specific contemporary Assamese community 
and identity. 
Furthermore, the utilization of historic myths by 
political actors in the present will be shown to have the 
purpose of achieving specific political ends, consciously 
or not. Thus references to, for example, the Battle of 
Saraighat do not exist for their own sake, but rather to 
establish or reinforce a specific cultural outlook and 
attitude. 
As with much of the literature concerning this 
topic, the manner in which authors have investigated the 
pre-colonial period is often highly partial; pro-Indian 
writers are seen to concentrate on certain events, pro- 
Assamese nationalists on others. But this is not to say 
that certain ideas are mutually exclusive. As has been 
argued by, for example, Manor (1996) and Jalal (1995), 
1 In the same manner of "illegitimate appropriation" 
as the standard histories of India which start with the 
Indus Valley civilisations (Kaviraj 1992: 17). 
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multiple identities are highly developed in South Asia. 
Identities based on caste, village, language, religion as 
well as the Indian nation, for example, are all available 
for use in different circumstances, reinforced through 
notions of "unity through diversity". However, the manner 
of the discourse regarding Assam is, at times, 
qualitatively different since some of the cultural 
markers of the Assamese group are directly opposed, 
rather than a complement, to the markers of a mainstream 
Indian identity. Given that Assamese identity is itself 
constructed from the various cultural artifacts available 
for manipulation by politicians, historians and so forth, 
it is equally important to examine why the focus is so 
clearly on exclusive, rather than integrative, historical 
events. 
Historical events cannot be used to emphasize 
difference without a definable group membership. This is 
not to say that there will not be problems and shifts of 
allegiance at the boundaries of the group. For "Assamese" 
to be used as a distinct cultural category, it must be 
clear who is, and who is not, an Assamese. Thus, from 
this, it is clear that the separate histories, of 
Assamese, Bengalis and so on, in themselves emphasize 
difference. Once membership of the different groups is 
defined, however loosely, interactions between the two 
groups and the outcomes of this interaction, can be 
utilized to integrate or divide the groups further. 
With regards to the Assamese, the recurring 
historical themes articulated are of continuous attempted 
foreign oppression and powerlessness with regard to 
control of their own destiny, particularly in relation to 
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neighbouring Bengal. This is often attributed to the 
political and economic power of Bengalis within Assam. 
Simultaneously, and despite this, there is a common 
feeling of Assamese superiority towards Bengalis. This is 
demonstrated by the less rigid and hierarchical caste 
structure of Assam, due to the particular Vaishnavite 
version of Hinduism practised in Assam, the relationship 
with the tribals and the much greater agricultural 
productivity of Assam in comparison to Bengal. These 
ideas recur throughout many of the particular historical 
events which are investigated in this chapter as defining 
events in the construction of an Assamese identity. 
These historical events include those occurrences 
which histories of Assam regard as the most important 
issues, as well as other events which appear less far- 
reaching. The common linkages between all the events 
discussed are that all these issues recur both in popular 
consciousness and in academic writings about the current 
situation to justify notions of Assameseness, and 
contemporary references to these events will demonstrate 
this. 
The role of Assam in the ancient epics is important 
as it suggests that, in as much as India was "more than a 
geographical expression" in the pre-Moghul and British 
periods, Assam was an integral part of this polity. The 
first section relates to the ideas discussed in the 
previous chapter referring to the basis of Indian 
nationalism and the continuing dichotomy between a 
modernizing, scientific "western" nationalism, and an 
indigenously developed Indian nationalism which, in large 
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part, would rely on Hinduism and consequently the 
Mahabharata and the Ramayana. 
The attempted Moghul invasions convey the opposite 
message; that the Assamese were never a part of this 
particular "all-India" empire. The second section will 
also assess other marginal comments about linkages that 
did exist between the Assamese and Moghuls and will 
examine scholarship assessing the structure of Moghul 
rule throughout India, to establish how marginal Assam 
was to the Moghul Empire. Although the main aim of the 
thesis is to demonstrate the manner in which historical 
events are used in the present, it would be naive to 
attempt this without some assessment of the validity of 
the claims made by present elites. 
The version of Vaishnavite Hinduism practised in 
Assam, coupled with the resulting looser caste structure 
and the image of Shankardeva as the founder of modern 
Assamese nationalism, has lent powerful images to 
Assamese consciousness. Religious identities are 
portrayed by their proponents as more "real" than other 
cultural identities, representative as they are of some 
"higher truth", but their manifestations are as easily 
available to justify external relationships, methods of 
behaviour and understanding of others. The third section 
will investigate the articulation of the difference 
between Assamese Vaishnavism and other versions of 
Hinduism. 
The fourth section investigates specific 
relationships with the (non-Bengali) Other. Artisans had 
long entered Assam to meet the requirements of the 
various kingdoms, particularly the Ahom. These early 
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immigrants, it is argued, assimilated Assamese customs, 
language and so forth, thus enabling contemporary 
Assamese nationalists to contrast readily and, indeed, 
usefully between early and later immigrants. They are 
further portrayed as having entered Assam for the benefit 
of the Assamese people, rather than solely for their own 
enrichment. The actual "truth" of this claim is less 
important, in terms of contemporary political 
developments, than its popular perception as fact. 
The relationship with tribals is even more confused. 
Some tribals2 now argue that notions of Assameseness 
derived from the constant interaction with tribals that 
occurred in the pre-British period. In this view the 
tribals are as important in the development of an 
Assamese identity as the Assamese themselves, both 
identities being the outcome of a specific relationship. 
To the tribals, the assimilation which has occurred has 
been due to the Assamese adoption of tribal customs, such 
as non-vegetarianism. 
Others, particularly the Assamese elite, would 
differ from this position, arguing that the Assamese are 
by definition more advanced and that any linkages have 
been solely one way, with the tribals borrowing cultural 
artifacts from the Assamese. This is but one example of 
the fuzziness at the boundaries of the Assamese 
community. Since Independence, specific policies such as 
reservations, the continuing Inner and Outer-Line 
policies and the Sixth Schedule (discussed in section 
2 For example, Jayanta Rangpi, Autonomous State Demand 
Council (A. S. D. C. ) Member of the Lok Sabha, for Karbi 
Anglong Constituency (Interview: New Delhi 6 July 1996). 
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2.4) and, more recently, state reorganization (see 
section 5.2) have all given greater rights to tribal 
groups at the expense of a common northeastern identity, 
tribal identities having been articulated in terms of an 
anti-Assamese sentiment. This follows Verrier Elwin's 
classic theory of isolating and perpetuating the tribal 
customs of the northeast (see section 2.4). In this way, 
difference, rather than commonality, has been emphasized, 
thereby increasing the tribal-Assamese division. 
The final historical metaphor to be examined is that 
of crisis. Many communities, particularly those which see 
themselves at risk of cultural take-over, or indeed 
minoritization, create myths to consolidate the group. 
Commonplace is the idea that the major threat comes from 
within the group itself; the idea of the debauched French 
Second Empire, for example, implied that military 
weakness could be attributed to a decline in moral 
standards, without which German invasion would have been 
impossible. The myth representing the Assamese fear of 
cultural annihilation is the Mayamaria revolt, quickly 
followed by, and in large part the cause of, the Burmese 
invasion in the early nineteenth century, both of which 
left the population massively diminished and the economy 
in ruins. The contemporary usage of this idea and its 
effect on the Assamese will be assessed in this section. 
3.1 The Mahabharata and the Ramayana 
Discussion of the ancient epics in contemporary Indian 
political debate owes as much to recent Hindu revivalism 
as to the secular/religious dichotomy regarding the basis 
of Indian nationalism (see Chapter Two). It is perhaps 
stranger that it is used as part of the argument that 
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Assam is an integral part of India. After a brief outline 
of the evidence given to suggest that Assam was an 
important link in the sub-continental span of the epics, 
the analysis will provide some explanation as to the 
utilization of this sparse evidence. 
The use of the ancient epics as contemporary 
political tools is only valid if it is accepted that the 
basis for "India" stems in some manner from Hinduism. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, it was not seen to be 
contradictory for the secular Congress Party to utilize 
territorial limits derived from ancient religious texts 
and myths, in particular the idea of Bharatvarsha; "the 
land of the mythical Vedic ruler Bharat" (Jalal 1995: 
26). For example, K. M. Munshi, one of those who framed 
the Indian Constitution, argues that the importance of 
the epics stems from the preeminence of spirituality in 
Indian nationalism; 
The greatness of Iran, of Greece, of Rome and of 
Byzantium faded within a few centuries... On the 
other hand the historical annals of China and India 
record millenniums. The world importance of nations 
cannot be measured in the long run in terms of the 
men they butcher in battle, of the wealth of which 
they rob others, or of the destruction they bring to 
civilisation. It has to be reckoned in terms of the 
knowledge, beauty and culture which they contribute 
towards man's possessions in his journey towards 
self-realization... in the vitality they conserve in 
order to equip man for a higher destiny. (Munshi 
1964: 5) 
This Indian spirituality manifests itself in 
Hinduism, in the attaining of dharma or higher 
consciousness, and; 
... behind the social, cultural and aesthetic 
achievements of the Aryan culture, stands the 
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influence of the two immortal works: the Ramayana 
and the Mahabharata. (Munshi 1964: 8) 
This ambiguous relationship, particularly concerning 
the racial implications of the Aryan myths with regard to 
the Dravidian south of India, suggests the importance of 
the epics in Indian nationalism. Attempts to portray the 
Assamese as an integral part of the remit of ancient 
Hindu society show a paucity, rather than a surplus, of 
material to argue the case; but what is important is that 
this evidence is used at all. 
That is to say that the explicit assumption is that 
the Indian identity is based on spirituality, rather than 
secularism, and the implicit suggestion that this is 
thereby inextricably linked to Hinduism. More than this 
though, portrayals of the Hindu epics imply that India's 
ancient glories were "disrupted by a stream of foreign 
invaders" (Jalal 1995: 255) The context of the epics 
provided a bench-mark against which independent India 
could be judged. 
How then is information regarding Assam's place in 
ancient India articulated? Madhu Limaye's work, 
Contemporary Indian Politics, demonstrates the rather 
blunt usage of the epics. The preface states that the 
work attempts to; 
examine the diverse aspects of the Indian polity in 
their proper historical setting. A central thread 
runs through all these essays, that is the desire to 
see a strong secularised India wedded to social 
justice and amity among its various religious 
communities and linguistic groups. (Limaye 1987: 
vii) 
The chapter referring to Assam however gives 
examples from the Mahabharata and the Puranas which, 
although containing a rider that this is "a mythological 
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account... ", argues that "... it goes to prove that 
Kamarupa was part of the Indian politico-cultural 
system". 3 
The first example given by Limaye comes from the 
Puranas; 
According to the Kalika Purana, Naraka was brought 
up by King Janaka of Videha. After the former 
attained the age of 16 he conquered the Kiratas and 
established himself as the ruler of Pragjyotisha. 
Naraka was killed by Krishna, and in response to the 
appeal of Naraka's mother he installed Naraka's son, 
Bhagdatta, on the throne of Pragjytisha. The two 
epics... also mention Naraka, who founded 
Pragjyotisha. (Limaye 1987: 299) 
The most oft-quoted event from this period is the 
battle of Kurukshetra, at which Bhagdatta, the ruler of 
Assam, and his allies, the Kauravas, were defeated by 
Arjuna's armies. This example recurs throughout 
introductions to Assamese political literature; 
"The Mahabharata indicates that... " (Dubey 1980: 62). 
"Even the epic Mahabharata mentions about... " (Hussain 
1993: 26). 
"The Sabha Parva of the Mahabharata narrates... " (Limaye 
1987: 300). 
"Both the Ramayana and . the Mahabharata make distinct 
references to Pragjyotish and Kamrup" (Singh 1987: 12). 
Kalidasa in his epic Raghu Vamsha also describes the 
triumph of Raghu over the King of Pragjyotisha.... 
3 Pragjyotisha and Kamarupa are the ancient names for 
Assam. The latter was the accepted name of the region at 
least until the Ahom invasion and survives as Kamrup, a 
contemporary district of Assam. 
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the King of Kamarupa (also called 
Pragjyotisheshwara) who used fierce war-elephants to 
fight his enemies, but the same King had to 
surrender, with all his elephants, to Raghu who was 
mightier than Indra. The King of Kamarupa then paid 
worship to Raghu with a garland of gems. (Limaye 
1987: 300-301) 
Doctor Sohoni argues that these references; 
establish that Kamarupa and its kings had been 
brought within the orbit of the Gupta empire and the 
Indian cultural mainstream by Samudragupta. (quoted 
in Limaye 1987: 301) 
The implication of this is clear, yet few would 
explicitly argue that this would be the basis for the 
post-Independence Indian national identity. 
The question is, why should any literature examining 
present-day political problems in Assam feel any 
compunction to quote from texts reportedly 3000 years 
old? These references would not appear to provide the 
context within which the Assam Movement developed. 
Clearly, any explanation of Assamese ancient history 
needs to quote from these sources, due to the lack of any 
other material. However, the works given as examples are 
not attempting to do this, rather to set the scene for an 
explanation of events in the 1980s. 4 
Despite the emphasis of the "high discourse" on 
notions of secularism, Hindu spirituality has recurred as 
a focus of identity for the "low discourse", and has been 
utilized by the elite for this purpose, as Munshi 
demonstrates. This spirituality permeated into the higher 
4 Assamese and Sanskrit are the only south Asian 
languages with an indigenous word meaning "history". 
"Assam is also the first in India in systematic history 
writing, which started in the 13th Century" (A. K. Das 
1982: 2). 
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discourse, particularly during the late 1970's and 
1980's, due to the decline of secular Congress ideology, 
and manifested itself in the popularity of the television 
version of the Ramayana from 19875 and later the 
Mahabharata. 
Benedict Anderson argues that the expansion of a 
singular state-wide print-media, replacing older dialects 
with a single vernacular, was an integral part of the 
creation of a national consciousness in western Europe, 
homogenizing linguistic differences (Anderson 1991: 67- 
82). Similarly, the homogenization of the ancient epics, 
which had been multi-form religious texts (Lutgendorf 
1995: 244) would appear to achieve similar ends in India. 
Through being broadcast on Doordashan, which was 
perceived as speaking to, and for, the elite, some 
legitimacy was provided to the low level discourse from 
the "secular" elite. 
It would seem valid to suggest that, despite the 
acceptance of the liberal model of governance, in both 
popular and elite perceptions the role of spirituality in 
mass identity is paramount. Assam is thus legitimated as 
an integral part of the Indian state not just through 
lying within its territorial spatial boundaries but 
through its shared spirituality (for the Assamese 
nationalist response to these claims see section 3.3). 
5 Conservative estimates suggest that viewing figures 
were between 40 and 60 million for the programmes 
(Lutgendorf 1995: 223). 
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3.2 The Moghul Invasions and the Ahom Kingdom 
Discussion of the Moghul invasions of Assam clearly 
represents the opposite viewpoint to references to the 
ancient epics and it is the idea of the separateness of 
Assam which has been used by elites through the 
articulation of this history. 
According to Limaye; "Assam was the only part of 
Sanskritized India which never fell under Muslim rule" 
(Limaye 1987: 302). The extent of the Sanskritization of 
the northeast could well be questioned (e. g. Hussain 
1993: 26-27) but the fact that India's contemporary 
nationhood is never argued to be based on the 
geographical area controlled by the Moghuls suggests that 
this memory is used in a different manner. 
The full history of the events surrounding the 
Moghul invasions are debatable, in large part due to the 
lack of complete records, but it seems likely that the 
final encounter, the Battle of Saraighat in 1671, marked 
the endpoint of a three power conflict between the Ahorns, 
who were to eventually triumph, the Koches, the preceding 
regional power, and the Moghuls. The first Muslim 
invasion of Assam had occurred in 1198, under Bakhtiyar 
Khilji, and the final invasion, which culminated in the 
Battle of Saraighat, was the sixteenth invasion attempt. 6 
Edward Gait's A History of Assam provides the 
accepted history of Assam's medieval period and the 
manner in which this is written, focusing primarily on 
6 The Assam Movement has referred to the present 
conflict as the "Eighteenth war of Independence". The 
seventeenth refers to the anti-colonial nationalist 
movement. 
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the Ahom Kingdom, has helped give a retrospective power 
to the belief that the Ahorns are the "original" Assamese. 
Through detailing the histories of the various other main 
groups, Koches, Kacharis and Jaintias separately, a 
greater emphasis on division rather than regional 
similarity is given. One explanation for this focus is 
the maintenance of written historical records by the 
Ahorns, in contrast to other groups in the northeast. 
From the thirteenth century to the end of the 
fifteenth century the Kacharis were the primary power in 
the northeast, controlling the south bank of the 
Brahmaputra from Dkallon to Dikhu, the river Dikhu 
forming the boundary between the Ahorns and Kacharis (Gait 
1992: 237). A battle was fought on the river Dikhu in 
1490, following an emigration of Kacharis from the 
eastern Ahorn region, in which the Kacharis were 
victorious, but the growing Ahorn power meant that over 
the next 30 years the Kachari kingdom was forced back to 
the Dhansiri river (Gait 1992: 238). By 1536, the Ahorns 
had pushed the Kacharis into the North Cachar Hills, 
leaving the whole southern bank of the Brahmaputra to the 
' Ahorns (Gait 1992: 238). 
The Kacharis are also known as Bodos. In the 1980's, 
and particularly since the signing of the Assam Accord, 
the Bodos, led by the All Bodo Students Union (A. B. S. U. ), 
pressed for greater autonomy within the state of Assam. 
The power of the A. B. S. U. declined after the signing of 
the Bodo Accord in 1993, and the Bodo Security Force, 
which followed a more extreme path, pressed for 
independence. 
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Ahorn power in the northeastern region of Assam was 
similarly developed in this period. In 1523 the Chutiyas, 
who controlled the region around contemporary Dibrugarh 
and Lakhimpur districts, were subjugated. 
However, the rising power of the Koch kingdom led to 
the Ahorns accepting the suzerainty of the Koch king and 
the loss of a large tract of territory on the north bank 
of the Brahmaputra in 1563. Ahorn preeminence returned 
after the Koches lost a war with the Moghuls, and this 
region fell under the direct rule of the Moghuls. 
The Koch kingdom provides another oft-quoted line of 
argument of interaction between the northeast and the 
rest of India. When the founder of the Koch Kingdom, 
Vishwa Singh, died in 1540, it is reported that his two 
sons, Malla Deb and Sukladhvaj, were studying in Benares 
(Dubey 1980: 62). $ 
Similarly, it is often claimed that Madhav Dev, a 
Vaishnavite Saint of the sixteenth century, wrote of 
being proud of being born in "Bharata" (A. Guha 1980: 
1701). The implication of these India-wide linkages is 
clear, but the fact that they are so often mentioned 
suggests more a lack of alternative evidence to show 
linkages than that the northeast was fully entwined in 
sub-continental events. 9 
8 Actually, it was Singh's two eldest sons who were 
studying in Benares. The youngest, Nar Singh, proclaimed 
himself king in his brothers' absence. Upon their return 
they rose an army and defeated him (Gait 1992: 47). 
9 Interestingly, the defeated son possibly became 
ruler of Bhutan which, "in ancient times... occasionally 
at least" formed part of the Kingdom of Kamrup (Gait 
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If the defining characteristic of India were the 
Gandhian notion that it is a land of villages, then it 
would seem fair to argue that for most regions, 
demonstrating nation-wide linkages would prove difficult. 
The point is that other regions of India do not 
particularly need to prove that they are an integral part 
of the present state, whereas in Assam various minor 
linkages recur throughout academic texts, as though to 
prove that such relationships exist. 
From 1615 to 1638 the Ahorns directed their energies 
against the Moghul invaders. The collapse of the Koch 
kingdom, which formed a bulwark between the Ahorns and the 
Moghuls led the Ahorns to sign a treaty ceding Guwahati to 
the Moghuls, paying war indemnities and retreating to 
Namrup. 
This position continued until the 1660's when the 
Ahorns attempted to take advantage of Moghul weakness 
during the war of succession between Shah Jahan's four 
sons Aurangzeb, Dara Shukoh, Murad and Shuja. 
The ascent of a new king, Cakradhvaja Simha, to the 
Ahorn throne, marked the beginning of the end of Moghul 
dominance; four years of war against Aurangzeb's general, 
Raam Simha of Ambar, eventually led to a crushing Ahom 
1992: 47). This linkage is generally not recognised in 
contemporary political articles. Similarly, the Duars, 
roughly synonymous with the contemporary district of 
Kokrajhar, were governed by a form of dual-sovereignty by 
the Bhutanese and the Ahorns (Lahiri 1994: 257). Full 
British annexation only occurred after the Treaty of 
Sinchula, following the Anglo-Bhutanese Wars of 1864-1866 
(Gait 1992: 303). Under the treaty the British paid an 
annual sum to compensate Bhutan for the loss of the 
Duars. This money is still paid by the Government of 
India (Robinson 1989: 164). 
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victory at Saraighat in 1667. Ahorn dominance of the 
northeast followed until 1769, when Ahorn rule was finally 
weakened by the Mayamaria revolt, which was thus 
indirectly to blame for the subsequent Burmese and 
British invasion. 
The Battle of Saraighat, and the actions of the Ahorn 
leader, Lachit Barphukan, in particular, are argued to be 
the proudest moments of Assamese history and as such have 
been used as contemporary metaphors by the Assam 
Movement. Barphukan is alleged to have killed his own 
uncle, in charge of building a section of ramparts, for 
allowing his troops to rest. According to Bhattacharya, 
Barphukan said; 
Rest!... The country is going to the ruins (sic) and 
you are still talking of rest. You have to either 
work or die. This is no time for rest... My uncle 
is not greater than my country. (Bhattacharya 1990: 
43) 
The implicit messages for the present situation of 
Barphukan's words and actions are clear; the idea of 
country or nation, the fear of crisis, and a stricture 
not to follow the Assamese trait of indolence (see 
section 4.2). As Das writes of Lachit Barphukan, "even 
today his name sparks patriotism and courage amongst the 
Assamese masses" (A. K. Das 1980: 12). 
During the protests of 1979, protestors at one rally 
in Guwahati hoisted; 
a huge silhouette portrait of Lachit Barphukan, the 
symbol of bravery and patriotism... the overall 
message of the meeting was that, if the Assamese 
people want to live with honour, they must win this 
battle. (A. K. Das 1982: 71) 
This history is worth noting for the purpose of this 
thesis for two reasons. Although this is not the place to 
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assess the manner of Moghul rule throughout India, it is 
frequently argued that the Moghul state primarily existed 
for the purposes of taxation and war. Given the vast sums 
of indemnities and tributes paid by the Ahorns and other 
groups in the northeast to the Moghuls, these links do 
not appear to be as different in the northeast from other 
parts of India where local rulers maintained 
jurisdiction. 
It is possible that revenue was claimed, at least 
from some of them, in the form of a stipulated 
annual tribute, as had been the practice in earlier 
periods; but the obscure records which alone are 
available for the territories of the more important 
chiefs can also be interpreted on the theory that 
the emperor claimed nothing beyond loyal service, 
including of course the periodical presents which 
etiquette required. (Cambridge History of India 
1937: 464-465) 
For example, it is recorded that the Koch kingdom in 
the late sixteenth century was a vassal of the Moghuls 
and; 
in 1578, according to the Ain-i-Akbari, Nar Narainlo 
renewed his demonstration of obedience to the 
imperial throne and sent 54 elephants and other 
valuable presents to Akbar. (Dubey 1980: 62) 
Secondly, there is nothing intrinsic in the pre- 
British period which suggests that the Assamese are in 
any way a singular definable cultural group. Some traits 
were shared, particularly the version of Hinduism (see 
section 3.3), but politically there was no all- 
encompassing "Assamese" group. The Assam Movement has 
retrospectively commandeered Ahorn history as the early 
history of Assam, and the Ahorns as the original Assamese. 
10 The name assumed by Malla Deb, Koch King from 1540- 
c. 1581. 
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That the Ahorns were the most powerful group in 
northeast India immediately prior to colonization is 
clear but the use of Ahorn myths as representative of the 
"Assamese" has been constructed retrospectively. One of 
the most important links is the belief that the very name 
Assam derives from the Ahoms. 11 As Dubey argues; 
There is a belief that the appellation Assam for 
this area is based on Ahorn ("S" becomes "h" in 
Assamese and "a" becomes 110" in the eastern Indo- 
Aryan languages). (Dubey 1980: 62) 
That said, those events which are seen as important 
at this time by present-day Assamese are the Battle of 
Saraighat, the clear message of which is that foreigners 
can be expelled if the Assamese work to this end with 
determined leadership. The internalization of the idea 
that the Assamese are workshy appears as political 
parties urge their followers to work for the benefit of 
the Assamese, in language implying that without 
strictures encouraging this, it will not occur; 
The fact that the political history shares many 
similarities with that of the rest of "Moghul" India, is 
ignored. The contemporary role of the Ahorns in Assamese 
society is noteworthy for the manner in which they are 
now seen to be separate from mainstream Assamese society, 
and particularly the Assam Movement. As with many 
originally non-Hindu ruling groups, the Ahorns, previously 
Buddhist, on conversion to Hinduism, received Sudra 
status. After losing their political rights to British 
11 Alternative viewpoints are that the term Assam 
derives from the Sanskrit asama, meaning "peerless" (for 
example, Rafiabadi 1988: vi) or is a corruption of the 
Thai cham, meaning "undefeated" or "conquerors" (Kakati 
1941: 2) . 
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colonization, new economic structures and forms of 
taxation reduced their economic power, such that after 
Independence they received other Backward Caste status, 
whilst petitioning to be recognized as a Scheduled Tribe. 
For Gait, it was their full-scale conversion to 
Hinduism that marked the end of Ahom dominance, as; 
By accepting a subordinate place in the hierarchy of 
Hinduism, not only did the Ahorns lose their pride of 
place and martial spirit, but, with a less 
nourishing diet, their physique also underwent a 
change for the worse... no one, looking at an 
average Ahom of the present day, would suspect him 
of being the descendent of a race of conquerors who, 
though small in number, gradually extended their 
rule over the whole of the Brahmaputra valley and 
successfully resisted the assaults of the Moghuls. 
(Gait 1992: 174) 
This demonstrates two important and generic features 
of British rule. There is a focus on physical 
characteristics and also a suggestion that these traits 
were not inherent but derived from the adoption of a 
different system of cultural values. 
The separation of the Ahorns from the rest of the 
Assamese community was encouraged by the British. The 
Ahorn Association, later the Ahorn Sabha (Gassah 1992: 20), 
was established in 1893 and in 1912 two members of the 
Ahorn Association were designated as representative of the 
Ahorn community by the government and given seats in the 
Assam Legislature (Bose 1989: 95). 
The Ahorn Mongolian Tai Pari shad, a pressure group 
for the Ahom Community in the post-Independence period, 
developed into a political party, the Ujani Assam Rajya 
Parishad (Upper Assam State Council) (U. A. R. P. ) which was 
founded in 1967 in Garhgaon, capital of the Ahom Kings 
(B. P. Singh 1996: 100). The U. A. R. P. contested three 
123 
seats in the 1969 election. Its platform was for the 
creation of an Ahom homeland in Lakhimpur, Dibrugarh and 
Sibsagar. This was combined with a criticism of the 
establishment of the first oil refinery in Naringi, 
Guwahati, rather than in Upper Assam, where the oil was 
produced. The party failed electorally as it failed to 
secure enough support from non-Ahorns, although it did 
establish itself as the party to which "the majority of 
Ahorns and Chutias owe their support" (Chauhan 1972: 376). 
The relationship between the Ahorns and other 
Assamese was again shown during the machinations of the 
Congress (I) Party during the early 1980's. As Sanjib 
Baruah writes, following the ministry of Anwara Taimur; 
The choice of Gogoi as chief minister in January 
1982 was an attempt to limit the damage of the 
erosion of influence of ethnic Assamese officials, 
reinforcing feelings of minoritization. Gogoi, an 
ethnic Assamese, was Ahorn by caste, which was 
another potential weak link in the Assamese ethnic 
coalition. (Baruah 1986: 1197) 
The result of these machinations was that, despite 
historical notions of Assamese identity being based upon 
the historic "myths" of the military triumphs and 
political power of the Ahorns, those Assamese with a 
direct genealogical link to the Ahorns are actually 
campaigning for a separate homeland on the basis of their 
caste and cultural difference from the other "ethnic" 
Assamese. The same situation occurs, more vociferously, 
with regard to the Kacharis/Bodos, raising an interesting 
issue as to who are the Assamese? As Anthony Smith 
reports, with reference to modern Greeks; 
"descent" was seen in largely demographic terms; or 
rather, cultural affinity with Byzantium and ancient 
Greece (notably Athens) was predicated on 
demographic continuity. Unfortunately for the 
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classicist Hellenist myth, the demographic evidence 
is at best tenuous, at worst non-existent. 
(A. D. Smith 1991: 28-29) 
The difference between Greek and Assamese origin 
myths is that the group to which the myths relate in the 
Assamese case is still in existence and articulates its 
separateness from the "Assamese". Despite this 
discontinuity, the importance of the Ahorns as metaphors 
at least for the present movement is undoubted. Two of 
the sparks for the foundation of the Assam Movement (see 
section 6.1) are directly related. In July, 1978, rioting 
broke out over an; 
obscure piece of research in a departmental journal 
of the Dibrugarh University, misconstrued to reflect 
the author's anti-Asamiya attitude. (A. Guha 1980: 
1706) 
M. L. Bose, the author, wrote that rumours that he 
had tried to create communal disharmony and "malign the 
Assamese people" were due to a misunderstanding that he 
had; "tried to prove the numerical minority of the 
Assamese people in the state" and had "held the Ahorns 
responsible for many social evils in the Brahmaputra 
Valley" (Bose 1989: 7). 
Not only was the preservation of certain 
interpretations of history important but the racial links 
of the Ahorns with southeast, rather than south Asia, were 
utilized in constructing difference. Later in 1978, the 
Gopinath Bardoloi Soccer Cup in Guwahati witnessed an 
attempt by some activists from the All Assam Students' 
Union to "harass and demoralise the team from Calcutta" 
(Nag 1990: 131). 
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During the final, between East Bengal, Calcutta and 
the Port Authority, Bangkok, the Assamese chauvinists 
supported the Thai team; 
who were more like "our ancestors, the Tai-Ahoms". 
To great jubilation... the Thais soon led 2- 
0... Later the Bengalis drew level, went on to win 
the match and in a gesture that blotted the name of 
the tournament for all time to come, one of their 
players took off his shorts to display his backside 
to a disappointed crowd. (Nag 1990: 131) 
This use of the image of the Ahom kingdom as a 
metaphor by the present Assam Movement demonstrates not 
only the ability of identities to be manipulated, but 
that any primordial link is insufficient, and indeed 
unable, to explain the use of historic myths in identity 
creation. 
The use of these historical images in popular 
literature is common, as it is in elite explanations. For 
example, in 1958, the Asom Jatiya Mahasabha (Assam 
National Conference) placed the immigration problem in 
this historical perspective, arguing; 
that Assam has survived by passing through many 
travails. (1) The Moghuls... (2) The Burmese... (3) 
The British by tagging Sylhet round her neck... (4) 
the Saadulla's Muslim League Government... (5) The 
British Cabinet Mission... But at every time the 
Assamese fought heroically against every such 
attack... Now it has become a plan of people who 
could be defeated by 12 Turkish cavalry soldiers and 
whose motherland has been given away to Pakistan, to 
influence and rule over Assam. (Asom Jatiya 
Mahasabha 1958: 1-2) 
The links between the historical and the present are 
clearly witnessed through this articulation of anti- 
Bengali sentiment. Unlike the Bengalis, and against all 
odds, the Assamese are argued, historically, to have been 
masters of their own destiny. It is solely inertia and 
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lack of leadership which has prevented them from taking 
their rightful place in affairs in the northeast during 
the last 150 years. 
3.3 Shankardeva and Neo-Vaishnavite Hinduism 
The articulation of religious differences consolidates 
notions of Assamese separateness from Bengal 12 The vision 
of Shankardeva as the founder of Assamese nationalism, 
resemblant of the retrospective portrayal of Jeanne d'Arc 
as the founder of French nationalism (A. D. Smith 1986: 
180), recognises his use of the vernacular Assamese 
language and suggests the contemporary Assamese focus on 
language as the key cultural signifier. 
The emphasis on the "Saintliness" of Shankardeva 
(1449-1548) (Cantlie 1985: 134) and the looser caste 
system, is reminiscent of the India-wide emphasis on the 
spiritual rather than the secular. Religious identity in 
Assam, at least amongst caste-Hindu Assamese, is believed 
to be superior to that elsewhere in India on the grounds 
that it is less divisive. In popular perception, there 
have never been; "retrogressive social practices such as 
dowry, Sati, caste and communal conflict" (A. K. Das 1982: 
2). 
During the 1920's, Gandhi is believed to have 
suggested that the campaign against untouchability was 
unnecessary in Assam, since Shankardeva's Vaishanavite 
reforms had effectively dispelled the worst excesses of 
12Sreenivasa Murthy argues that; 
Though some would regard the Neo-Vaishnavite 
movement of Assam as an off-shoot of Bengal 
Vaishnavism. the two schools are independent of each 
other. (1973: iii) 
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the caste system. Gandhi's attitude towards Assam varied 
over time and much of his early writings suggest that it 
was more the backwardness, rather than the liberal 
attitudes, which attracted him. He wrote that "Assam 
impresses one as altogether a different sort of land" 
(Gandhi 1966: 18) and that "few reforms have been 
introduced... and consequently the people have saved 
their wealth and preserved their prosperity" (Gandhi 
1966: 54). 
These impressions represent a shift from his earlier 
position in which he; 
compared the Assamese people to the Coles, Bhils and 
Pindaris in an article in Young India in 1908. On 
[his] visit in 1921, Pandit Hemchandra showed him 
Assamese literature, art and fine hand-woven 
clothes... Gandhi... gracefully corrected himself. 
(A. K. Das 1982: 1) 
The differences between Hinduism in Assam and 
elsewhere in India will be analyzed in this section and, 
more importantly, in terms of this thesis, the manner in 
which these differences have been portrayed. 
Despite continuous migration into Assam by various 
groups from China, Burma, Tibet and India since ancient 
times, Hinduism was the dominant religion, although many 
groups engaged in Sanskritization continued to use; 
11 ... certain rituals and practices of their pre-Hindu days 
together with the Sanskritized rituals and practices" 
(Hussain 1993: 28). 
Before Shankardeva, Shaktaism predominated in the 
Brahmaputra Valley, but the India-wide Bhakti movement, 
articulated by Shankardeva in Assam, led to the 
popularity of Vaishnavism. 
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The Assamese version of Vaishnavism is similar to 
that practised elsewhere in India in as much as it is 
monotheistic and "Visnu is worshipped as the supreme God" 
(Sreenivasa Murthy 1973: 9). 
Vaishnavism has certain features which distinguishes 
(sic) itself from Saivism. In the first place it is 
thoroughly monotheistic. The second important 
feature is that Visnu assumes different forms or 
Incarnations (avatara). The word Avatara means 
"descent". It signifies that in order to present to 
us a higher ideal of life God brings himself down. 
(Sreenivasa Murthy 1973: 11). 
Assamese Vaishnavism follows the path of devotion 
(bhakti) based on the teachings of the Bhagavata 
Purana. (Cantlie 1985: 134) 
The major tangible distinction of the Assamese 
version, due to Shankardeva's reforms, are the use of 
Satras, or monasteries. 
Soon after his [Shankardeva's] death, his disciples 
established centres of worship, called Satras, which 
provide the permanent organization of the sect. A 
Satra consists of a guru and his disciples initiated 
by him. Physically it comprises the house of the 
guru, a large prayer hall for daily worship called a 
Name House and, in some cases, rows of huts for 
celibate devotees who have renounced the world. 
(Cantlie 1985: 134) 
There are estimated to be over six hundred Satras 
distributed throughout the State. Worship is chiefly 
congregational, different castes combining to sing 
hymns in the vernacular before the Bhagavat, into 
which the God is invoked for the duration of the 
performance. The hymns consist largely of the many 
names of God and performances of Name, as it is 
called, are held on all seasonal festivals, rites de 
passage, and other contingencies of life. (Cantlie 
1985: 135) 
The Name Houses, or Namghars, have played an 
important part in village life not just for purposes of 
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worship, but have been used for village assemblies, 
meeting places for discussion and at "one time they tried 
offenses by local villagers and were usually inviolable" 
(Hazarika 1995: 43). They have thereby provided an 
additional arena of public space unavailable in much of 
India, and in themselves emphasize a concrete difference 
from other regions. 
There are further nuances to Assamese Vaishnavism 
which are played upon to focus solidarity. One 
implication is that it is an indigenous movement, which 
of itself improved Assamese society; 
Assam presented a sorry spectacle on the eve of the 
revival of Vaishnavism in Assam. In politics it was 
an age of disintegration... In the sphere of 
religion, the period distinguished itself for the 
notorious practices of Tantricism... Above all, 
there was no social solidarity because of the 
baneful effects of the caste system. (Sreenivasa 
Murthy 1973: 44) 
Shankardeva's philosophy emphasised discipline and 
morality, and attacked ritual and tradition for its own 
sake. The result of these tendencies is that Assamese 
Vaishnavism is seen to differ in some senses from the 
more "fatalistic" mainstream Hinduism; 
Success in life either worldly or spiritually is 
impossible without great effort or heroism. This 
fact is recognised and emphasised by the Assam 
school of Vaishnavism. (Sreenivasa Murthy 1973: 63) 
Perhaps the most far-reaching effect of this 
movement though, is in the actual manner that the 
religion is practised; 
According to Shankardeva, one man is higher than 
another not through his birth but only through his 
own love and sympathy. There is only One God who is 
the origin of all, the distinctions of caste and 
creed vanished for him and he saw humanity as one 
large family, and all men as brothers... he gave up 
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the use of Sanskrit and started his preaching in the 
language of the common man and thus laid the 
foundation of modern vernacular literature in the 
province of Assam. (Sreenivasa Murthy 1973: 67) 
Thus Assamese Vaishnavism allows for an easier 
conception of the secular and the religious than is 
possible with much of Hinduism, since worship proceeds 
more separately from general morality. 
Cross-cutting identities have made long-term 
cultural unity for political purposes an extremely rare 
event in south Asia. As Manor argues; "heterogeneity 
within individual states- means that serious threats to 
break away seldom arise" (Manor 1997: 466). In general, 
when they have arisen, they have been short-lived due to 
the difficulty of maintaining internal cohesion. The 
"success" of this method of organization in Assam could 
well be ascribed to the lack of serious caste-based 
division and fluidity of caste boundaries in northeast 
India. 
For example, one, of the foremost tales of this 
period used to demonstrate caste mobility in northeast 
India is that of the War-Brahmins, quoted by Bhuyan; 
During the invasion of Assam by the Koch general 
Chilarai, the Ahoms dressed up their soldiers in the 
guise of Brahmans, each wearing a sacred thread and 
seated on a cow, the killing of a Brahman or of a 
cow being tabu (sic) to a Hindu. Chilerai... 
desisted from attacking the Ahom army. But the 
social consequences... resulted in serious confusion 
in society. Most of these "War-Brahmans" refused to 
give up their sacred threads; they began to live the 
life of Brahmans to all intents and purposes, and 
claimed the privileges and respect due to that 
superior caste. (Bhuyan 1949: 20) 
Brahmins, although influential, do not dominate the 
social hierarchy. Other high-castes are equally 
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influential, whilst all non-Brahmins are classed as 
Sudras; "among whom there is considerable inter-caste 
mobility; and there are practically no untouchables" 
(Datta ed 1994: 13). Furthermore, castes are not related 
to professions, and "caste-based disabilities are few" 
(Datta ed. 1994: 13). 
Despite the mass support for Vaishnavism, the 
Brahminically controlled Shataism continued. Ahorn kings 
patronized both groups but towards the end of their rule 
began to favour the latter (leading to the events 
discussed in section 3.5). Vaishnavism encouraged the 
development of; "the Asamiya language, literature and 
performing arts like dance and drama" (Hussain 1993: 29). 
Shankardeva's description. as the father of Assamese 
nationalism stems both from his providing certain 
stigmatized differences from non-Assamese societies and 
providing the environment within which these differences 
could assert themselves. 
Despite Assamese elites emphasizing the fluidity of 
caste boundaries within Assam, serious caste and 
religious conflicts have occurred. Despite the general 
assumption that division is less common than elsewhere in 
India (for example, B. P. Singh 1996: 5, A. K. Das 1982: 
23), the Mayamaria rebellion (see section 3.5) and the 
Vaishnavite reform movement of the 1930's partially 
refute this impression. The latter was a movement by non- 
Brahmins, criticizing the rituals that had "corrupted" 
Shankardeva's original religious message. Followers did 
not recognize; "the category of caste" (Cantlie 1985: 
157) and opposed the rights and privileges claimed by 
Brahmins. The Assamese emphasis on religious harmony 
132 
ignores divisions which have occurred but, as elsewhere, 
this reflects the importance of popular perception. 
3.4 Who are the Assamese? Pre-Colonial Immigration 
and the Relationship with Tribal Groups 
Assam's contemporary political problems are blamed in 
large part on immigration and particularly on the lack of 
assimilation of recent immigrants into Assamese society. 
It seems unsurprising that it is argued that earlier, 
pre-British immigrants into Assam somehow adapted to the 
Assamese "way of life", forsaking their old customs and 
becoming accepted as Assamese, and thus contrasting with 
later unwanted immigrants. 
Those areas in which pre-British immigrants and 
other later groups such as tea plantation workers, are 
seen to have adapted implies those cultural traits which 
it is necessary for more recent immigrants to adopt if 
they are-to be accepted into Assamese society. 
Conversely, there are no true "indigenous" Assamese, 
most Assamese having entered, in various waves, over the 
last 3000 to 4000 years (Gait 1992: 3). Any that entered 
prior to the Ahom invasion of 1228 are considered the 
original inhabitants, in large part because their arrival 
cannot be accurately dated, and any later, including the 
Ahorns, are often represented as immigrants. 
Indeed, it is generally accepted that the Assamese 
category is not derived from blood ties but rather it is 
a civic category, using the distinction between German 
and French nationalisms. Notions of the Assamese 
community are closely related to territory; it is an 
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archetypal "sons of the soil" movement. Being Assamese is 
primarily justified as a relationship to the land and 
more recently to the administrative unit. Whilst cultural 
markers such as language are clearly vital, the fact that 
more recent migrants are seen to have extra-territorial 
affiliations, to West Bengal or Bangladesh, these early 
immigrants were welcomed due to the fact that they had 
renounced any other ties. 13 
Both Gait and Bhuyan agree that this immigration was 
important, the former stressing that it predominated 
under certain "good" Ahom rulers, in particular Rudra 
Singh, who constructed stone bridges with the help of 
Bengali masons and "imported many artificers from Bengal" 
(Gait 1992: 171). Bhuyan argues more generally that; 
The Ahom rulers encouraged men from India to come 
and settle in Assam, provided their introduction was 
of advantage to the country. Artisans, craftsmen, 
weavers, clerks, accountants, scholars and saints, 
both Hindu and Muslim were freely admitted, and 
occasionally brought by special arrangement with the 
rulers of Hindustan* as there was an inadequacy of 
such men in Assam. But these licensed foreigners, 
after having come to Assam, had to cut off all 
connection with their mother country, and to become 
assimilated with the Assamese in language, manners 
and racial sympathy. They became subjects of the 
Assam government like older inhabitants. (Bhuyan 
1949: 57) 
Thus, Bhuyan highlights four areas of integration 
necessary for acceptance into the Assamese (Ahorn) 
13 Note the similarity of this position with the 
argument by Golwalkar, for example, that the Hindu is 
defined by his (sic) religious attachment to religions 
originating in India, in contrast to civic notions of 
Indian Nehruvian nationalism. 
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community; language, manners, racial sympathy and lack of 
extra-territorial affiliation. Of the recent immigrants 
it is the tea-garden labourers who have most clearly 
followed this pattern and have generally, though not 
completely, been accepted by the Assamese community. The 
temporal context of Bhuyan's writing is important in that 
he is able to perceive of a secular and religious divide, 
such that Muslims are not inherently seen to hold extra- 
territorial affiliations. 
The debate over whether Muslims are a part of 
Assamese society has become more vociferous, particularly 
after the massacre at Nellie. Hussain (1987,1993) 
provides perhaps the strongest arguments for Muslim 
acceptance in suggesting that Muslims were an integral 
part of pre-colonial society, numbering one-sixth of the 
population (Hussain 1993: 29) and claiming that 
"obviously there were no Muslim and non-Muslim conflicts 
in colonial Assam" (Hussain 1993: 29-30). But in 
supporting the claims of "Asamiya" Muslims, Hussain 
ignores the arguments against more recent illegal 
immigrants allowing the R. S. S. and Hindu nationalists to 
focus solely on these (as articulated by B. J. P. 
Secretary, J. Singh 1984). 
The point being that there is no "essential" 
definable Assamese community. Acceptance by elites of 
borderline groups in one period of history does not 
necessarily mean that this implies acceptance in a 
different period. The Assam Movement has attempted to 
focus any articulation of grievances against recent 
Bangladeshi immigrants on' their illegality, rather than 
religion, but Hindu nationalists are able to (correctly) 
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point out that they are also Muslim. This inevitably 
leads to the potential for excluding previously accepted 
"Assamese Muslims" from the contemporary Assamese group 
(see also section 5-1). 
One further feature of Bhuyan's analysis is perhaps 
most important; these foreigners were brought in by and 
for the Assamese rulers. They posed neither an economic 
nor a political threat to the indigenous Assamese. That 
this was the case, made them more likely to be accepted 
by the Assamese community. These immigrants were 
generally disparate, without large supporting communities 
and this made them more likely to repudiate previous ties 
and adopt Assamese customs. Again, this can be contrasted 
with the contemporary situation of Bengali Hindus and 
Marwaris, who are economically more powerful, and Bengali 
Muslims, who maintain their previous allegiances. 
Notwithstanding the fact that defining the Assamese 
in this period is virtually impossible, the interaction 
between tribals and "Assamese" is more fraught with 
difficulty. The tribal relationship is perhaps more real 
and widespread than the artisan immigration but 
controversy over how it has affected both sides, 
particularly given the recent developments over 
reservations policy and the Sixth Schedule (see sections 
2.4 and 5.2) have made definitive statements more 
difficult. 
What does seem justifiable is to claim that both 
groups have borrowed from each other; Brahmins in Assam 
are one of the few Brahminical groups to eat meat, whilst 
the tribals economic circumstances are dependent upon the 
plains-dwelling Assamese. However, whereas the Assamese 
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are more prone to regard themselves as the rightful 
"masters" of the tribals, the tribals argue that it is 
their influence which has produced an inclusive Assamese 
community. In their view, being Assamese relates to the 
intricate relationship between different peoples in one 
of the most heterogeneous places in the world (see 
section 5.4). 
Evidence for this is provided by analysis of 
folklore of various tribal groups in northeast India; 
... we 
have a whole range of folklore material of 
the narrative genre which exemplify such awareness 
and consciousness [of "commonness" and 
"togetherness"] and that, too, from communities 
which have normally been associated by outsiders, 
including scholars, with remoteness and 
exclusiveness, both physical and cultural. In fact, 
the degree of openness and catholicity of view 
contained in many tribal myths and legends is simply 
staggering. (Datta 1994: 27) 
Origin myths of many tribal groups give explanations 
not only of their own origins but those of other tribal, 
as well as non-tribal plains Assamese. 
These issues have resurfaced over issues such as 
state reorganization, the present problems of Karbi 
Anglong and the Bodos and language policies, most tribals 
preferring English to Assamese. 
It would not seem far-fetched to suggest that had 
the Bodos or Karbis been the dominant regional power when 
colonization began, it would be the Ahorns who would have 
been protected by Inner and Outer-Line policies and 
defined as tribals, and not the Karbis, Bodos and so on. 
Any reading of the historical literature does not suggest 
that different groups were living isolated existences, 
rather that most communities were to a greater or lesser 
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extent "pre-modern". The British belief that certain 
groups, such as the Nagas, were particularly backward 
due, for example, to practising cannibalism, marked them 
for special attention, but generally it seems clear that 
all these groups interacted economically and culturally. 
The fact that the Ahorns in the early British 
histories of this period fought "military campaigns", 
whilst the Nagas went on "head-hunting missions" implies 
more about the British, assuming that the "rulers" of a 
region were by definition more advanced than the ruled 
and that within each community there were rulers and 
ruled, than that there were any intrinsic differences 
between the various groups at this time. The Ahorns, it 
should be remembered, were originally a Thai tribe, 
arriving in the northeast in 1228. 
3.5 Notions of Crisis 
The soil of the Brahmaputra Valley is fertile, but 
its climate is damp and relaxing so that, while the 
people enjoy great material prosperity, there is a 
strong tendency towards physical and moral 
deterioration. (Gait 1992: 7) 
Notions of crisis are prevalent in many communities, 
formed in opposition to other groups, and historical 
memories incited to protect the group's rights against 
the other. The period from 1769 until the final British 
invasion is without doubt the Assamese "dark ages", when 
external invasions and internal religious civil war 
decimated the region's population. 
According to the 1820 Description of Hindostan, the 
Mayamari rebellion developed out of a growing rift 
between the spiritual and the secular in Assam, due to 
the rising powers of the former; 
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About 1770, the power of the spiritual teachers had 
achieved such strength, and their insolence had 
become so intolerable, that the reigning Raja, with 
the view of curbing their pride, burned a building 
that had been erected contrary to the law, by one of 
them named Mahamari, who guided a multitude of the 
lowest and most ignorant of the people. (Description 
of Hindostan 1820: 746) 
The rebellion continued during the reign of the 
following king, Gaurinath, who was forced from the throne 
but, due to the protection he received from Lord 
Cornwallis, was returned to the throne in 1793, by 
Captain Welsh and 1100 Sepoys. As the British left Assam, 
the Bura Gohaing, the senior hereditary counsellor of 
state, expelled the Mayamarias, "accelerated ... the 
death of Raja Gaurinath" and "seized on the whole 
authority of Government" (Description of Hindostan 1820: 
746). 
It seems clear that the causes of this rebellion 
stem from the split between Shakti and Vaishnavite 
Hinduism (see section 3.3). As Gait argues; 
The neo-Vaishnava sects... had now obtained 
remarkable dimensions. The country was full of 
religious preceptors and their followers who claimed 
exemption from the universal liability to fight and 
to assist in the construction of roads and tanks and 
other public works. (Gait 1992: 159) 
Over a period of one hundred years or so, the growth 
of Vaishnavism resulted in Ahom kings, who had previously 
patronized both groups, increasingly supporting Shakti 
priests (e. g. Gait 1992: 158-191, Hussain 1993: 29). As 
the Ahom kings became weaker and more aligned to 
Shaktaism, so the Vaishnavites rebelled. 
Ignoring the British involvement in the northeast, 
which will be assessed in the following chapter, and 
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passing over the point that it was in the British 
interest in the 1820's to portray Assam as an anarchic 
region, to justify their invasion, it is clear that this 
was a turbulent period. The Bura Gohaing, on achieving 
power, dismissed "Ghoulam All Beg, a Hindostany (sic) 
Mogul, who had been entertained by the Assam rajas to 
fight against the Mahamari" (East India Gazetteer 1828: 
77). All Beg gained some form of sovereignty over sixteen 
villages "on the eastern bank of the Manas from which he 
received a large revenue, readily paid by the inhabitants 
for protection" (Description of Hindostan 1820: 748). He 
was forced into Bhutan by another "freebooter", Manick 
Ray, who disrupted trade and forced the local villagers 
to give; 
up all idea of having a fixed residence, retiring at 
night into the British provinces, where they kept 
their women and children, and re-crossing in the 
morning to cultivate their crops in Assam. (East 
India Gazetteer 1828: 77) 
The "rightful" sovereign of the time, Chunder Khant, 
appealed to the Burmese for support in regaining his 
throne against the Bura Gohaing and in the early 1820's 
retook the throne. Attempts to remove his Burmese 
supporters failed and he was forced to flee to Bengal. In 
1822 Menghee Maha Theluah, the commander in chief of the 
Burmese army, was proclaimed Raja of Assam (East India 
Gazetteer 1828: 78). 
Estimates of the numbers killed in this period vary. 
Edward Gait quotes Gaurinath; 
In his last letter to Sir John Shore begging for the 
retention of the British detachment. (He] affirmed 
that the Moamanas had destroyed "cows, Brahmans, 
women and children" to the extent of one hundred 
thousand lives. (Gait 1992: 205) 
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Gait himself states; 
It is impossible to say what would have been the 
ultimate fate of the unhappy Assamese, had they been 
left unaided to the tender mercies of the Burmese. 
(Gait 1992: 266) 
The Mayamaria revolt could well suggest that the 
religious harmony created by the adoption of Vaishnavism 
was a myth. Instead, it is used to support a call for 
unity, suggesting that when the Assamese work together 
they can repel invaders (as demonstrated by the Battle of 
Saraighat); when, however, the Assamese are divided, they 
are prone to invasion and cultural minoritization. 
Indeed, throughout this period it is foreign powers 
who are seen to be the primary cause of the blood-shed, 
whether "freebooters" or the Burmese. However, this 
intervention could only occur because of the weaknesses 
of the successors to Gaurinath; Chundra Khant and 
Kamelshwar. Under their rule; "the feeble Ahom monarchy 
showed little of its earlier vitality and strength" 
(Rafiabadi 1988: xiv). 
The contrasts between these rulers and Lachit 
Barphukan are clear. With strong leadership, the Assamese 
can solve their problems and protect their rights; 
without it they are doomed to division and takeover. The 
idea that Assam declined after the Burmese invasions 
suggests that previously it was in a stronger position 
(see section 4.1). One of the implications of the blatant 
use of selective myths by the Assam Movement is that 
there is much in the history of Assam to contradict the 
standard version. The discontent shown at the publication 
of Bose's work (see section 3.2) reflects this dichotomy. 
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Chapter Four 
The Construction of Assamese Identity; 
From the British Invasion to 1947 
4.0 Introduction 
The British method of rule emphasized differences between 
groups. Real differences were consolidated, perceived 
differences were given greater significance and new lines 
of division were created. The British assumption that the 
control of resources, and in particular land, was the 
defining feature of regional hierarchy entrenched certain 
groups and disempowered others. The latter group, in 
Assam, provided the basis for the contemporary Assam 
Movement, which has made claims on the basis of 
territorial affiliation, a factor ignored by the British 
except in certain cases such as that of the tribal 
groups. 
The act of classification and categorization is both 
a manifestation and a consolidation of power (see section 
1.2). The British used the term Assam to describe the 
entire geographical, region and, given the British method 
of governance, the administrative and geographical 
unification of the region can be dated to the onset of 
British rule. 
Throughout the colonial period, and since 
Independence, the northeast has been viewed as a single 
entity in the perception of those from outside the region 
and the formation of some political and economic bodies 
reflects this. ' On one level this simply recognises a 
1 The North East Council, for example, was founded on 
1 August 1972 and was seen as necessary in the light of 
state reorganization to integrate development across the 
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truism. Geographically, there is an clear homogeneity 
throughout the region. Politically, particularly since 
Independence and the creation of East 
Pakistan/Bangladesh, the region has been virtually 
separate from the rest of India. But on other levels, 
culturally and linguistically, for example, there are 
major differences. Curiously, it is argued that the 
homogeneity of the region is reflected by its 
heterogeneity (see section 5.4). 
The key themes which will be analyzed from the 
period of British rule are those developments which are 
either perpetuated to the contemporary period, through 
specific modes of governance, for example, or which have 
provided myths which are now utilized to consolidate a 
particular Assamese consciousness. 
The similarity of government systems before and 
after Independence and the shorter time-span since the 
end of colonial rule, has resulted in many of these 
policies continuing to the present. The focus on language 
policy, for example, is important in itself but is 
primarily the same debate as occurred during the colonial 
period. 
Other features are less directly but equally 
importantly, linked. The notion of indolence is 
perpetuated to the present as economic behaviour reflects 
and reinforces previously held colonial stereotypes. 
region. It has established other bodies such as the North 
Eastern Regional Agricultural Marketing Corporation and 
the North Eastern Handicrafts and Handlooms Development 
Corporation. 
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The development of British rule in the northeast is 
important to the general argument on three counts. 
Firstly, the original justification for colonization, the 
actions of individuals and short-term necessity, was 
quickly changed to a portrayal of good government 
replacing a previously anarchic void. The dominant 
British historiography has created an almost unquestioned 
perception that pre-colonial Assamese society was 
anarchic. 
Secondly, the manner of British rule and the British 
perception of the different groups in Assam, led to 
certain policies, particularly the use of Inner and 
Outer-Line regions (see section 2.4), remaining in large 
part unchanged until the present. The manner of colonial 
rule throughout India took many of the prevalent methods 
of rule, at first, for example, acting as Diwan of the 
Moghul Emperor in Bengal (Bayly 1988: 53), often co- 
opting merchant classes which evolved during the Moghul 
decline (Bayly 1988: 9-10) and later prioritising the 
Talukdar landowning classes (Bayly 1988: 197). 
In Assam, the "native" Pyke system, whereby the male 
labouring classes, or Pykes, were the property of the 
State and were required to perform four months personal 
service a year, was ended as the British abolished what 
they perceived to be slavery. Instead, the Pykes were 
converted from serfs to free tenants on payment of three 
Rupees a year. This measure, coupled with the failure to 
pay any compensation to the Ahom ruling class, destroyed 
the latter's economic power (Mills 1853: 69). Thus 
although the India-wide elites were utilized in revenue 
collection within Assam, the different starting point 
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inevitably led to the growth of an administrative system 
at odds with that prevalent elsewhere in India. 
Thirdly, this difference in the method of government 
led to certain ideas, such as Assam becoming a Crown 
Colony or joining with the North Burmese hill areas, 
being perceived as viable alternatives long after other 
regions had accepted the new state of India. This is 
linked to the geographic isolation of the northeast after 
Independence, as well as the territorial claims of 
neighbouring states over parts of the region. 2 
As with the previous chapter, it is not the 
intention to present historical material in an abstract 
sense. The claims made will be justified through 
reference to contemporary political events throughout. 
4.1 The Causes of British Expansion 
The manner of British rule in northeast India is clearly 
an integral part of the formation of Assamese 
consciousness. Sharma has argued that the; 
contradictory anti-imperialist and anti-non-Assamese 
aspects of Assamese nationalism were spotted by the 
British quite early and they naturally tried to 
destroy the former and encourage the latter. This 
resulted in the development of a strong Assamese 
intellectual tendency which saw the imperialists as 
saviours or at least as friends in the struggle 
against other Indians. (Sharma 1980: 1322) 
British policy originally attempted to remain 
outside internal political relationships but, as Kaviraj 
2 The North East Frontier Agency/Arunachal Pradesh is 
claimed by China, as is Sikkim. Kokrajhar district of 
Assam is claimed by Bhutan. In 1995, an athlete from 
Arunachal Pradesh was refused a visa from China on the 
basis that he was already Chinese. In 1997, the same 
occurred for the Chief Minister of the state. 
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argues, given enlightenment rationality, over time, 
policies attempted "to introduce the logic of modernity" 
(Kaviraj 1991: 78) into previously unenumerated 
societies. Reactions to this varied between acceptance or 
resistance, the latter sometimes based upon "pre-existing 
structural forms" or else through new forms of collective 
action. 
The immediate causes of the expansion are relevant 
in the sense that the British perception of the situation 
in Assam on their arrival affected their subsequent 
manner of rule. 
The 1820 Description of Hindostan demonstrates the 
growing links of the British with the region before 
formal colonization. Along with the military involvement, 
there were economic ties; 
Many years ago the Bengal government, in consequence 
of orders from Europe, established a salt agent at 
Goalpara to monopolize the Assam salt trade, but 
after several years trial, the loss sustained was so 
great that the Marquis Cornwallis, who always 
abhorred petty traffic, ordered it to be suppressed. 
Mr Daniel Raush, a respectable Hanoverian, succeeded 
as the principal merchant, but soon found himself 
creditor to the Raja, Bura Gohaing, and to many 
other chiefs, who had the address to get possession 
of his property, in spite of his caution and long 
experience of their bad faith. In 1796 he quitted 
his factory at Goalpara, entered Assam and proceeded 
towards the capital, to endeavour to effect some 
compromise for his claims amounting to three lacks 
(sic) of Rupees; but on the route he was 
treacherously assassinated by the Raja of Dring's 
(or Dorong) followers, and had his pinnaces pillaged 
and his papers destroyed. In 1801, the Marquis 
Wellesley, compassionating (sic) the distress of his 
widow and destitute family, dispatched Comul Lochun 
Nundy, a native agent, to the court of Assam, to 
recover the arrears; in furtherance of which object 
he furnished himself with letters to the Raja and 
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prime minister, explanatory of his mission, and 
reminding them, that they were wholly indebted for 
the re-establishment of their authority to the 
British succours under Captain Welsh in 1793. 
(Description of Hindostan 1820: 746-747) 
Nundy returned after two years with 10,000 Rupees 
"recovered" from a custom-house agent. He reported 
however that; 
... the general anarchy, the injustice exercised, and 
the horrid cruelties perpetuated by whoever has the 
power, excites surprise that all the lower classes 
who have the means do not migrate to the British 
territories, which are close at hand and contain 
immense tracts of waste land. (Description of 
Hindostan 1820: 747) 
The report concludes that; 
Assam in its present condition is so utterly 
destitute of any thing to attract an invasion, that 
its invasion by the Chinese and Gorkhas of Nepaul 
(sic) may almost appear an extravagance; yet in the 
year 1815 two agents were despatched on the part of 
the Nepaul government to the court of Assam, which 
they quitted after sojourning some time, and 
returned to their own country, either through the 
northern part of Bootan, or the southern tract of 
the Grand Lama's territories. (Description of 
Hindostan 1820: 749) 
Yet within two years the Burmese army had invaded, 
as the mercenaries which the Ahom rulers had attempted to 
utilize against the Mayamarias, instead turned against 
them. As the 1828 East India Gazetteer relates; 
Now began the never-failing aggressions that 
invariably take place when a prosperous native power 
comes in contact with the boundaries of the British 
dominions, which at last terminated in a rupture 
about the muddy island of Shapuree, on the coast of 
Chittagong. A British detachment under Colonel 
Richards then entered Assam, and in the course of 
1825, expelled the Burmese usurpers and obtained 
completed possession of the country, which must 
henceforward be virtually considered and integral 
portion of the British empire in India. Indeed 
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without population and with an unknown frontier, 
this phantom of a kingdom could not for a year exist 
on its own resources, it must consequently be 
supported by its conquerors; a civil and military 
establishment appointed; a fleet of boats on the 
Brahmaputra, and many other expensive drains created 
on the Bengal treasury; such is the uncontrollable 
progress of events in India. (East -India Gazetteer 
1828: 78)(my italics) 
The causes of British expansion then seem clear. 
Firstly, the economic motive was apparent, witnessed not 
only through the salt trade but, as the Gazetteer 
suggests, a belief that; ' "while Hindostan was under the 
Mogul emperors, the trade with Assam was a source of 
considerable national profit". 
Secondly, and most immediately, following the 
Burmese invasion, continuing raids from Assam into the 
British territory required a British response, the First 
Burmese War, the timing of which resulted in large part 
from the defeat of Napoleon and the Marathas, freeing the 
Indian Army for the northeast frontier (Burns 1973: 1- 
14). 
Thirdly, the personalities involved enabled Assam to 
remain on the colonial agenda. Raush was clearly 
influential given that Marquis Wellesley sent an 
expedition into Assam on the apparent basis of the 
destitution of his widow. Most of Britain's earlier 
involvement with, and knowledge of, Assam had come from 
attempts to recover the debts to Raush. 
Fourthly, Assam was seen as anarchic and the British 
would seem justified in making this claim. However, by 
1858, the Gazetteer changed the emphasis of justification 
for involvement in the northeast, making no mention of 
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Raush, merely stating that, after Captain Welsh and his 
detachment left Assam in 1793; 
From this period Assam seems to have been abandoned 
into anarchy... Under British rule there can be no 
doubt that the arts of civilization will gradually 
extend. (Gazetteer of the East India Company 1858: 
46) 
That the British would choose to emphasize the 
introduction of good government as a cause of expansion 
is a wide-spread phenomenon; 
The "white man's burden" was to civilize the world. 
The British were the torch bearers... Not only did 
these countries [colonies] have to safeguard the 
right of Europeans to define the meaning of 
civilisation - which actually guaranteed their 
preeminence - but the protection of this right 
became, in addition, the moral raison d'etre of the 
conquerors. (Ferro 1997: 21) 
This desire to justify moral superiority, 
particularly in the mid to late nineteenth century, might 
well be seen to colour visions of what went before. In 
the case of Assam this would not seem to be the situation 
but the over-riding emphasis on the negative aspects of 
pre-British rule might appear to require further 
elucidation, particularly given that this period is used 
as a metaphor for an Assamese fear of annihilation. The 
disappearance of Raush from the later Gazetteers provides 
a confirmation of a widespread aversion to adventurers 
throughout subsequent British imperial expansion. It was 
preferable to predicate expansion on the basis of 
Imperial destiny rather than individual whim, despite the 
latter having provided the origin of most of the British 
Empire. 
The justification of British rule is a subject in 
itself, and is only important to this thesis in as much 
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as it imposed a lasting discourse on the Assamese. In the 
terms of this work Assam's colonization has given 
hegemony to a number of ideas which have subsequently 
been represented and passed down through generations and 
have affected forms of governance, based upon initial 
British impressions of the "type" of people they had 
conquered. It is interesting to hypothecate the 
possibility that Assam could have become a princely 
state. The British attempted to impose tributaries on the 
throne of Assam but, due to an inability both to meet the 
financial burden, the scale of which, questions the 
British intent to enable Assam to remain separate (see 
section 4.3), and the need to maintain internal order in 
such a strategically important region, led to direct 
British rule. 
4.2 British Economic Policy: 
New Immigrants and the Indolent Assamese 
That British colonialism was generically justified 
through differing and, at times, contradictory, motives 
is well-documented. On the one hand, notions of good 
government, discussed in the previous section, suggested 
that it was Britain's moral responsibility to guide 
"lesser" peoples towards the principles prevalent in 
nineteenth century Britain. 
On the other hand, there were more pressing short- 
term needs for the new rulers. Despite an overt emphasis 
on the moral aspects of rule, there was a need to make 
colonies economically productive such that, rather than 
being a drain on the British state's resources, they 
could profit the metropolis (Roberts 1990: 26). This 
required the introduction of new economic conditions on 
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the colonized and removed that agency necessary for the 
fulfilment of any form of self-rule. 
That the British" were aware of the trading 
opportunities of Assam is undoubted, particularly given 
the role of Raush in early British expansion. Yet in the 
1820's it seems clear that profit was not instantly 
achievable and that it was at all owed more to historical 
accident than any advanced planning. Indeed, as was often 
the case, territory was initially conquered due to the 
actions of individuals and simultaneously justified 
through notions of good government. Later, as Parliament 
and the Exchequer in Britain became more opposed to 
paying money to the colonies, expansion was justified 
through economic motives which were even further away 
from the original cause of expansion than were notions of 
"good government". 
The severance of Japanese trade with European states 
in the early nineteenth century (Griffiths 1967: 37), 
coupled with the fear that China would do likewise, led 
to a fear that tea would disappear from the markets of 
Europe. Observations of tea-drinking amongst the Assamese 
tribes in 1815 and the discovery of a tea plant in 
Katmandu in 1816 (Griffiths 1967: 35), eventually led to 
the establishment of a Tea Committee in Calcutta, 
consisting of; 
seven servants of the East India Company, three 
Calcutta merchants, Wallich [a botanist working of 
the East India Company] and two Indian gentlemen. 
(Griffiths 1967: 39) 
A memorandum was sent to local officials of the 
Company, and Captain Jenkins, from 1834 the Governor- 
151 
General to the Northeast Frontier, reported that tea was 
indeed indigenous to Assam. 3 
Within four years tea was sent to London but tea 
production required two necessary inputs. The first, tea- 
plants, came from China. The second, tea planters and 
pickers proved more difficult. The British, apparently 
convinced of the Chinese propensity for tea manufacture, 
originally shipped Chinese labourers from Singapore but, 
after an altercation in Calcutta in which sixty Chinese 
were jailed by the Magistrate (Griffiths 1967: 64), new 
sources of labour were sought. 
Until 1859, most of the labour used was local, 
primarily Kachari tribals. However, the ability of local 
people to strike and gherao the planters led to the use 
of poorly-paid indentured labour (Guha 1988: 14). 
In many senses much, if not most, of the present 
problems in Assam flow directly from decisions made at 
this time. The perceived indolence of the Assamese 
required labour to be transported to Assam from elsewhere 
in British India. The tea labourers were brought in from 
what is now Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and the plantations 
themselves were run by British and other European 
entrepreneurs. At a stroke the economic power of the 
indigenous Assamese was removed and they were, in large 
part, irrelevant to the main industry of the northeast. 
Those high caste Assamese who did start their own 
plantations, or worked as managers on the estates, 
3 The full story of the "discovery" of tea in Assam by 
the British does not need to be made here. Chapter Four 
of the History of the Indian Tea Industry by Sir Percival 
Griffiths (1967) comprehensively describes the process. 
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suffered from discrimination by British planters (Hussain 
1993: 44). 
This important characteristic of Assamese indolence 
was explained by the British in four differing, and 
indeed contradictory, approaches. The first method was to 
argue that the Assamese were simply a lazy people and for 
some this was clearly perceived to be an inherent racial 
trait, requiring no justification; 
An extent of 300 by 300 will cost from 200 to 300 
Rupees; i. e. according to the manner in which the 
miserable Opium-smoking Assamese work. This alone 
ought to point out the utility of introducing a 
superior race of labourers, who would not only work 
themselves, but encourage their women and children 
to do the same... This I have not been able to 
instil into the heads of the Assamese, who will not 
permit their women to come into the Tea gardens. 
(Bruce, Quoted in Griffiths 1967: 55) 
... Naholia 
is and always has been very short of 
labour: a good deal of dependence has always been 
placed upon a large Assamese village close at hand, 
whence labour might be drawn to work the whole 
garden three times over, but the men will not work, 
finding it more profitable to sit at home and rear 
fowls and ducks for our Coolies... Elephant traps 
have also drawn away a considerable number of hands 
from this village; it suits the lazy habits of the 
Assamese to sit by a trap the live-long dauy (sic), 
doing nothing but eating pan and opium, which is 
supplied by the owner of the trap gratuitously, 
together with a few annas money, and there is the 
prospect of a large share of the proceeds when the 
herd has been captured, which, however, does not 
happen very often. (Report of the Directors of the 
Northern Assam Tea Company 1867: 60) 
The Assamese are lazy and likely to be ousted by 
more pushing but less attractive Bengali Muslims. 
(Wavell 1973: 41) 
The Assamese use of opium was regarded as the 
primary cause of their reluctance to work and affected 
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the manner of British rule since revenue from opium went 
directly to the government. The use of opium in Assam 
apparently originated from a gift from the Moghul kings 
in the seventeenth century before which its usage was 
uncertain, 4 but; 
... the custom, if it existed at all, was certainly 
confined to the Royal Court and the nobles. That the 
Royal Court indulged in it at the end of the 
eighteenth century can be gathered conclusively from 
the Report of Captain Welsh in 1792 to Lord 
Cornwallis. He describes the King, Gaurinath Singha, 
as "a poor debilitated man, incapable of transacting 
business, always either washing or praying; and 
whenever seen intoxicated with opium. " (Assam 
Congress Opium Enquiry Report 1925: 17-18) 
Furthermore, during the early period of British 
rule, the Assam Congress claimed that; "their one care 
was to introduce their own opium for revenue purposes in 
order to undersell the indigenous product" (Assam 
Congress Report 1925: 19). 
British criticism of the Non-Co-operation Movement 
of the 1920's on the grounds that its object was not 
"temperance but simply the embarrassment of the 
government" (Assam Congress Report: 29) were incorrect, 
according to the Congress Party since; 
... the object of the Non-Co-operators was not aimed 
at its revenue directly; it was a movement of 
genuine temperance reform among the people... the 
resultant effort of their efforts was indeed to 
reduce Government revenue and indirectly to 
embarrass the Government; but the Government is to 
blame for entangling itself so much with excise 
revenue. (Assam Congress Report 1925: 29) 
4 Ignoring historical evidence, a P. L. P. (see section 
5.5) memorandum of 1978 claimed that "the British 
introduced opium and hemp to devitalise the population" 
(Quoted in Trivedi 1987: 598). 
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That said, it was claimed that; 
In places, Non-Cooperation workers encouraged 
illegal poppy cultivation, telling the cultivators 
that swaraj would mean the end of restrictions on 
domestic opium production. (Report on the 
Administration of the Excise Department 1922/23: 7) 
But even in the 1850's British officials justified 
the undercutting of indigenous opium with cheaper 
imported opium from Bihar sold by the Collectors not for 
revenue purposes but for the good of the Assamese; 
With some portion of the present generation, kanee 
[opium) is really a necessary of life; they 
positively could not exist without it, and I am 
perfectly sure that no checks that could be devised 
would ever cure them of taking it in large 
quantities. Stopping the cultivation [through 
taxation] will be of use chiefly to the next 
generation, and partly to such of the present as 
have not yet learnt to use if intemperately. I 
perfectly agree with the local authorities in 
thinking, that aiding in the cultivation and 
preparation of kanee gives the Assamese a relish for 
it, and that the practice of itself has created a 
large number of kaneeahs, or confirmed opium-eaters. 
(Mills 1853: 75) 
The most important influence of the use of opium lay 
in the attractiveness of using immigrants to work in 
Assam and made the granting of generous allowances for 
immigrants much more acceptable. Despite the economic 
influences in governance, those British officers and 
administrators who were keenest on immigration for 
increasing tea production for revenue purposes, such as 
C. A. Bruce, were generally the more disapproving of the 
intemperance of the Assamese, and were those who were 
unconcerned about the possible extinction of the Assamese 
language and culture (see also section 4.4). The 
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underlying theme to both attitudes was clearly based on 
the ability to raise revenue; 
Opium was the most important source of revenue in 
colonial Assam... It was a gold mine... The 
Government opium policy was of maximising the 
revenue through a system of monopoly pricing. (A. 
Guha 1988: 55) 
The moral issue regarding the use of opium to 
extract taxation was less of a problem to those who 
regarded opium-taking as an inherent trait, unchangeable 
in the short-term at least. 
The second method ' of explaining the need for 
immigrant labour was to argue that there actually very 
few, indigenous Assamese, due to the preceding "anarchy". 
As such, in this interpretation, there was no problem to 
be solved; 
Assam, before it came under British protection had 
been almost entirely depopulated by internal discord 
and Burmese invasion. The population of a country in 
such circumstances is but slowly renewed. (Assam 
Company's Report 1841, quoted in Griffiths 1967: 64) 
Jenkins, writing in 1833 argued that Assam, before 
the Burmese invasions; 
... supported a very 
dense population on the whole 
happily governed. The wealth of its princes appear 
to have subjected the inhabitants to faction, 
dissensions and foreign invasions and ended in 
reducing a flourishing and populous state to the 
utmost degree of wretchedness and degeneracy. 
(Quoted in Lahiri 1994: 272) 
Not only does this suggest that the population of 
Assam was decimated but this provides external support 
for the resurrection of a golden period in history, prior 
to the Burmese invasion, able to be utilized in the 
contemporary period. 
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Major Vetch, Deputy Commissioner of Assam and 
Commissioner of Revenue in the 1850's, was clearer than 
most that the main purpose of British rule was to collect 
revenue, rather than instil good government. He argued 
for "a regular line of steamers" to be used to import 
coolies from Bengal, and that; 
In a country so abounding with waste land as Assam, 
and with so scanty a population, Government may well 
part with a portion, on any terms, if thereby 
settlers be induced to come into the country, 
trusting to the general advantage to be gained by 
the impetus to trade and agriculture from planting 
factories in different parts of the Province. (Mills 
1853: 72) 
Vetch believed that the changes introduced to the 
revenue system in Assam (see section 4.0) were at fault 
in encouraging "an indolent contentment [rather] than 
act[ing] as a stimulus to further exertion" (Mills 1853: 
69). Vetch also suggested a rent free period of thirty or 
fifty years since the requirements of tea labourers would 
ensure that waste land would be used profitably (Mills 
1853: 74). Vetch then attributes indolence to the 
taxation system, rather than to any inherent trait, and 
suggests that through the imposition of incentives 
productivity would be encouraged. His ideas regarding 
general taxation and rent were derived from those rules 
for establishing tea plantations which; 
... were 
issued in 1838, when it was laid down that 
any tract of waste land, from 100 to 10,000 acres, 
might be taken up on a forty-five years' lease, with 
a rent-free period of from five to twenty years... 
and, after that, a progressive assessment on three- 
quarters of the area rising to 1-2 Rupees an acre. 
(Gait 1992: 340) 
Thirdly, and perhaps most controversially in as much 
as it was used at varying times to explain the behaviour 
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of (nearly) all communities in India, was the commonplace 
British perception that effeminate Hinduism had sapped 
the strength of the Assamese. 5 As Inden has argued, the 
portrayal of Hinduism as emotional, irrational and 
feminine, and thereby in opposition to "Western, male 
rationality", removed human agency and the ability to act 
rationally from Indian subjects (Inden 1992: 87). In some 
senses the British did not need to understand the 
differing situations of Indians. Through their training 
and experience they knew instinctively how the Indians 
acted and why this was so, even as the contradiction 
between the "difference" of India they assumed, and 
similarities they witnessed became almost untenable as 
British rule progressed (Metcalf 1997). As the 
Description of Hindostan argued; 
Hitherto the Assamese had been a warlike and 
enterprising people, and their princes worthy of the 
government; but after their conversion by the 
Brahmins the nation sunk into the most abject 
pusillanimity towards foreigners, and into internal 
turbulence and confusion. (Description of Hindostan 
1820: 745) 
Fourthly, it was argued that the Assamese and 
Bengalis were two of the many intrinsically opposed 
groups out of which India was comprised and as such were 
incapable of working with each other; 
There was abundance of local labour, and with proper 
tact I don"t think any imported labour would have 
been required; but some few Bengalees were got in 
the first instance, and... the local labour, too, 
which used to be abundant has also been scared away 
by the Bengalees. (Report of the Directors of the 
Northern Assam Tea Company 1867: 39) 
5 Edward Gait explained the same process, in relation 
to the Ahorns (see section 3.2). 
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As a rule I object to Assamese being in charge of 
gardens where Bengali coolies are employed, as there 
may be some disturbance. (Report of the Directors of 
the Northern Assam Tea Company 1867: 45) 
The growth of the portrayal of individuals as 
members of intrinsically opposed races throughout this 
period owes much to anthropological studies emphasising 
difference between groups and cultural similarity within 
(see section 1.1). The effect of this, particularly 
towards the latter half of the nineteenth century, was to 
imply a level of causality to events where racial 
tensions were absent. Thus, if a Bengali "coolie" and an 
Assamese manager caused a "disturbance", this merely 
demonstrated the underlying tension between the races, 
rather than suggesting that there was some fault in 
labour practices or another strategic issue. 
The British attributed Assamese indolence to the 
features summarized above. At this stage it is worth out- 
lining the present-day Assamese response to claims of 
indolence. The first point is that the Assamese were 
economically better off continuing to work on their 
highly productive and scarcely inhabited land than they 
would have been moving to tea plantations. Simple 
economic rationality, rather than sloth, was the primary 
cause of their decision to remain outside the plantation 
economy (for example, Das 1982: 23). Indeed, some of the 
more sympathetic British officials agreed. Jenkins, for 
example, admitted that; 
The Assamese had very few wants: they lived 
principally upon rice, and were clothed in their own 
silks and cotton, and none of them had ever been 
traders, nor are they now, nor had they any other 
than domestic manufactures. (Mills 1853: 59) 
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Gait simply attributed the need for immigrants to 
the fact that; 
There are very few landless labourers in Assam and 
people who have land naturally prefer the 
independence and ease of their position as 
cultivators to the discipline and labour of the tea 
gardens. (Gait 1992: 340-341) 
Secondly, there is a claim that the British actually 
preferred to use indentured labour, rather than local 
people, due to the ease with which they could be 
controlled. 6 Certainly, it is argued, once the initial 
decision had been made to use such labourers, they proved 
easier to exploit than the indigenous Assamese. 
The use of opium was regarded by Assamese elites 
themselves as an explanation of the backwardness of their 
community. In 1919, a member of the Assam Legislative 
Council, Phani Dhar Chaliha, argued that; "if the opium 
trade is retained, the Assamese race will be almost 
extinct within about two hundred years hence" (Quoted in 
A. Guha 1988: 90). 
There is another argument, prevalent in some 
Assamese quarters which suggests a different cause of 
this problem. Rather than disagreeing with the British 
notion, the wide-spread use of opium is suggested to have 
affected the genetic make-up of the Assamese, such that 
the whole population is permanently drugged. Rumours 
exist within Assam of a medical report, which none of my 
interviewees could pinpoint, suggesting that this would 
6 "Labour, " wrote the late Sir Herbert Risley... "is y... 
the birthright of the pure Dravidian and as a coolie 
he is in great demand wherever one meets him. 
Whether hoeing tea in Assam... " (Holderness 1928: 
70) 
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take seven generations to fade away, explaining the 
recent revival of Assamese nationalism. Medically, this 
concept has no substance, but its discussion raises the 
importance of perception, rather than truth, and the 
desire to exonerate ancestors for "allowing" the 
immigration to occur. 
That the notion of Assamese laziness developed from 
certain attitudes held by the British of the time is 
clear, but that it remains in popular perception, and 
even appears in some academic texts, is perhaps more 
surprising. ' The chapter regarding Assam in State Politics 
in India (Narain 1976), ascribes the massive growth in 
population to; 
... 
immigration from Pakistan, Nepal and other 
states in India in search of a livelihood which is 
relatively easier to get here particularly because 
of the medieval aversion of the local people towards 
certain jobs, especially of manual nature. In fact, 
almost the entire labour force in the state comes 
from outside. (Deka 1976: 30) 
It is essential to understand the importance of this 
concept for an understanding of the rise of the Assam 
Movement in the contemporary period. Not only did the 
idea that the Assamese were indolent lead to the 
encouragement of immigration but this impression has 
remained, leading to non-Assamese businessmen arguing 
that they prefer to employ other non-Assamese, not 
Although, as post-modern approaches increase in 
salience, perhaps less so; 
Categories continue to exist long after their 
foundations have been knocked away as a result of 
their reproduction in political and cultural 
discourse. (McAll 1990: 38) 
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because of cultural support networks, but simply because 
they feel the Assamese to be incapable of working hard. 
An idea that the British at least attempted to justify, 
has passed into non-Assamese perceptions of the Assamese 
as a "fact". Given that many of the root causes of the 
Assam Movement can be ascribed to perceived economic 
backwardness, both state-wide, but more importantly, 
relative to other groups within the state, the impression 
that the local people are work-shy is a major 
contributory factor to the rise of Assamese chauvinism. 
This has not only affected the image of the Assamese 
in paid employment. Even when their homes are at risk 
from flooding, in the post-Independence period, it has 
been suggested that the Assamese lack the motivation to 
protect themselves. Nag reports that; 
The legendary Assamese laziness has shown up year 
after year as the Brahmaputra floods strike the 
valley. It is common practice for the relief 
agencies to employ flood-hit people as daily wage- 
labourers to build bandhs, etc. Officials have 
frequently recorded instances of the Assamese hiring 
Mians for the job for as little as half the wage... 
(Nag 1990: 119) 
Again, this could be explained through simple 
economic rationality but rather it is assumed to 
demonstrate the correctness of the colonial stereotype. 
As with the preference for indentured immigrant tea- 
plantation workers, many Assamese suggest that the major 
cause of this is less due to their unsuitability to work 
but more due to the availability and ease of using cheap 
Bangladesh labour. The continuing ability of businessmen 
to employ cheap unskilled Bangladeshi labourers, often 
through middlemen, particularly for construction 
projects, has led to artificially low wages in the 
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northeast and especially in major cities such as 
Guwahati, adding to hostility towards immigrants. The 
importance to the Assam Movement of building greater 
defences against illegal immigration stems from this as 
much as the desire for a tangible symbol. It is commonly 
believed, although obviously no reliable figures exist, 
that half of all rickshaw pullers, and two-thirds of 
construction workers in Guwahati are recent (illegal) 
immigrants from Bangladesh. 
The British introduction of immigrant tea-plantation 
workers is important as it not only added to the 
perception that Assam was a region to which hard-working 
migrants could move, setting the path for the later 
Bengali Muslim migration, but in the manner of their 
cultural assimilation. Like earlier immigrants (see 
section 3.4) these tea-plantation workers gave up their 
migrant cultures and adopted both the Assamese language 
and culture, celebrating Bihu festivals, for example 
(Weiner 1978: 90). This occurred despite the spatial 
separation of tea plantation workers from the Assamese, 
the tea plantations being physically isolated from 
mainstream society. 
This contrasts vividly with the perception of later 
Bengali Muslim immigrants who were seen to transfer their 
entire communities into Assam and maintain their earlier 
cultural artifacts. 8 The Bengali Muslims are also much 
more noticeable than the tea plantation workers, often 
living in the same villages as the Assamese. 
8A common contemporary complaint is that they "point 
their television aerials towards Bangladesh". 
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Pakistani flags were flown in Assam in 1962 when 
China invaded India. Bangladesh flags and portraits 
of Mujibur Rahman were displayed with "Joy Bangla" 
slogans on March 26,1980, at Howley, Barpeta in a 
demonstration by the infiltrators. (A. K. Das 1982: 
3-4) 
Generally, these Muslims were small-scale peasant 
farmers, constrained by the Line System from settling 
throughout the northeast, instead concentrating 
themselves in certain areas in the Brahmaputra Valley, 
Cachar and Sylhet. However, as the 1882-83 Assam Trade 
Report notes, describing trade to and from Manipur, in a 
manner noteworthy for its description of the Angami 
Nagas; 
By far the larger numbers of traders which enter the 
valley are Bengalis from the district of Cachar and 
Sylhet, and the bulk of these are Mohammedans... A 
larger number than usual of Angamis from the Naga 
Hills district have traded to and from this year and 
have told me, in reply to my question that their 
present occupation is a far pleasanter and more 
palatable one than being constantly on the war path 
and cutting off one another's heads. (Assam Trade 
Report 1883: 12-13) 
A defining moment of Bengali Muslim immigration came 
during the Chief Ministership of Saadulla (see section 
4.3). Fears that Assam was being swamped by Muslims for 
communal purposes led Jawaharlal Nehru and Rajendra 
Prasad to express concern about the influx in the 1930's, 
and Prasad; 
.., even wanted to balance the (immigration] by 
sending large numbers of Hindus from Bihar. In 
November 1937, two leading Assamese intellectuals of 
the day, Ambikagiri Roy Choudhury and Nilmoni 
Phukan, had met Jawaharlal Nehru with a formal 
representation which stated that the Congress would 
get the whole hearted support of the Assamese people 
only if it backed effective steps to fight the 
influx from Bengal. (E. P. W. 8 December 1979: 1993) 
164 
Whereas the Bengali Muslim immigrants were generally 
poor but a numerical threat to the Assamese, Bengali 
Hindu and Marwari immigrants were numerically small but 
conspicuous both for the economic superiority and their 
maintenance of separate institutions. Marwari trading 
communities started entering Assam as soon as it was 
opened up by the British. Marwari migration to take over 
the commerce of the northeast was accompanied by 
immigration of Bengali Hindu bhadraloks (gentlefolk) who 
moved into administrative positions (see section 4.4). 
This increased from the 1920's onwards as it became 
clearer that east Bengal was to be separated from west 
Bengal. An exodus of Bengali Hindus left the east to move 
to neighbouring regions, particularly western Bengal and 
Assam. Although the majority stayed until partition, even 
prior to Independence, the growing Bengali Hindu 
preponderance in urban areas was becoming more marked. 
4.3 Political Reorganization 
The political changes instigated by the British derived 
at times from changes in language policy, from economic 
rationalization and from a number of different strategic 
or attitudinal factors, particularly with reference to 
the tribal groups. Through focusing specifically on the 
changes and their causes, this section will elucidate 
some generic trends in British policy in the northeast. 
These trends have, in large part, continued after 
Independence and thus have helped create the environment 
in which the contemporary Assam Movement has flourished. 
Once the Treaty of Yandabo had been concluded in 
1826, the British announced that, although Assam was 
technically theirs by right of conquest, they did not 
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believe that immediate annexation was necessary. David 
Scott, the political agent of the East India Company 
appointed during the Burmese War, suggested that the 
Company should take over western Assam, whilst the east 
could be ruled by an Ahom King as a protectorate (Lahiri 
1994: 34). 
This latter move was delayed under the pretext of an 
inability to find a suitable ruler. Rebellions in 1828, 
and again in 1830, led to the East India Company acceding 
to Scott's request, though its implementation was delayed 
until 1833. Purandar Singh, the chosen ruler, was forced 
to pay a massive tribute to the Company of 50,000 Rupees, 
half of his annual revenue. By 1839, Singh was deposed 
because of an ability to pay and due to alleged 
"maladministration". Assam was subsequently incorporated 
into the Bengal Presidency (Gait 1992: 292-293). 
Political developments from 1837 to 1871 focused on 
the issue of language9 which became the unifying symbol of 
the Assamese. Bengali was made the language of schools 
and the courts in 1837 and Assamese was only recognized 
as distinct from Bengali in 1871. The subsequent 
fracturing of Assam from the rest of the Calcutta 
Presidency, in 1874, was basically due to administrative 
rationalization and Assam became a Chief Commissioner's 
Province. In 1905, Sir Andrew Fraser's plan to partition 
9 The Indian Mutiny/First War of Independence scarcely 
affected Assam. Maniram Dewan, Chief Minister of the last 
Ahorn king, was executed for treason after soliciting 
Hindu soldiers stationed in Dibrugarh to rebel (Gait 
1992: 310-322) . Due to his anti-imperialist message, he 
has latterly been portrayed as one of the first Assamese 
nationalists (A. Guha 1988: 19). 
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Bengal was implemented. The Chief Commissioner of Assam's 
response to Fraser's initial suggestion of the 
amalgamation of Assam and east Bengal was that four new 
Commissionerships could be created at the reorganization; 
The effect of this would be to give the new province 
five Commissionerships, and pro tanto to enhance its 
attractions as far as the prospects of promotion are 
concerned. (Reconstitution of the Provinces 1906: 9) 
The importance of this was reiterated during a 
discussion regarding the proposed creation of a new Chief 
Commissionership of Behar (sic); 
The proposed Commission would not be large enough to 
recruit for itself, and would therefore have to 
borrow officers as Assam does now. If it were 
attached for recruiting purposes to the United 
Provinces, as considerations of language would seem 
to suggest, it is probable that officers of those 
provinces would be nearly as unwilling to serve in 
the new province as Bengal officers now are to go to 
Assam. (Reconstitution of the Provinces 1906: 12) 
Throughout the discussion of advantages and 
disadvantages of this new division, the main 
justification given was to aid Assamese development 
through joining it to more advanced eastern Bengal. Most 
of the complaints against the move came from Bengalis, 
either businessmen such as Siddarth Roy with interests in 
both halves of Bengal, or from those in eastern Bengal 
who felt that they would be dragged down by backward 
Assam. The Report claims; 
Among some with whom the Lieutenant Governor first 
discussed the matter, there was no doubt a feeling 
that Assam was more or less a land of Rakshas, 
hobgoblins and various terrors; and the strange 
similes used in describing the transfer to Assam 
would be really incredible to one who had not heard 
them. (Reconstitution of the Provinces 1906: 64) 
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The new state; the "North-Eastern Provinces", i. e. 
eastern Bengal and Assam, comprised eighteen million 
Muslims and twelve million Hindus and was further seen as 
a counterpoise to Bengali nationalism. As Curzon argued; 
Bengal united is a' power. Bengal divided will pull 
several different ways. That is what the Congress 
leaders feel; their apprehensions are perfectly 
correct and they form one of the great merits of the 
scheme... one of our main objects is to split up and 
thereby weaken a solid body of opponents to our 
rule. (quoted in Penderel Moon 1989: 934) 
Saroda Charan Mitter, a Calcutta High Court judge, 
claimed that "high caste Hindus will dominate Eastern 
Bengal fifty years, aye, a century hence" (Limaye 1987: 
307). However, it was, clear that in a democratic 
framework that the British had encouraged to act along 
sectarian lines, the Muslims would eventually take 
control. 
In 1912, the partition of Bengal was annulled due to 
Bengali protests (A. Guha 1988: 81) and Assam was 
reestablished as a separate Chief Commissioner's 
province. This remained until the Government of India 
Act, 1919, under which Assam became a Governor's 
Province. At Independence the predominantly Bengali 
Muslim district of Sylhet opted to join East Pakistan, 
after a referendum, although the largely Bengali Hindu 
province of Cachar remained in Assam. 
The main issue of note in this section is that the 
indigenous Assamese had virtually no control of the 
political changes imposed on them. Although this may seem 
self-evident in a colony, it contrasts vividly with the 
position of neighbouring Bengal. Whereas political 
changes regarding Bengal were made in response, either 
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reactive or proactive, to events in Bengal, 
reorganization occurred in Assam not because of events in 
Assam or demands from Assamese elites but rather in 
response to events in Bengal. 
Consequently, the importance of these machinations 
is that two ideas have been used, with considerable 
effect, to affect popular perceptions of governance, and 
in particular Assam's relationship to the centre. The 
first is that Assam is somehow a pawn used in other 
political debates. The merger of eastern Bengal and Assam 
was clearly politically motivated. The earlier division 
of Assam and the Inner and Outer-Line policies, all 
instigated for administrative convenience or in response 
to non-Assamese demands, are seen to have overlooked any 
wishes of the Assamese themselves. This idea recurred 
during the state reorganization of the 1970's (see 
section 5.2). 
The second idea, following from the first, is that 
the Assamese have only achieved their aspirations, 
however these are defined, through protest. Whether 
recognition of language (see section 4.4), statehood or 
later events, without protest none of these political 
demands would have been achieved. The building of the 
second bridge over the Brahmaputra at-Saraighat, Guwahati 
in 1987 is an oft-quoted recent example used to 
demonstrate that this feeling still holds true (e. g. 
Hussain 1993: 78). Before this bridge was built, there 
was only one bridge in an 800 kilometre stretch of the 
Brahmaputra. The idea of neglect is discussed elsewhere 
(see section 5.4) and is closely linked to the need for 
protest to achieve political demands. 
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The outcome of the Government of India Act, 1935 
provided one further tool to be used by contemporary 
Assamese nationalists. In April, Mohammed Saadulla, whose 
party, the Assam Union Muslim League gained seven seats, 
became Chief Minister. He headed a coalition Government 
opposed by the Congress Party which held 35 out of 108 
seats in the State Assembly. Saadulla was supported by a 
disparate group including the tea planters. Various 
smaller Muslim parties, including the Surma Valley 
Independent Group1° and the United Muslim Party generally 
sided with the Congress Party, and Saadulla resigned on 4 
August 1938, forming a new, predominantly Muslim League, 
Ministry the following day. Although forced out by 
September 1938, Saadulla had effectively packed local 
boards with his own supporters (A. Guha 1988: 227). 
Saadulla's support eventually crumbled and Gopinath 
Bardoloi formed the first Assamese Congress Ministry. 
This resigned in 1939 as the Congress Working Committee 
demanded withdrawal over the declaration of war. Subhas 
Chandra Bose argued that Assam was a special case and the 
Congress government should have continued. Gandhi later 
admitted that he was wrong in opposing this (Hazarika 
1985: 56). 11 The second Saadulla Ministry saw a conscious 
attempt to encourage Muslim immigration. This was 
recognized as an attempt to ensure that Assam became part 
10 The price of whose eventual support was, according 
to Sir Robert Reid, Governor of Assam, a ministership 
(Hazarika 1995: 52). 
11 The treatment of Assam as a special region by 
Congress leaders before Independence can only have 
reinforced the idea that the Assamese were somehow 
different from mainstream Indian society. 
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of the Muslim group of states and throughout the 1930's 
and 1940's Bengali Muslim control of agricultural land 
increased. 12 
Saadulla is still a reviled figure to Assamese 
nationalists, particularly in contrast to his Congress 
opponent, Gopinath Bardoloi, 13 under whose leadership the 
caste Hindu Assamese elite had a freedom to wield power 
unmatched until 1985 (Hazarika 1995: 151). 
The Line System, introduced in the 1920's, had been 
aimed primarily at preventing Bengali Muslim migration 
into tribal areas, but the effect of this was to act as a 
diversion from the hills into the plains. That the 
Bengali Muslims adopted the Assamese language was 
generally perceived to be an attempt to ensure Assam 
joined the Islamic grouping, whilst immigrants sacrificed 
the least costly part of a Bengali identity, particularly 
given the similarities between the two languages. 14 
As Independence grew closer, a great many ideas were 
floated throughout British India, and the idea that Assam 
12 A further cause of the growth of immigration was 
the increased ability for it to occur, both due to the 
reduction in disease and the improvement of 
communications. J. McSwinney, Superintendent of Census 
Operation, wrote that the extension of the railway to 
Guwahati was likely to encourage more immigration (Limaye 
1987: 308). 
13 Bardoloi's son was kidnapped in 1993 by the Bodo 
Security Force. 
14 The extent to which Bengali Muslims have adopted 
the Assamese language is debated (see section 5.1). As 
Gupta argues; "most Bengalis have never accepted that 
Assamese is a fully-fledged language in itself" (Gupta 
1984: 129). 
171 
was to remain a Crown Colony after Independence has 
remained strong, despite this viewpoint being supported 
only by a few British officers and opposed by the British 
authorities (Sema 1986: 81). Sreejut Rohini Kumar 
Choudhuri raised questions in the Legislative Assembly 
regarding the possibility of the hill districts of Assam 
forming a new province combined with the trans-frontier 
hills and parts of north Burma, and warned Edward 
Benthal l's that; 
... the 
idea of separation of the areas from Assam 
and their amalgamation with the trans-frontier hills 
and Northern Burma... is repugnant to the people of 
Assam living in the plains and hills? (Legislative 
Assembly Debates 1946: 1212) 
Benthall, in his reply, stated that; 
The attention of the Government of India has been 
drawn to certain allegations that schemes are under 
consideration for the separation of the Assam hill 
areas from India and their constitution as a 
separate Colony or State. There is no truth in these 
allegations and no such scheme is being considered. 
(Legislative Assembly Debates 1946: 1212) 
Despite these denials, the idea has remained in 
Assamese consciousness that the British did prefer a 
different option for Assam than independence within 
India, allowing for the feasibility of contemporary 
Assamese independence to appear greater and, more 
importantly, to emphasize difference from the mainstream 
Indian polity. 
In 1946, the Cabinet Mission Plan included Assam in 
Group C, meaning it would be joined, again, to Bengal in 
15 War Transport Member of the Governor-General's 
Executive Council. 
172 
the projected Provincial Assembly. According to Wavell, 
Nehru; 
... passed over the 
joining of Assam to Bengal 
without much comment, accepting the reason that 
geographical reasons made it necessary. (Wavell 
1973: 271) 
After the Indian National Congress won an absolute 
majority in the post-war elections, Vallabhbhai Patel 
warned Wavell that; "he had no great fears about Section 
"B", but it was different in Section "C" where Assam 
might be overwhelmed" (Wavell 1973: 347). 
As partition became inevitable, the Cabinet Mission 
Plan was abandoned and, under the subsequent Mountbatten 
Partition Plan, a referendum was to be held in Bengali- 
dominated Sylhet, which acceded to East Pakistan. This 
increased the ratio of Assamese-speakers vis-a-vis 
Bengalis, although it led to an influx of Bengali Hindus 
from Sylhet, particularly to the neighbouring "twin" 
district of Cachar. 
With the majority of Bengali Muslims, particularly 
at elite level, leaving Assam for East Pakistan at 
Independence, the Other, which under Saadulla's Ministry 
had clearly been Bengali Muslims, was reconstructed as 
Bengali Hindus, at least for the early years after 
Independence. What is important for the argument 
regarding the contemporary construction of the Assamese 
community is that myths regarding Muslim acceptance or 
rejection are both available and different voices within 
the Assam Movement have articulated both themes to 
justify personal visions of Assamese society. 
Saadulla's attempts to increase Bengali Muslim 
immigration with the aim of joining Assam to a future 
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Pakistan failed but it was more the interest of national 
level Congress leaders which prevented this from 
occurring, rather than Assamese protest. Bardoloi, for 
example, was not a powerful enough figure to oppose the 
demands for his resignation in 1939 which allowed 
Saadulla to return to power. 
4.4 Language Policy 
Fear of Assamese cultural genocide has, since 1837 when 
Bengali replaced Assamese as the language of schools and 
courts, manifested itself most markedly in attitudes 
towards official language policy. This is not to say that 
the Assamese language is the most important feature of an 
Assamese identity, then or now. This is shown by 
attitudes towards Bengali Muslims, who have at times been 
accepted for their use of the Assamese language and at 
other times opposed. Rather, it is generally through 
language that opposition to immigrants has been 
expressed. 
One possible explanation of the focus on linguistic 
affiliation is the role of the British census. This was 
the only accurate method by which the extent of 
immigration could be assessed, as Assamese language 
speakers could be quantified. Thus although protests have 
focused on language, it seems hazardous to give 
paramountcy to language as the major feature of Assamese 
culture since linguistic data was the only method by 
which such claims could be made. 
British policy towards language was not 
intrinsically opposed to the Assamese but the need for 
trained administrators was clearly biased against them 
since they had no experience; "of keeping written and 
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formal records of administration, revenue or land" 
(Hussain 1993: 38). 
The fact that the Bengal Presidency was amongst the 
earliest of Britain's Indian colonies had given the 
emergent Bengali Hindu middle-class, the vilified 
bhadraloks or babus, an advantage in performing the 
administrative functions of the colonial state. Given the 
proximity of Bengal to Assam, transferring Bengali 
administrators into what the British perceived to be a 
vacuum was an obvious step, particularly given the 
apparent over-crowding of Bengal, in absolute terms, and 
particularly relative to "under-populated" Assam. This 
notion has remained with East Bengalis. 16 However, even in 
Mills' report of 1853, Maniram Dewan protested at the use 
of immigrant labour, when the older Ahom administrators 
were unemployed; 
while a number of respectable Assamese are out of 
employ, the inhabitants of Marwar and Bengalees from 
Sylhet have been appointed to Mouzdarships; and for 
us respectable Assamese to become the Ryots of such 
foreigners is a source of deep mortification. (Mills 
1853: 607) 
Many early British officials thought that the 
perpetuation of the Assamese language and culture was 
unlikely if massive Bengali immigration occurred. 
However, this was not seen as a major problem since 
Assamese culture was thought to revolve around opium 
addiction and indolence. The initial view of British 
16 In 1981, for example, population density per square 
kilometre was 254 in Assam, although the figure is much 
higher in the Brahmaputra Valley than in the Assam hills. 
West Bengal and Bangladesh had densities of 614 and 630 
respectively. 
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officers was that Assamese was not actually a distinct 
language from Bengali and this was coupled by a view 
that, even if Assamese language and culture was 
different, its annihilation was not of particular 
importance. As Bruce argues; 
Yes, there is another very grave drawback which I 
believe I before noticed, namely the want of 
population and labourers. They will have to be 
imported and settled on the soil, which will be a 
heavy tax on the first outlay... the redundant 
population of Bengal, will pour into Assam, as soon 
as the people know they will get a certain rate of 
pay, as well as lands, for the support of their 
families. If this should be the case, the Assamese 
language will in a few years be extinct. (Bruce, 
Quoted in Griffiths 1967: 58) 
Those British officers and administrators who were 
first to learn the Assamese language were to find that 
"... Bengali and Asamiya have a sizeable common vocabulary 
and a common script, with the exception of only two 
letters in the alphabet" (Guha 1980: 1717). 1' That these 
are the only differences is still agreed, but the 
emphasis changed from the similarities to the 
differences. Eriksen argues that Swedish, Danish and 
Norwegian are only considered distinctive languages due 
to the effects of territorial nationalism (Eriksen 1993: 
104). In the Assamese case, the work of Assamese elites 
and American missionaries in the late nineteenth century 
17 The specific written differences are that the 
symbol for r is spelt differently in Assamese and Bengali 
and that the w/v sound in Assamese is non existent in 
Bengali. S. K. Bhuyan, writing the preface for Assamese: 
Its Formation and Development, states that "Dr. Kakati 
establishes for the first time the individuality of 
Assamese, placing it in the proper perspective of its 
sister languages" (Kakati 1941: vii). 
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secured acceptance of the idea of the difference between 
Assamese and Bengali. Without this protest it seems clear 
that, over time, the marginal differences would have 
declined leading to the merging of the two languages. 
This legacy has led to a perception of the Bengalis 
as cultural imperialists, as articulated by various 
Assamese cultural organizations such as the Assam 
Jatiyatabati Dal, for example (see section 5.5). That it 
was the British who encouraged the migration of Bengali 
Hindus, as administrators, and other Bengalis, primarily 
Muslims, as farmers or tea-plantation workers, is 
overlooked. Once this migration had started, it became 
self-perpetuating, as families came over and social 
support bases were established. Indeed, before long, 
Assam was being presented as a land of opportunity, in 
which "hard-working" Bengalis would prove more useful for 
British revenue-raising purposes than "indolent" 
Assamese. The notion of the lazy Assamese and the 
characterisation of Assam as a land of opportunity, has 
particularly consolidated itself in Bengali 
consciousness. 
Whereas the British primarily focused their analysis 
of Assam on the inhabitants of the region, and saved 
description of the physical environment to comments about 
rainfall and its suitability for tea-growing, the Bengali 
tradition focused much more on portraying the region of 
Assam as Bengal's frontier land. 18 
18 For the Assamese, the Brahmaputra is the major 
physical defining feature of their environment. For the 
Ahorns it was the Nam-Dao-Phi, River of the Star God, and 
the resulting productivity of the region earned the title 
Mungdum chum kham; Land of the Golden Gardens. 
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Despite this, until the late nineteenth century, 
widespread disease discouraged much immigration. 19 
Kalaazar, or black fever, which entered Assam in 1888, 
reduced the population of Goalpara district, for example, 
by 1801 between 1881 and 1891. The average death rates on 
the tea plantations of upper Assam from 1865 to 1867 was 
one hundred and seventy per thousand. At one tea garden 
in Nowgong district, sixty-two out of one hundred and 
fifty people died during the second half of 1866 
(Griffiths 1967: 351). 
The administrative changes discussed above set the 
scene for the linguistic debates. Whilst Assam was part 
of the Bengal Presidency, from 1838 to 1871, the 
linguistic demands grew. The recognition of the Assamese 
language in 1873 went hand in hand with the subsequent 
establishment of Assam as a Chief Commissioner's Province 
in 1874, although this was primarily justified by 
administrative rationalization. 
The mobilization of what is called, in retrospect, 
the Assamese middle class over the language issue was due 
less to an indigenous rediscovery of Assamese literature 
than the work of missionaries, particularly American 
missionaries, in their preferred use of the vernacular. 
Downs argues that this preference derived from three 
distinct influences; Evangelicalism, Baptism and America. 
Evangelicalism in the early nineteenth century was 
influenced by the French Revolution and other radical 
19 Despite the fact that, as Lieutenant-Colonel 
Matthie, an early Deputy Commissioner, suggests, "waste 
lands have been offered to them on very liberal terms" 
(Mills 1853: 76). 
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movements, resulting in their portrayal of social issues 
as religious issues; Baptists; 
as a consequence of their own status and history, 
had special reason to be sensitive to issues of 
social injustice and conditions under which the poor 
lived. (Downs 1989: 252) 
Furthermore, because the missionaries were generally 
American they; 
therefore saw themselves as standing on the side of 
the masses over against the oppressive elites who 
were blamed for everything. (Downs 1989: 253-254) 
That said, many of the early missionaries were 
closely affiliated to British officers. Miles Bronson, 
one of the most influential American missionaries 
involved in the language. agitation (Hazarika 1995: 45) 
and publisher of the Assamese Dictionary in 1867 (Nag 
1990: 56), wrote, on his work with the Nagas, that he was 
given elephants by the British to perform his work and 
that the Nagas had; 
... much time 
for idleness and useless amusements. 
Our esteemed and energetic patron, Captain Jenkins, 
has interested himself on this subject also. 
(Bronson, letter to Rev. S. Peck 22 June 1840) 
Although claims for linguistic recognition of 
Assamese were originally made by missionaries, the work 
of Dhekial Phukan, along with Maniram Dewan (see section 
4.3) one of the earliest Assamese "nationalists", 20 
20[Andandaram Dhekial-Phukan] was in every respect a 
product of the modern age of enlightenment. He got 
his inspiration from the contemporary "Bengal 
Renaissance" and from what he read about England's 
material process and Peter the Great's reforms in 
medieval Russia. He dreamt of days when reforms and 
material progress would surely dawn on Assam. (A. 
Guha 1988: 21) 
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prompted the founding of a number of small Assamese 
societies during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century; the Assam Deshaitaishi Sabha (Assam Patriotic 
Society) was founded in 1858 in Sibsagar, and a School 
Club was founded in Guwahati in 1869. In 1872, the 
Asamiya Chattrar Sahitya Sabha (Assamese Students 
Literary Society) was formed in Calcutta and, in 1888, 
this same group formed the Asamiya Bhasa Unnati Sadhini 
Sabha (Assamese Language Improvement Society) (I. Barua 
1990: 29-30). 
These groups targeted the poor standards of 
education in Assam, and the neglect of the Assamese 
language (I. Barua 1990: 19). More overtly political 
constitutional agitation was undertaken by the Assam 
Association. Active in 1882 in Sibsagar, the Assam 
Association was officially founded in 1903 and held its 
first general session at Dibrugarh in 1905 (A. Guha 1988: 
64). In 1916 the Assam Chattra Sanmilan (Assam Students' 
Conference) was founded, the first of these societies 
organized on an "All Assam basis" (I. Barua 1990: 70). 
The following year, the Assam Sahitya Sabha (Assam 
Literary Society) was established, with the motto "my 
mother language - my eternal love". 
These organizations focused upon similar issues to 
the later Assam Movement attempting to define a; 
linguistic-regional identity, their concern over the 
Government-blessed opium evil and their desire to be 
administered at the lower level, at least, not by 
recruits from Bengal. (A. Guha 1988: 335) 
As has been demonstrated, these desires were more a 
response to the particular manner of colonial rule in the 
region, rather than any ethnic reawakening. 
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Chapter Five 
The Construction of Assamese Identity; 
From Independence to 1977 
5.0 Introduction 
The period from 1947 to 1977 witnessed a dramatic 
increase in Assamese mobilization. New societies were 
founded and membership of these organizations increased. 
Assamese cultural organizations became more conspicuously 
politically active, articulating the need to protect the 
Assamese "way of life", in particular focusing upon 
language and the need to maintain a linguistic majority 
within the state. 
The formation of the Asom Gana Parishad (Assam 
Peoples' Council) (A. G. P. ) represents the culmination of 
this process, as the distinction between cultural and 
political organizations faded and an overtly Assamese 
political party gained control of the Legislative 
Assembly. As Sanjib Baruah argues, both the All Assam 
Students Union (A. A. S. U. ) and the Assam Sahitya Sabha 
(A. S. S. ), Assam's two most important cultural 
organizations, called themselves non-political, even from 
1983 to 1985 when they effectively stopped any 
"constitutional" government from operating. Baruah 
suggests this implies that they were working for a higher 
body; the nation, rather than for lower, day-to-day 
political concerns (Baruah 1994: 660-661) . Until it was 
accepted that the protection of Assamese culture was 
inherently "political", and as such needed to be dealt 
with within the political framework, this transition was 
incomplete. 
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It could be argued that the natural endpoint of this 
process would be the creation of a sovereign Assamese 
state. However, macro-political factors, over which the 
movement has no control, and internal Assamese acceptance 
of limited concessions, prevent this from occurring. In 
the case of Assam, certainly in the early 1980's, the 
vast majority of the population desired a change in 
governance but internal division, the strength and 
ability of the centre to resist these demands and the 
international state system prevented the completion of 
the project. Indeed it is due to this that, when the 
final position is achieved, cultural factors are likely 
to decline in importance, particularly if the regional 
party gains a voice at the centre where opportunities for 
individual advancement are greater. Since 1947, the only 
new states which have been formed, apart from those 
involved in de-colonization and the collapse of the 
U. S. S. R., are Eritrea and Bangladesh. 
Thus although the events examined in this chapter 
are important in themselves, in terms of this work they 
are more relevant as additional tools used to finally 
consolidate the notion of Assameseness into a party 
political form and to demonstrate how a particular 
discourse became prevalent amongst both elite and 
subaltern groups in Assam. 
The first section assesses the language issue and 
Bengali immigration. Concern about the Assamese language 
was given added impetus by three factors. Firstly, 
concerns about Bengali Muslims declaring Assamese as 
their mother tongue were such that Assamese elites could 
claim to be unsure about whether Assamese speakers were 
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actually in a majority in the state. Equally important, 
it represents a schism over whether Bengali Muslims who 
have adapted to the Assamese language were to be accepted 
as members of the Assamese community. Secondly, the 
growth of education made the issue more important to more 
people. ' Thirdly, state reorganization gave an added 
impetus to the language issue as the main focus of 
regional identity. 
The second section investigates state 
reorganization. It was Congress Party dominance which 
enabled the reorganization to be passed. Although, at the 
time, it was regarded as a modernizing feature by the 
secular elite, it is now regarded as one of the most 
important consolidating factors behind the resulting 
events. Many Assamese political activists hold the view 
that the reorganization of states encouraged the idea 
that states were culturally based rather than merely 
administrative units. As such, their control by a 
particular cultural elite appeared more natural than had 
previously been the case. Indeed, the manner in which the 
Congress Party was run in Assam, examined in the third 
section, gave substance to these claims. 
The continued support for the Congress Party in 
Assam, from Independence until the Emergency, is the main 
justification for treating the pre-1978 period as 
something qualitatively different from what followed. 
1 For example, the use of Urdu as a mobilizing tool by 
the Muslim League in the 1930's and 1940's was 
meaningless to the majority of illiterate Muslims, only 
evoking "a positive response among the upper and middling 
strata of Muslims in the urban centres of the Punjab" 
(Jalal 1995: 225). 
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That the rise of the Assam Movement coincided with the 
decline of the Congress Party suggests a degree of 
causality, which will be examined in Chapter Six. During 
the immediate post-Independence period, linguistic and 
other cultural problems were dealt with either within the 
Congress Party or by cultural groups, rather than through 
the electoral process. Assam appears integrated into the 
wider India-wide political trends of the period, 
supporting Congress during the period of "Congress 
System"2 and the Janata Dal in the post-"Emergency" 
elections. 
One of the major causes of the Assam Movement is 
often argued to be economic neglect. The fourth section 
evaluates the portrayal of Assam, and indeed the whole 
northeast, as economically and socially neglected. The 
perception of Assam as an internal colony is felt in both 
state-wide terms, vis-a-vis other states in India, and by 
the Assamese with regard to other groups within Assam. 
The reasons for this perception will be traced, along 
with the articulation of this idea by Assamese elites. 
The final section In this chapter evaluates the 
manner in which cultural organizations were beginning to 
move into an overtly political arena even before 1979. 
Some Assamese nationalists have argued that it is only 
with rising levels of education that the potential of any 
cultural Assamese Movement could be realized. This 
2The system of government in the first two decades 
after Independence has been described as "a political 
machine based on transactional alliances which were 
developed around the distribution of spoils" (Manor 1989: 
105). Kothari (1964) assesses the nature of the "Congress 
System". 
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viewpoint reflects western ideas of nationalism whereby 
the inherent attributes of the nation are portrayed as 
being omnipresent but the political fulfilment of these 
aims can only be witnessed when modernizing influences 
are apparent. Rather than an ever-present primordialism, 
at least a certain level of socialization was necessary 
for the Movement to attract enough support. However, the 
specific events of 1978-1979, and their portrayal as 
"ethnic" problems, were similarly vital, as the failure 
of previous political movements shows. 
5.1 Language Policy and Bengali Immigration 
As with the perpetuation of the Inner and Outer-Line 
system, the language debate after Independence remained 
similar to that which had preceded, focusing primarily 
upon control of the language of education. 3 Yet there were 
both qualitative and quantitative differences which 
changed the focus of protest; partition, state 
reorganization and the expansion of education after 
Independence. 
Firstly, a new claim could be made against Bengali 
Muslim immigrants in that the region from where they 
migrated, east Bengal, had become a separate state; East 
Pakistan, until 1971 and Bangladesh thereafter. Although, 
previously, complaints could be made against migration 
from Bengal on cultural grounds, there was no 
constitutional impediment to these migrants moving to 
Assam, or at least into the Brahmaputra Valley. The 
formation of a separate state however, led to new grounds 
3 Assamese elites proposed Assamese, Bengalis both 
Assamese and Bengali, whilst most tribals argued for the 
retention of English in some form. 
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on which to oppose these particular immigrants. That 
said, the separation of Sylhet from Assam calmed Assamese 
fears of minoritization, at least in the short term 
(E. P. W. 8 December 1979). 
In the early period after Independence, few 
complaints could be raised against the influx of Bengali 
Hindus from East Bengal. Although, as mentioned earlier, 
many had left from the 1920's onwards, few moral 
objections could be raised against their leaving the 
Muslim state of Pakistan to move to the secular state of 
India. 4 During the Bangladesh War of 1971, an estimated 
700,000 refugees entered Assam from East 
Pakistan/Bangladesh, and of these it was unclear how many 
remained after the formation of Bangladesh (E. P. W. 8 
December 1979). 
Furthermore, one of the main props of Congress 
hegemony in the northeast was seen to be the support of 
"illegal" immigrants from East Pakistan (see section 
5.3). Due to this situation, it is commonly argued by the 
Assamese (e. g. A. K. Das 1982: 58) that Congress leaders 
in Assam did not attempt to remove Bengali Muslims from 
the Brahmaputra Valley. Even when laws were passed, they 
were implemented half-heartedly. 
In 1950, the Immigrants Act (Expulsion from Assam, 
Act X of 1950) was passed, in part due to the issue of 
potential communal violence being raised by Omeo Kumar 
Das, an Assamese leader, and the interest in the issue of 
Vallabhbhai Patel, who had earlier argued for transfers 
of the Hindu and Muslim populations across the 
4 Any immigrants who arrived from Pakistan before 26 
July 1949 automatically became Indian citizens. 
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international boundary (Das 1982: 55). The Act provided 
for the deportation of any migrants from Bangladesh who 
had not been displaced by civil unrest. Protests from 
Pakistan led to the Nehru-Liaquat Pact of 8 April 1950, 
under which anyone who returned to India by 31 December 
1950 would be considered an Indian citizen (cited in Das 
1982: 346-351). The Immigrants Act was not implemented 
but was eventually repealed in 1957, after Patel's death. 
The outcry over open support from Bengali Muslims 
for Pakistan during the Chinese invasion of 1962 (see 
section 5.4) led to the Prevention of Immigration from 
Pakistan to Assam Plan (P. I. P. ) of 1964. Based upon the 
National Register of Citizens (N. R. C. ) of 1951,5 B. P. 
Chaliha, one of the most pro-Assamese Congress Chief 
Ministers, initiated the detection of illegal immigrants. 
In the first three years, 240,000 immigrants were 
identified, of whom 190,000 were deported (A. K. Das 1982: 
57). Fear of losing support of immigrants caused other 
Congress M. L. A. 's to urge Chaliha to slow down the 
process. In 1969, Chaliha announced that; "no more 
infiltrators were to be found" (Hussain 1993: 218). Fear 
of losing the election of 1972 halted the process 
s The N. R. C. was a transcription of certain census 
information from the 1951 census in Assam. It was a 
"secret administrative document, not open for 
inspection". Furthermore it was compiled by "unqualified 
or ill-qualified persons" and insecurity over the 
position of Bengali Muslims given the Nehru-Liaquat Pact 
may well have led to many returning after the register 
was compiled, in March 1951, leading to under- 
enumeration. In 1967 the Guwahati High Court stated that 
the N. R. C. was not admissible in a civil proceeding, 
being "directly prohibited under section 15 of the Census 
Act" (Chaudhury 1981: 267-268). 
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altogether. Despite the scale of the deportations, the 
importance of maintaining border controls was ignored by 
both state and central governments. The A. S. S. argued; 
It is claimed that 297,743 Bangladeshis were 
deported from Assam up to 1979. These figures are 
meaningless for the simple reason that almost every 
deported foreigner comes back to Assam in a matter 
of weeks or months. There is the remarkable example 
of one deportee who reappeared on the scene 19 
times. (A. S. S. 1980: 3) 
Protests by the A. A. S. U. against the ending of the 
P. I. P. resulted in the Government of India issuing 
instructions to the state government to detect foreigners 
on the electoral roll. Sinha, then Chief Minister, could 
not implement this programme as 25 Muslim M. L. A. 's 
refused to support it. 
The difficulties of proving citizenship in a state 
such as India are clearly immense, particularly given the 
effects and upset of partition, coupled with low levels 
of literacy and education. One of the main contentions of 
the Assam Movement has been that the spuriously attained 
right to vote has in itself been used to provide proof of 
citizenship. 6 This right, it is argued, was given by the 
Congress Party elites to those on whom it should not have 
been conferred in order to maintain Congress power. It is 
further believed that Congress elites persuaded Bengali 
Muslim migrants to claim Assamese as their mother tongue 
in census reports, to avoid raising suspicions amongst 
the Assamese community and thus to perpetuate Congress 
rule within the state. An alternative explanation is that 
this was done "out of fear"'(Gassah 1992: 51). 
6 The Assam Movement demanded proof of citizenship to 
be given from equally spurious documents (see section 
6.1). 
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This move has, however, been viewed differently by 
various Assamese writers. Many Assamese hold a 
patronising view of the Bengali "mians" and argue that it 
is the Congress elites, rather than the Bengali Muslims, 
who are at fault. In this interpretation, the threat to 
the Assamese community from the immigrants stems more 
from their sheer weight of numbers and "vote-bank" status 
given the democratic nature of the state. 
Rather than overt instrumentalism by Congress Party 
elites, discussed in the following section, it has 
conversely been argued that Bengali Muslims were willing 
to sacrifice their identity to establish themselves in 
Assam. As Deka, for example, argues; 
The Bengali Muslims who migrated to this state for 
an agricultural livelihood invariably returned 
Assamese as their mother tongue, since knowledge of 
the local language helped them tremendously in 
getting land and to gain acceptance in Assamese 
society. They also sent their children, unlike 
Bengali Hindus, to Assamese schools. (Deka 1976: 32) 
The leftist and elitist Assamese position however 
compares these migrants to earlier immigrants who were 
seen to adapt to Assamese culture. That they were willing 
to sacrifice their mother tongue on census reports 
suggests some degree, however instrumental, of cultural 
assimilation. This, they argue, can be contrasted with 
the real "other", Bengali Hindus and Marwaris, who have 
taken no steps to assimilate, and are much more of an 
economic threat than the landless "mians". Indeed, in the 
years after Independence, both the tea-garden labourers 
and the East Bengal peasantry developed from being 
"pejoratively known... as "coolie" and "miau" to being 
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"given the sobriquet of "Neo-Assamesel", (Prabhakar 1972: 
2142) .7 
That said, by the 1980's, the notion of being 
Assamese was closely linked to the perception of 
foreigners within the state of Assam. In part this was 
able to arise due to notions of "unity through diversity" 
such that differences were constitutionally entrenched. 
This led to a situation whereby blurring commonly existed 
in Assamese consciousness between illegal foreigners, 
that is, Bengali Muslims who arrived from East Pakistan 
or Bangladesh, and legal migrants, who had moved into 
Assam from elsewhere in India, particularly (west) 
Bengal. As the situation developed through the 1980's, 
the Assam Movement was forced to explicitly revert to the 
stricter definition as it became clear that nothing 
Monirul Hussain has argued that Muslims in Assam, 
rather than being a "single homogenous community" 
(Hussain 1987: 397) can be divided into four distinct 
categories; (i) Assamese Muslims, including the 
descendants of soldiers who stayed in Assam, medieval 
artisans brought into Assam by the Ahom kings, preachers 
and local converts during the Ahom period, (ii) Neo- 
Assamese Muslims, consisting of immigrants and their 
descendants from what is now Bangladesh, (iii) Muslims of 
the Barrack Valley, who moved into Cachar from the 
neighbouring districts of East Bengal during the British 
period and (iv) North Indian Muslims, those who moved 
into Assam primarily from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. 
Although an interesting classification, the publication 
of an article in 1987 which is able to conclude that 
"[t]he Muslims of Assam are an inseparable part of the 
present day Assamese society and active partners in 
building its future destiny" (Hussain 1987: 401), without 
mentioning the calls for repatriation of immigrants seems 
some way short of the mark. 
190 
legally could be done to expel Indian migrants. Thus even 
if the Bengali Muslims had adopted the Assamese language, 
this was not considered enough for acceptance into the 
Assamese community. As Prafulla Mahanta, when Chief 
Minister, wrote; 
The problem of citizenship in India has been put in 
a melting-pot in Assam. The effects of partition, 
the wrong and misplaced notions of national 
commitment, the obligations under so-called 
international treaties (not even presented in 
parliament), and above all some convenient 
interpretations of the humanitarian considerations 
in clear derogation of the lawful rights of bona 
fide citizens residing in Assam and the formation of 
a sub-nationality having distinct culture and 
heritage - all these have entered into a holy 
alliance to promote the servile interests of a group 
of persons to subjugate and trample on the rights of 
the people of Assam. A group of people having no 
citizenship eligibilities or certificates as members 
of minority communities... have been sought to be 
sold as minorities in India. (Mahanta 1986: 116-117) 
As will be demonstrated in Chapter Six, the change 
of focus to Bengali Muslims resulted in increased support 
for the United Liberation Front of Assam (U. L. F. A. ) who 
were able to, illegally, pressurize west Bengali and 
Marwari immigrants. 
Secondly, Independence brought a massive expansion 
in education throughout India and grievances over 
language became focused towards control of education and 
consequent opportunities within the state sector, 
requiring pre-eminence for Assamese. 
In 1960, agitation by the Assam Sahitya Sabha led to 
serious disturbances by Assamese-speakers demanding that 
Assamese became the official language of the state. This 
resulted in counter-agitations by Bengali-speakers (Dube 
1977: 459). The Assam Official Language Act, despite 
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making Assamese the official language of the state, 
"formally recognized the special position of English in 
the hills and of Bengali in the district of Cachar" 
(Chaube 1973: 122). The passing of the Act led to 
resentment in the hill areas and the formation of the All 
Party Hill Leaders Conference, and thus encouraged the 
process by which the hill areas broke away (Gassah 1992: 
43). 
In 1972, further rioting broke out as Guwahati 
University called for the introduction of Assamese as the 
language of instruction, with two exceptions; 
1. English was to be retained as the language of 
instruction for a period of time; and 
2. students would be permitted to answer their 
examination questions in English and Bengali, as 
well as in Assamese. (Weiner 1978: 117) 
This protest also followed the publication of the 
1971 Census which showed a greater Bengali speaking 
population than was expected after the previous Census. 
This derived from the changing structure of the Congress 
Party, and the role of the Chief Minister Chaudhury. A 
Bengali Muslim, Chaudhury attempted to reassert Bengali 
Muslim rights and encouraged the community to proclaim 
Bengali, rather than Assamese, as their language (Sharma 
1980: 1323). 
After Assamese students protested against the 
maintenance of Bengali, the University withdrew this 
option. Complaints by Bengalis on the basis of Article 30 
of the Indian Constitution, 8 led to widespread anti- 
8A11 minorities, whether based on religion or 
language, shall have the right to establish and 
administer educational institutions of their choice. 
(Constitution of India: Article 30) 
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Bengali rioting. Eventually a compromise was reached 
between Indira Gandhi and the A. A. S. U. whereby 
recommendations regarding the language of instruction by 
Guwahati and Dibrugarh Universities would be followed and 
Assamese would be made a compulsory subject in all non- 
Assamese schools in the state. The movement was called 
off, but both Bodos and Bengalis felt that their position 
was being threatened by Assamese imperialism. 
5.2 State Reorganization 
One of the major impetuses for the language debate 
occurring at this time was that state reorganization, as 
well as Assamese becoming the official language, was seen 
to imply that the Assamese should have more power within 
their state. State reorganization was justified by Indian 
elites through promoting administrative rationalization, 
yet it implicitly suggested that a state for the Assamese 
was to be created. Although most Assamese realized that 
it was more due to demands by the tribal regions within 
Assam that the restructuring was taking place, 9 the notion 
of an Assamese homeland increased in salience. 
As B. P. Singh argues; 
the tribal elite... were highly proficient in 
English, accepted western dress and modes of living 
and were keen to become chief ministers and 
ministers of their own lands. (Singh 1996: 22) 
From an alternative standpoint, Monirul Hussain claims 
that; 
The present Chief Ministers of Arunachal Pradesh, 
Nagaland and Meghalaya can speak Asamiya as fluently 
as the present Chief Minister of Assam. (M. Hussain 
1993: 245) 
193 
Although state reorganization was generally 
predicated on the basis of linguistic homogeneity, the 
justification for the restructuring of the northeast was 
not. The Report of the State Reorganization Commission of 
1955, which approved the state division of the south of 
India on the basis of linguistic difference (see section 
2.4), actually argued for the unification of the 
autonomous districts of the northeast into Assam proper. 
That is, that Tripura, Manipur, the former native states 
(Chaube 1973: 189), and the North East Frontier Agency 
(N. E. F. A. ) should rejoin Assam on the grounds that they 
were too small to be viable. Within two decades the 
reverse occurred; greater division rather than 
unification, but not for linguistic reasons. In 1971, 
presenting the North Eastern Areas Reorganization Bill, 
K. C. Pant, the Minister of State in the Ministry for Home 
Affairs, stated; 
... the basic object of the Bill 
is to restructure 
the administrative set-up in the north-eastern 
region so as to equip it for the bigger task of 
development of the region and to promote the welfare 
of the people of the area. (Agrahayana 23,1893 
1971: 112) 
The point being that the reorganization was less 
intended to consolidate an Assamese identity than to 
restructure the administration of the area, providing 
statehood for the tribal regions; Manipur and Tripura, 
and Union Territory status for Mizoram and Arunachal 
Pradesh. It was the tribal leaders in those areas, the 
new middle class whose aspirations were being held back 
by the Assamese, that had pressed for the changes, rather 
than any Assamese movement working for a more homogenous 
Assamese state. Indeed, the major justification given was 
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simple administrative rationalization, and perhaps 
military necessity, the existing system being inherited 
from the unclear and divisive British policies. As Pant 
argued; 
The north-eastern region at present consists of two 
States, namely Assam and Nagaland and the two union 
territories of Manipur and Tripura. Within Assam 
itself, we have N. E. F. A. which is constitutionally a 
part of that state but is administered by the 
Central Government as if it is a Union Territory. 
Then we have six autonomous districts which are 
administered under the Sixth Schedule to the 
Constitution. These are the Garo Hills, the United 
Khasi and Jaintia Hills, Jowai, Mikir Hills, North 
Cachar Hills and Moizo districts. The rest of Assam, 
comprises six districts in the Brahmaputra Valley 
and the Cachar district. The three autonomous 
districts of Garo Hills, the United Khasi and 
Jaintia Hills and Jowai form the autonomous state of 
Meghalaya within Assam. (Agrahayana 23,1893 1971: 
103) 
The potential effect of consolidating the state of 
Assam, whilst simultaneously maintaining a sizable 
Bengali minority therein, was recognized at the time. 
Prabhakar argues that Cachar1° should have been separated 
from the rest of Assam, thereby concluding; "that dream 
of the Assamese middle classes -a homeland for their 
language" in which culture and geography closely overlap 
(Prabhakar 1972: 2142). 11 Similarly, the effect of 
10 According to the 1971 Census of India, 71.76% of 
the population of Cachar/Barak Valley district were 
Bengali speakers (Quoted in Hussain 1993: 238). 
11 But Prabhakar accepts that there were other 
unresolved "contradictions" in Assamese society, 
particularly the relationship with the Plains Tribals and 
the Neo-Assamese which, given the speed with which the 
peripheral regions split from Assam after Independence, 
may well have led to further division. However, he 
believed that, after achieving linguistic unity, the 
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immigration into Tripura, the population of which was 80% 
Bengali, could have been recognized and Cachar district 
merged with Tripura. Alternatively, Basumatari, M. L. S. 
for Kokrajhar, argued that Assam should have been further 
consolidated by removing the tribal regions of the North 
Cachar and Mikir Hills, to protect the tribals remaining 
within Assam (Agrahayana 30,1893 1971: 55). 
12 
However, throughout the Bill there was no discussion 
of how the Bill would benefit Assam, rather how it would 
benefit the adjoining tribal areas. The similarity of 
this with previous administrative changes, which were 
primarily aimed at appeasing or displeasing Bengal, was 
not lost on many Assamese nationalists. Yet again they 
perceived themselves to be hapless pawns, used to mollify 
more influential adjoining areas. 
A major cause of the lack of protest at the time was 
that many within the state of Assam recognized the 
implications in terms of political power rather more than 
the central Congress Ministers. Firstly, Assamese would 
become consolidated as the language of the state, many of 
the tribals having argued for a maintenance of English. 
"real", that is, class and economic, divisions would 
prove easier to resolve. 
12 It is interesting to note the comparison between 
this debate and that which occurred in Northern Ireland 
at Eire's independence. Claims were made for a nine 
county solution, providing population parity for both 
Protestants and Catholics within Northern Ireland, a six 
county solution, which was finally chosen, or a four 
county solution in which Protestants would have a much 
greater majority. 
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Secondly, given the development of political power in the 
northeast, state boundaries have become important in 
relation to conceptions of identity. That is, notions of 
identity in the region are closely related to the 
administrative unit. 13 This spatial consolidation gave an 
obvious impetus for the construction of a more 
chauvinistic identity focusing itself on the official 
territorial borders. 
As the tribal regions around Assam broke away, a new 
plains, caste-Hindu, Assamese identity was consolidated. 
" 
At this moment the very notion of being Assamese changed. 
The term Assam had always been closely related to the 
land, and when this included almost the entire northeast, 
the relationship between Assamese speakers and the hill 
tribals was clearly an integral part of the "imagined 
community". The notion that the Assamese were protectors 
of the tribal people's and that the northeast contains 
"Seven Sisters" (Baruah 1994) had to change given the 
administrative restructuring. 
13 As Anderson has argued, territorial nationalism has 
proved a potent force in creating an "imagined community" 
based on the administrative unit in post-colonial states 
(Anderson 1991: 52). 
14 Mizoram achieved Union Territory status in 1971 and 
full statehood in 1987. Nagaland achieved statehood in 
1963 and Meghalaya, Manipur and Tripura in 1972. 
15 Despite the fact that the caste-Hindu Assamese have 
latterly been perceived by many to suppress even advanced 
groups such as the Bodos and Ahorns (e. g. Rafiabadi 1988: 
2, Gohain 1985: 36). 
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Simultaneously however, those groups which were not 
in the (new) dominant Assamese coalition, argued that 
they too were entitled to-states, leading to; 
demands for a separate hill state in the autonomous 
districts, an Ahom homeland in the Sibsagar and 
Lakhimpur district, and a Kamata state in the 
Goalpara. (Deka 1976: 34) 
Previous divisions used by the British resurfaced as 
the basis for further regional reorganization. The 
Autonomous State Demand Council (A. S. D. C. ) was formed to 
secure an Autonomous State for the Karbi people of Karbi 
Anglong on the basis of the Sixth Schedule; a move which 
was finally realized on 12 September 1995. The difference 
of this region had already been noted within the Assam 
Official Language Act. Karbi Anglong district, along with 
North Cachar, was able to continue using English for 
official purposes. 
In effect then, the dominant Assamese community 
consolidated its power in the state of Assam and 
presented itself as the embodiment of an Assamese 
speaking identity, whilst simultaneously other groups, 
although linguistically similar, claimed political rights 
for themselves on the basis of cultural difference. The 
result was to emphasize the heterogeneity of the region, 
and gave the impression that political demands were best 
made through emphasizing these differences, rather than 
through articulating an inclusive regional identity. 
The regional reorganization of the 1970's continued 
a trend in which the relationship with tribals had been 
changing since Independence, despite the many regional 
links. As S. C. Marak, present Chief Minister of 
Meghalaya, commented; 
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Geography has created a common identity of the North 
Eastern States due to shared constraints on 
development in trade, commerce, communications and 
investment requirements. (Indian Express 9 July 
1996) 
The introduction of reservations and the Sixth 
Schedule for Scheduled Tribes had led many groups to 
assert their tribal identities at the expense of their 
Assamese, i. e. northeast Indian, identity. 16 The effect of 
this was to halt the process by which both tribals and 
plains Assamese had been borrowing cultural artifacts 
from each other. The most oft-quoted examples of the 
Assamese adoption of tribal customs are that Assamese 
Brahmins eat both meat and fish, whilst weaving is an 
honourable occupation for women, unlike the rest of India 
(Datta ed. 1994: 13). 
Many liberals have argued that this assimilation was 
the prime feature of a northeast regional identity. The 
ending of this process consolidated a more xenophobic, 
inward looking Assamese identity, and more vociferous 
tribal identities, as the Assamese group represented a 
smaller and smaller proportion of the inhabitants of the 
northeast. The reorganization of states was the third 
16 Apocryphal stories of tribals abusing the system 
are common. For example, in 1976, Member of the Lok Sabha 
Dasaratha Deb argued that the Laskars in Tripura become a 
Scheduled Caste rather than a Scheduled Tribe as they had 
allegedly gained land through their tribal status and 
sold it using their Bengali status (Gallanter 1984: 151). 
Heuze-Brigant gives a similar example from Singrauli, 
where those dispossessed after the building of a dam 
articulated a tribal identity and gained support from 
environmental lobbies despite there being; "no tribal 
society inside or in the immediate vicinity of the tribal 
zone" (Heuze-Brigant 1991: 312). 
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political action which affected this relationship. 
Both the manner of British rule, culminating in 
Inner and Outer-Line policies (see sections 2.4 and 4.3) 
and reservations policy (see section 2.4), similarly 
widened the cleavage between tribals and plains Assamese, 
such that notions of Assameseness in the 1980's, although 
recognising the importance of the closeness of the 
relationship, were based on completely different precepts 
to those of, say, 1900. 
This has also led to a situation in which some 
Assamese are requesting the same level of protection for 
"their" group as has been awarded to tribals, on the 
basis of their relationship with the tribals. Indeed the 
Congress Party in Assam has appeared happy to comply with 
these demands since the Assam Movement began, 
particularly under the leadership of Hiteshwar Saikia who 
was commonly seen to operate a policy of divide and rule 
with regard to the indigenous Assamese. In the 1996 
Congress (I) Manifesto the completion of the process of 
enlisting "Ahorn, Maran, Matak, Chutia and Tea and ex-tea 
labourers (Tea Tribes)" into the Scheduled Tribe schedule 
was promised (Congress Party 1996: 18). The previous 
Congress government had "provided for Bodoland Autonomous 
Council and the Councils for Rabhas, Tiwas and Misings" 
(Congress Party 1996: 17). The United Peoples' Party of 
Assam claimed in response that the granting of; 
so-called autonomy without demarcation of boundaries 
endanger[s] the lives of thousands of non-tribals 
living for generations and creating permanent enmity 
between them. (U. P. P. A. 1996: 3) 
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5.3 Congress Party Dominance 
The relationship, discussed in Chapter Two, between the 
Congress Party and the nationalist movement was such that 
opposition to the Congress Party implied an opposition to 
Independence, thus guaranteeing Congress hegemony for at 
least the first generation thereafter. The political and 
electoral outcome of this was that state-centre disputes 
developed into more clearly defined sub-nationalist 
movements than perhaps needed to be the case. The 
development of the parliamentary system and consequent 
relative decline of Congress power at the centre, 
resulted in the party adopting a more ideologically 
coherent approach, particularly under the leadership of 
Indira Gandhi, thereby allowing other parties to increase 
their support on the basis of alternative ideologies. 
Despite the growing grievances regarding the 
language issue and immigration, Assam provided the 
Congress Party with almost complete support, at least in 
electoral terms. From 1946 to 1977, the state government 
was continuously controlled by the Congress Party. It has 
been argued that -those groups who felt themselves 
peripheral to any mainstream Indian identity, 
particularly Muslims, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes and in Assam tea garden labourers (Deka 1976: 44), 
show higher signs of political participation than other 
groups. This can be ascribed to attempts to legitimize 
their separate status and rights, through gaining the 
support of the ruling party, in return for giving their 
electoral mandate. 
Subsequently, their self-protective tendency has led 
them, in state as well as national elections, to 
vote more for the party most likely to win than for 
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parties representing class or community appeals 
particular to their condition. (Rudolph and Rudolph 
1987: 47) 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that, after the decline 
of the Congress Party, Muslims in Maharashtra have even 
voted for the B. J. P.. 
In Assam however, the most important influence was 
the nature of the Congress Party in the state. Unlike 
elsewhere in India, particularly the "Hindi Heartland", 
the Congress Party was not run through landlords and 
their proxies. Rather, it was dominated by high-caste 
Assamese, changing during the late 1960's into a 
coalition of backward-caste Hindus and Bengalis. 
The use of illegal vote banks by the Congress Party 
were safe whilst Congress ran the Legislative Assembly. 
As will be demonstrated (see section 6.1) when a non- 
Congress government came to power, the issue of previous 
Congress corruption was available to encourage anti- 
Congress feeling. The blind eye turned to illegal 
immigration from East Bengal by Congress certainly merely 
saved up problems for the future (J. Singh 1984: 1059). 
As the E. P. W. reported; 
The problem of the influx was underplayed by 
successive Congress governments because the 
immigrants, often illegally present and always 
afraid of exposure, blindly voted under the 
direction of village chiefs with whom the Congress 
established close links. (E. P. W. 8 December 1979) 
The 1969 mid-term elections would appear to support 
the above argument. Voting turn-out in the polls averaged 
49%, although the highest turn-out occurred "in Barpeta 
and Dhubri [where] more than 60% and 63% of the 
electorate exercised their franchise" (Deka 1976: 45). 
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Both of these constituencies had a sizable Muslim 
population and a Muslim candidate. 
Indeed, it is widely believed that immediately upon 
arrival in Assam, Pakistani/Bangladeshi immigrants 
registered themselves as voters to establish resident 
status and in return provided support for the Congress 
Party (for example, Das 1982: 32, Gassah 1992: 6). A 
memorandum of the A. A. S. U. claimed that; 
The first thing the foreign nationals try is to 
control their names in the voters' list with the 
connivance of the anti-social leaders, politicians 
and officials on this side of the border. The motive 
is crystal-clear. The infiltrators vote for the 
politicians who protect them in all respects. 
(Quoted in Trivedi 1995: 636) 
This manifested itself in continued, if declining, 
Congress electoral success. The percentage Congress Party 
vote for Legislative Assembly elections declined 
gradually during the first four elections eventually 
dropping from 48% in 1962 to 43% (Deka 1976: 37) in 1967. 
Yet, given the famine in Assam in 1966, which was 
primarily blamed on a failure of the (Congress) state 
government distribution system (Deka 1976: 33) and the 
Chinese invasion of 1962, this still represented a major 
victory. 17 
The mid-term election of 1970 resulted in a Congress 
(R) clean sweep of Assam's Lok Sabha seats, securing 
60.83% of the vote. As elsewhere, this can be attributed 
to Indira Gandhi's mobilization of particular sectors, 
through appeals to caste, religious and community 
17 According to Chief Minister B. P. Chaliha, the 
famine deaths were in fact due to malnutrition, the; 
"outcome of not taking balanced diets" (Deka 1976: 33). 
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affiliations. The policy of garibi hatao (remove poverty) 
implied a shift from caste to class politics, yet Indira 
Gandhi's populism still relied on conciliating specific 
18 groups ; 
in Gujarat the KHAM strategy: Kshatriyas, Harijans, 
Adivasis and Muslims, in UP Brahmins, Rajput 
Thakurs, lower castes and minorities such as 
Harijans and Muslims. (Jalal 1995: 213) 
In Assam a combination of tea garden workers, Muslim 
and rural votes formed the dominant coalition and this 
was represented in the cabinet of the new Chief Minister, 
Chaudhury. The 26 strong cabinet included four Muslims, 
six members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
and three representatives of linguistic minorities. Of 
the remainder, four were Brahmins, and the rest non- 
Brahmin. 
This trend was consolidated under Sinha and by the 
end of 1971, control of the Congress Party had shifted to 
an alliance of Other Backward Castes, Scheduled Castes 
and Tribes, Bengalis, Muslims and tea garden tribals. The 
high caste Assamese which had previously dominated the 
Party were adversely affected by the more populist 
policies of Indira Gandhi and consequent attempts to 
broaden the base of Congress Party support. This 
coalition remained intact until the collapse of Saikia's 
Ministry in 1985.19 
18 In the 1980's a more explicit appeal to Hindu 
chauvinism, particularly with regard to Sikhs, by Rajiv 
Gandhi was still accompanied by appeals to Muslim voters, 
as in the Shah Bano case (see section 2.3). 
19 This scenario recurs throughout India. Under the 
Syndicate, although unrepresentative, the state Congress 
Parties were dominated by the most politically 
influential groups within the state. Under Indira 
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The new support base of the Congress Party and the 
division of the northeast into separate states adversely 
affected the upper-caste Assamese Hindus' self- 
perception. Although they may have over-exaggerated their 
powers in the 1950's and 1960's, after 1972 their 
influence was clearly drastically reduced. However, this 
new coalition did prove electorally successful. Congress 
support in the 1972 Legislative Assembly elections peaked 
at 53% (B. P. Singh 1996: 79). 
Despite this, many of the alternative (Assamese) 
political parties founded in the late 1960's and early 
1970's were equally affected by the more populist 
Congress tactics, particularly at local level. The 
construction, after Assamese protests, of two small oil 
refineries and an adoption of many P. L. P. policies and 
attitudes by senior Congress politicians, 20 resulted in 
electoral failure for these groups (see section 5.5). 
Gandhi's leadership, top-down appointments of favoured 
politicians, the emphasis on winning national, rather 
than state elections and a greater willingness to 
interfere in state's affairs, homogenized the Congress 
coalition on an India-wide basis, rather than reflecting 
regional differences. 
20 The power of the Assamese elite in the Congress 
Party before the 1970's was demonstrated by the 
leadership of B. P. Chaliha. In 1968, Chaliha; 
had to give a clarification... that by "Assam for 
Assamese", he meant the economic and employment 
development of the state. (Deka 1976: 48) 
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5.4 The Hinterland Notion 
The Assam Movement has used various economic and social 
circumstances to reinforce the perception that Assam is a 
colonial hinterland within the Indian Union. The 
importance for this thesis is the method whereby these 
ideas have been used to consolidate the Assamese identity 
in relation to other, economically privileged and 
stigmatized, groups . 
21 
The perception of Assam as a colonial hinterland is 
a commonly held belief by many Assamese and an image used 
by the Assam Movement to justify their demands. The 
purpose of this section is two-fold. Firstly, to examine 
the claims made by the Assam Movement and by the Assamese 
elite in general, to attempt to establish the popularity 
of the notion that Assam is exploited and, conversely, to 
examine the responses that have attempted to deny this 
idea. 
The claims made by Assamese groups have also been 
made on behalf of the northeast as a whole and, indeed, 
all of eastern India, that is, the northeast, West 
Bengal, Orissa and Bihar. One clear explanation for this 
is the declining role of Calcutta. Replaced as the 
capital of India by New Delhi in 1911, Calcutta suffered 
further through partition, the shift to Bombay as the 
major trading port in India and from the alleged bias 
towards the Hindi Heartland by elites in New Delhi. 
The internal colony model is popular due to the fact 
that Assam is rich in natural resources but appears to 
benefit little from this. "In many ways, Assam is the 
21 This approach is derived from Hechter's "internal 
colonialism" model (see section 1.1). 
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richest state in India" (A. K. Das 1982: 1). Over half of 
India's oil and natural gas was produced in Assam until 
1977 and 1979 respectively (Misra 1980: 1361), declining 
proportionally after that due to discoveries elsewhere in 
India (Hussain 1993: 74). It was not until the start of 
the Assam Movement, in 1981, that the Assam Oil Company 
and Oil India Limited were nationalized, both previously 
being 49% owned by British companies. 
Despite the only oil refinery in Assam, at Digboi, 
having been built in 1901, the increased expansion in 
production after Independence in Assam necessitated the 
construction of a large refinery in Barauni, Bihar, 
against the advice of Soviet experts who recommended it 
to be situated in Silghat, Nowgong. This political, 
rather than economic, decision required a 1400 kilometre 
pipeline to be built, an easy target during the agitation 
of the 1980's. When two small refineries were eventually 
constructed in Assam it was, again, the result of 
previous agitation. 
Fifty-five per cent of India's tea is produced in 
Assam, although it is commonly assumed (e. g. Hussain 
1993: 71) that profits are concealed and thus the state's 
share of revenue is reduced. Despite the Guwahati Tea 
Auction Centre being the largest in volume in the world, 
the headquarters of the Indian Tea Board and the larger 
tea gardens are outside the state, primarily in Calcutta 
and London, thus most of the higher paid jobs connected 
with the industry are elsewhere. That many of the tea 
plantations are British owned and these are generally the 
most profitable, suggests another grievance with resource 
allocation within Assam. 
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The forestry industry is again perceived to be 
biassed against the Assamese. Sixty per cent of India's 
plywood is produced in Assam (A. K. Das 1982: 1), but none 
of the plywood factories are owned by the Assamese. The 
Assamese government received only 3,500,000 Rupees in 
1980 from sales tax on plywood, as against 60,000,000 
Rupees by the Indian government, primarily as there are 
no Assamese sales depots (Hussain 1993: 77). 
Other mineral supplies within Assam are unexploited. 
Of an estimated one billion tonnes of coal reserves in 
Assam, only 558,000 are mined annually. Iron ore is 
"virtually untouched" (A. K. Das 1982: 230), as is the 
potential hydro-electric power within the state. 
Furthermore, per capita investment, as provided by 
the sixth Plan, for example, actually allocated less than 
the India-wide average for Assam. 22 Despite the 1981 
National Committee on Backward Areas reporting that, 
except in the oil, tea and forestry producing areas of 
Upper Assam, all other distri-cts were industrially 
backward, the North-Eastern Council stated that; "no one 
can complain about the lack of resources for the state" 
(North Eastern Council 1980: 31). 
The notion that an independent Assam would be 
economically viable is based on the vast amount of 
natural resources in the state and, although most realize 
the improbability of independence occurring due to geo- 
political realities, that it exists at all is due to this 
22 Assam was to receive 448 
against a national average of 557 
states of the northeast were all 
than the average, Nagaland, for 
Rupees (North Eastern Council 1980: 
Zupees per capita, as 
Rupees. The other six 
to receive much more 
example, with 2,692 
31). 
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perceived economic advantage. The demands made in the 
Assam Accord (see Appendix D) and in the aims of the 
A. G. P. (see Appendix E), for example, suggest that a 
rectification of this economic backwardness would do much 
to appease Assamese groups. The problem, however, is that 
benefits from industrialization are seen to go to non- 
Assamese groups within the state, such as Bengali Hindus 
and Marwaris. It is this observation that led a "senior 
journalist of Gauhati" to call for inhabitants of 
Meghalaya to oppose the extension of the railway into 
that state since "a few years of backwardness may be 
preferable to the exploitation of the State by others 
from outside" (B. P. Singh 1996: 60) 
This has led to a situation whereby terms such as 
development and industrialization are portrayed by the 
Assamese elite as being in the interests of non-Assamese 
citizens (B. P. Singh 1987: 169). This can be seen as a 
continuation of the lack of Assamese control over the tea 
plantations and economy from the nineteenth century (see 
section 4.2). 
The hinterland notion need not only be applied to 
economic policies. Widespread resentment exists in Assam 
due to the Indian national anthem, which names all the 
states of India except for Assam, possibly due to 
Rabindranath Tagore's inability to find anything to rhyme 
with Assam (Weiner 1978: 116). However, in popular 
perception, this is regarded as yet another example of 
Bengali cultural imperialism. 
Immediately after Independence, the northeast was 
isolated from the rest of India since Rangpur, through 
which road and rail links passed, was transferred to 
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Pakistan. Not until 1950 were replacement links 
constructed (Das 1982: 16). Similarly the protests which 
occurred before the second bridge over the Brahmaputra 
was built and without which it apparently would not have 
been constructed, reinforce this perception of spatial 
and intellectual isolation (see section 4.3). 
The idea that New Delhi elites were disinterested in 
the region was reinforced in 1962, only two years after 
the first major language riots. The Chinese invasion 
prompted All India Radio to; 
call for sacrifices in pursuit of a just war. The 
Hindu past was resurrected to remind Indians not 
only of the sacred nature of the Himalayan border 
but also of battles in which right had been on the 
side of the defeated. The Hindu scriptures were 
interpreted to apply to the current conflict. The 
epic of the Mahabharata was particularly apposite 
with its story of the godlike heroes of the Battle 
of Kurukshetra. (Edwardes 1971: 306-307) 
During the war the Chinese army invaded the N. E. F. A. 
and reached the tea gardens of Upper Assam. 23 Fear of an 
invasion of Assam led to Nehru's infamous broadcast in 
which he; 
made a pathetic farewell address over the radio on 
November 12,1962, "My heart goes out to the people 
of Assam", he said. (A. K. Das 1982: 17) 
Thus, the Assam Movement was able to consolidate 
sub-nationalist support through reference to the centre's 
apparent lack of concern for the northeast. As the E. P. W. 
23 By' the middle of November 1962 the Chinese had 
established themselves in N. E. F. A., as well as Ladakh in 
the west. A week later they were only 49 miles from 
Tezpur and controlled Walong, which opened up the route 
to the Digboi oilfields. They unilaterally withdrew on 21 
November 1962. 
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reported, in 1979; "Today, the Assamese are being made to 
recall [Nehru's broadcast]" (E. P. W. 8 December 1979). 24 
One of the methods used to deny the "hinterland 
notion" is the portrayal of the region as a miniature 
India. The notion of unity through diversity, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, has been used both by Indian 
nationalists to justify the position of the northeast in 
the Indian Union, and by Assamese Congress elites. The 
Assam Pradesh Congress Committee Resolution Re- 
Organization of Assam (May 20 1967) opposed the 
restructuring of the northeast on the basis that; 
The hill and the plains areas of Assam are so inter- 
linked geographically and inter-dependent 
economically and otherwise that the existence and 
development of one without the other is not 
possible... Ethnically and socially Assam with a 
background of an admixture of races and cultures 
presents an image of unity in diversity. (Quoted in 
V. R Trivedi 1995: 406) 
Indeed this notion of difference in the northeast 
recurs throughout writing on the region; 
The state of Assam is one of the most interesting 
parts of India from the ethnological point of view 
for some of the most picturesque tribes had their 
homes here. (Bahadur 1977: 1) 
But the foremost feature of the social order of 
northeast India is its heterogeneity. The region is 
inhabited by three major groups... Within each group 
there is tremendous variety; in terms of race 
(probably greater variety than in any other part of 
the globe); language (as many as 420 languages and 
dialects); and religion. (B. P. Singh 1987: 258) 
24 Another example of Assamese perceptions of other 
Indians as prejudiced towards them comes from the use of 
the term mota asami as an insult throughout much of north 
India. The term describes a lazy fat person, who deserves 
to be robbed. Asami is itself Bengali for "criminal". 
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Perhaps, nowhere in the world is found such 
cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic diversity 
as found in the northeast. (Indian Express July 9 
1996) 
Assam with Nepal helped very largely in the 
absorption of this Kirata element in the formation 
of the North Indian (Hindu) people. This can be 
looked upon as Assam's great contribution to the 
Synthesis of Cultures and Fusion of Races that took 
place in India. (Chatterji 1955: 11) 
On one level, the usage of this metaphor is simply a 
recognition that differences do exist, which is perhaps 
not surprising given the prevailing view that tribal 
culture and minority languages, for example, are to be 
maintained. On another level, these ideas of difference 
are played down by most Assamese, who view their 
(dominant) relationship with the hill tribals as the 
defining characteristic of social relationships in the 
northeast; 
The "unenduring, wooden-headed and insensitive" 
attitude of the Assamese elite has not only 
alienated the tribals and other non-Assamese 
minorities but in fact, continues to do so. (S. K. 
Das 1994: 47) 
In the Assamese perception, the linkages between 
hill tribals and plains Assamese, rather than division on 
the basis of any classifiable difference, is the main 
point of reference. 
Writing in 1972, Prabhakar argued that; 
For too long the Assamese people have been fobbed 
off with pious rhetoric about Assam being a 
"miniature India", a home for many nationalities, 
just like the mother country. If the analogy were 
really valid, the Assamese language should at least 
have enjoyed the same position vis-a-vis the other 
-languages of this miniature India, as Hindi does 
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vis-a-vis the languages of the mother country. 
(E. P. W. 21 October 1972: 2142) 
The effects of this division are clearly difficult 
to categorize. The legitimacy given to tribal customs has 
given political and economic rights, originally in the 
hands of the Assamese, to the tribals themselves. The 
selling of the northeast as a colourful pageant, to 
encourage tourism and to legitimize Indian rule in the 
face of Chinese territorial claims, similarly emphasizes 
difference. Indeed, this latter point perhaps reaffirms 
the Assamese claim that their political situation is not 
in their hands (see also sections 4.3 and 5.2). 
There is perhaps a similarity with the other 
peripheral region of India; Kashmir. Whereas the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir is essential to legitimize India's 
claim to be a secular state, being the only non-Hindu 
majority state, so perhaps the northeast is essential as 
it reflects the overall diversity of India, particularly 
within Assam, in a single state. 
5.5 The Development of Cultural Organizations 
into Political Movements 
The development of Assam from a territorial description, 
in the early nineteenth century, to a cultural category, 
has been documented thus far. The final development 
traced in this thesis is the utilization of this 
community, through the use of cultural markers, for a 
political purpose. As argued in Chapter One, the linkages 
between the cultural and the political are complex. Until 
1979, cultural signifiers were used for political 
purposes, but generally not within the party political 
framework. However, there were previous attempts to 
create sub-nationalist parties before 1979 and these 
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early moves into an overtly political sphere will be 
traced in this section. 
Furthermore, cultural organizations, such as the 
A. S. S., became more politicized, whilst other 
organizations, such as the Assam Yuvak Samaj (Assam Youth 
Society), a youth organization founded in 1965 by 
Ambikagiri Raichowdhury, articulated Assamese cultural 
values explicitly in terms of anti-Bengali sentiments. 
These developments generally came from disaffected 
Assamese members of existing political parties, in 
contrast to the later A. G. P. which derived its support 
primarily from the A. A. S. U. and Assamese cultural 
organizations, with additional support from these 
existing parties. For example, the Purbanchaliya Loka 
Parishad (Democratic Peoples' Council) (P. L. P. ), was 
formed by Gauri Saukar Bhattacharjee in the mid 1960's; 
"who left the Communist Party because of his alleged 
grave differences with the Communist leaders over the 
language issue" (Chauhan 1972: 377). The P. L. P. nominated 
four candidates in the Lok Sabha elections of 1970, and 
"secured a very unimpressive percentage of votes" (Deka 
1976: 42). The P. L. P. pressed for industrial development 
and opposed the centre for its apparent neglect of the 
region. Its 1978 election manifesto explicitly called for 
unification of the northeast to fight against the 
"colonial exploitation" of the centre (Gassah 1992: 53). 
However, despite its slogan "Assam for the Assamese" 
clearly attempting to secure support on the basis of 
anti-immigrant feeling, the P. L. P. definition of an 
Assamese as an Indian citizen who lived in Assam and felt 
like, being Assamese, in an attempt to gain support from 
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migrants, highlights a problem prevalent in the Assamese 
community. The Assamesegroup has always been a mixture 
of differing peoples who have arrived at different times. 
On the one hand there is a hope that the Bengalis will 
themselves adapt and become "Assamese". On the other hand 
it represents a desire to protect the "traditional" 
Assamese culture which, contradictorily has been based 
upon assimilation. 
This presents a similar paradox to that regarding 
historical writing (highlighted in section 3.2). As with 
any region, through emphasizing different features of its 
history, a different viewpoint can be articulated. In the 
Assamese case, certain discourses and ideas dominate with 
the intention of creating a particular contemporary 
identity and corresponding view of the past, overlooking 
alternative cultural interpretations. 
The P. L. P. 's inability to consolidate support from 
"indigenous" Assamese, due to its fear of appearing too 
xenophobic, coupled with some industrial projects 
instigated by Indira Gandhi, particularly the 
construction of Assam's third oil refinery in the early 
1970's led to its electoral failure. Although its 
electoral base consisted of high caste Hindus (Chauhan 
1972: 377) it was unable to secure enough support amongst 
this group, nor appeal to a wider section of the 
population. In the elections of 1978 again, it gained no 
seats and in 1985 the P. L. P. amalgamated into the newly 
formed A. G. P. (Gassah 1992: 13). 
The Assam Jatiyatabadi Dal (Assam Nationalist Party) 
(A. J. D. ) was perhaps the most parochial of these early 
parties. Its President, Girin Barua, allegedly claimed; 
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Whenever they (Bengalees) get a chance they try to 
suppress us. This is why we have had clashes with 
the Bengalees since 1837. Whenever there is a 
movement or demand they always say the movement is 
against Bengalees. (A. K. Das 1982: 67) 
Whereas the P. L. P. estimated the number of 
foreigners to be 1,300,000, the A. J. D. claimed that 
4,000,000 were living within Assam (Hussain 1993: 134). 
The Ujani Assam Rajya Parishad (see section 3.2), 
the P. L. P. and the A. J. D. failed in part due to their 
exclusive definitions of the Assamese community, but also 
due to the manner of Congress rule. Congress elites in 
Assam adopted a similar anti-centrist posture which, 
coupled with Indira Gandhi's occasional economic 
appeasement, suggested that the solution to Assam's 
problems lay through working within the Congress Party, 
rather than against it. The change in the internal 
organization of the Congress Party, accompanied by 
nationwide developments, rather than any shift of policy 
by Assamese elites, led to the events of the late 1970's. 
Furthermore, all of the main Assamese 
cultural/political groups; the Ujani Assam Rajya 
Parishad, the A. S. S., the A. A. S. U. and the All Assam Gana 
Sangram Parishad (All Assam People's Struggle Council) 
(see section 6.1) refer to Asom or Assam, rather than to 
the Assamese, suggesting an inclusivity referring to the 
land of Assam (S. Baruah 1986: 1186), despite the 
geographical territory of Assam itself having changed 
dramatically, rather than an exclusivity based on a 
difficult to define and electorally less popular Assamese 
group. 
The main cause of the failure of these sub- 
nationalist political parties was the all encompassing 
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role of the Congress Party in Assam, as elsewhere in 
India (see section 5.2). These early parties derived from 
and helped consolidate, notions regarding territorial 
rights and the relationship with immigrants but, due to 
the control held by the Congress Party, were unable to 
form a mass movement for these aims. 
The decline of Congress Power at the centre and its 
changing organization within the state led to its defeat 
in the 1978 elections. This corresponded with a greater 
success for the regional parties. Both the P. L. P. and the 
A. J. D. failed to win seats in the election, but through 
their articulation of the foreigners' issue "very tacitly 
helped in the defeat of several candidates of the Left 
parties" (Hussain 1993: 100). 
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Chapter Six 
Political Events; 1978-1997 
6.0 Introduction 
By 1978, the Assamese elite was in a position to set the 
political agenda within the state. The protests which 
broke out after large numbers of foreigners were observed 
on the electoral roll at a bye-election in Mangaldoi are 
generally regarded as the initial cause of the Assam 
Movement (for example S. Baruah 1986: 1191, J. Singh 
1984: 1062). This was in fact the final spark after a 
year-long series of events, most of which were not in 
themselves "ethnic" but were able to be portrayed as 
such, both by the overt leaders of the movement and by 
the Assamese vernacular press. As in the discussion of 
myth (see section 1.3) the original cause was less 
important than accepted perception, itself affected 
through elite representation, which in time becomes an 
unquestioned truth. 
Despite political wrangling over the electoral rolls 
between the Congress Party and the Assam Movement from 
1979, elections were still held in 1983, against the 
advice of many in Assam, on the basis of the unamended 
rolls. Deeply engrained notions of difference, produced 
by decades of communal socialization, resulted in various 
massacres in the run-up to the elections. The complete 
lack of any feeling of commonality between Indian 
citizens in the state of Assam, coupled with the lack of 
any substantial cross-cutting cleavages within groups, 
provides the background to these events. The existence of 
perceived foreigners, the Bangladeshi immigrants, has to 
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be seen in a context in which they were targeted along 
with other groups. 
Although the "foreigners" perhaps suffered the worst 
atrocities, they were by no means the only target of 
communal violence and Bharatiya Janata Party (B. J. P. ) 
attempts to portray the situation as such are clearly 
politically motivated. As in other examples, such as the 
former Yugoslavia (see Cigar 1995), although the 
breakdown in ethnic accommodation may appear 
instantaneous, it instead reflects a historical situation 
which, in a certain political climate, is able to be 
manipulated. 
The massive mandate given to Rajiv Gandhi in the 
elections following Indira Gandhi's assassination 
resulted in a new strategy towards peripheral problems, 
particularly in the Punjab and the northeast. Rajiv 
Gandhi attempted a more blatantly policy to appease 
divisions, through the allocation of grants and benefits. 
The coming to power of the Asom Gana Pari shad 
(A. G. P. ) in 1985 marked the end-point of the Assam 
Movement. On achieving power in the state, every-day 
political concerns took precedence over cultural 
politics. Subrata Mitra argues that, as sub-nationalist 
movements mobilize "their" community, the initial 
intensity recedes. Once the movement achieves dominance, 
there is a "rapid loss of intensity as power imposes its 
own logic", until the movement is "banalised" (Mitra 
1997: 27). 
The failure of the 1985-1990 A. G. P. government can 
be ascribed to strategic factors, which are perhaps an 
inevitable result in the decline of cultural intensity 
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caused by the success of the previous movement. Rising 
levels of corruption and violence, an inability to 
deliver economic promises and a consolidated campaign by 
the Congress (I) Party, both at the centre and in the 
state, against the A. G. P., as well as the failure of the 
National Front (non-Congress) government at the centre 
combined to cause the collapse of A. G. P. support in 1990. 
Similarly, the subsequent collapse of the following 
Congress Party government, and the return to power of the 
A. G. P. in 1996, was primarily due to a revulsion against 
Hiteshwar Saikia's blatantly divisive policies in the 
state, rather than a positive endorsement of the A. G. P.. 
The A. G. P. victory demonstrated its adaptation into a 
party which could align itself to other parties, whose 
support derived from non-ethnic or alternative ethnic 
groups; the C. P. I., C. P. M., the Autonomous State Demand 
Council and the United Peoples Party of Assam, in the 
five party alliance opposing Congress rule. ' 
The death of Saikia, days before the 1996 election, 
was expected to provide an electoral boost to the 
Congress Party but in the event the A. G. P. became by far 
the largest party in Assam in both the Lok Sabha and the 
Legislative Assembly. Its integration into the United 
Front- Government and its subsequent crackdown on the 
United Liberation Front of Assam (U. L. F. A. ) suggest its 
development into a party more integrated with the 
mainstream of Indian political life, particularly in the 
1 Also important, in Assam as elsewhere in India, was 
the widespread disenchantment with the central 
government, stemming particularly from the numerous 
scandals which occurred. 
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manner in which this integration is based upon greater 
regionalism, rather than regionalism dealt with within 
the singular Congress Party. 
The election of 1996 suggested to many commentators 
that a more clearly-defined recognition of Indian 
regionalism was occurring and, in this sense, India's 
unity may well be reinforced through a more positive 
recognition of difference. As Achin Vanaik argues; 
The United Front's coming to power at the Centre was 
taken as striking evidence that the regionalization 
of the Indian polity even at the national level is 
now a fact. (Vanaik 1997: 344) 
6.1 The Development of the Assam Movement 1978-1985 
One of the major arguments of this thesis is that the 
origins of the contemporary Assam Movement can be traced 
historically from the latter stages of British rule. The 
political events after 1978 can be seen as the final 
outcome of these previous developments. Although the move 
into an overtly political arena is on the one hand a 
continuation of what had- preceded, on the other hand it 
reflects the complete failure of non-political actions to 
succeed and a resulting need to move into a different, 
more overt, forum. 
The ability of Assamese elites, and their desire, to 
present everyday events in an ethnic/cultural light, 
demonstrates the changing power structure within the 
state of Assam. During the period of Congress hegemony 
from Independence until the Emergency of 1975-1977, 
indigenous non-Congress elites had neither the 
opportunity nor the ability to affect public perceptions 
in, such a manner. Despite occasional Assamese dominance 
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of the Congress Party, more chauvinistic policies could 
not be implemented. 
During the Emergency, Hussain argues that the All 
Assam Students Union (A. A. S. U. ) underwent; "an internal 
transformation from left of the centre to right of the 
centre" (1993: 108), as many of the earlier activists 
left to join the Students' Federation of India which 
opposed the imposition of the Emergency. Membership of 
the A. A. S. U. is self-selecting, with non-Assamese 
students generally joining rival organizations, so that 
the relationship between the A. A. S. U. and Assamese 
cultural organizations has always been close. 
Hussain attributes the changed stance of A. A. S. U. to 
a need to gain support from the Asamiya bourgeoisie and 
press which was not forthcoming given the previous 
leftist stance (Hussain 1993: 108). Hussain's 
interpretation ignores the previous role played in all 
post-Independence language controversies by A. A. S. U., and 
the correlation between the Assamese elite and A. A. S. U. 
activists, both of which were attempting to regain the 
position lost in the early 1970's as Other Backward Caste 
interests took control of the state Congress Party. This, 
accompanied by the splitting of Meghalaya, Manipur, 
Tripura, and Mizoram into states and union territories 
separate from Assam, had alienated many upper-caste 
Assamese throughout the early 1970's. 
The ending of the Emergency and the coming to power 
of the Janata government, the splitting of Congress in 
1978, as well as the recent formation of the parochial 
political parties (see section 5.5), provided a further 
impetus for these developments. 
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The consolidation of the C. P. I. (M) in universities, 
rural areas and tea gardens was such that, during the 
elections of March 1978, it won eleven seats, allegedly 
with the help of "foreigners' votes", despite polling 
only 6% of the vote (B. P. Singh 1996: 79). Throughout 
Assam, 28 seats in the Legislative Assembly were held by 
the Muslim block (Darnell and Parikh 1988: 273). For the 
first time since Independence a non-Congress group, the 
Janata Party, controlled the Legislative Assembly in 
Assam, securing 53 seats with 28% of the vote (B. P. Singh 
1996: 79) in alliance with the Plains Tribal Council of 
Assam and the Ujani Assam Rajya Parishad (Dubey 1980: 
64). Congress (I) Party support collapsed to 24%, and 
only 26 seats. 
2 The Janata Dal utilized the issue of 
illegal immigration in an attempt to expose the 
corruption of the previous Congress Party government (see 
Section 5.3). Moraji Desai made statements in August, 
October and November 1978 which; 
hinted at stern measures against the infiltrators 
and even issued directives to the Borbora government 
to speed up the deportation of foreigners. (E. P. W. 8 
December 1979) 
Furthermore, in October 1978, the Chief Election 
Commissioner, S. L. Shakdher, told a conference of Chief 
Electoral officers that; 
The influx has become a regular feature. I think 
that it may not be a wrong assessment to make on the 
basis of this increase of 34.95% between the two 
censuses, that the increase that is likely to be 
recorded in the 1991 census would be more than 100% 
over the 1961 census. In other words, a stage would 
2 Although the split in Congress aided this. The 
remaining Congress Party gained 9% of the vote and 8 
seats. 
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be reached when the state may have to reckon with 
the foreign nationals who may in all probability 
constitute a sizeable percentage, if not the 
majority population, in the state. (Limaye 1987: 
330) 
It is often noted that in 1931, the Census 
Superintendent, C. S. Mullan, wrote3; 
Wheresoever the carcass, there vultures be gathered 
together. Where there is wasteland thither flock the 
Mymensinghias. In fact the way in which they have 
seized upon the vacant areas in the Assam Valley 
seems almost uncanny. (Census Report 1931: 51) 
-He continued that it seemed likely that within 
thirty years Sibsagar would be the only district of Assam 
in which the Assamese would feel at home (Census of India 
1951: 73). 
These quotes have become a standard fare in 
discussions of Assamese insecurity, suggesting an 
inevitability of cultural assimilation into a greater 
Bengal, as well as providing external support for the 
Assamese cause. 4 This fear is echoed in many regions where 
a particular community fears take-over by another, who 
have 'a higher birth-rate. 5 Although the situation in Assam 
is slightly different, the idea of a culture at threat is 
commonplace. 
3, For example, similar quotes are cited by J. Singh 
(1984: 1060), Chaudhuri (1982: 37), A. Guha (1988: 212), 
Hussain (1993: 206), A. A. S. U. (1980 memorandum to the 
Prime Minister). 
4 Along with Sons of the Soil by Myron Weiner, Monirul 
Hussain describes the quotes by Shakdher and Mullan as 
,, the three most sacred certificates to the cause of the 
movement" (Hussain 1993: 103). 
5 For example, Protestants in Northern Ireland and 
"ethnic" Russians in the U. S. S. R. have made such a claim 
against Catholics and central Asian Muslims respectively. 
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The Gopinath Bardoloi Cup and the publication of 
, research by Bose (see section 3.2), were amongst the 
earliest manifestations of the articulation of Assamese 
resentment to "foreign" domination. 
It has already been noted (see section 3.3) that, 
despite the close links between Ahorn and Assam, the Ahorns 
themselves were not an important part of the contemporary 
Assam Movement. Caste Hindu Assamese used the Ahorn name 
and history to consolidate support amongst other caste 
Hindus, whilst the Ahorns themselves were peripheral, at 
most, to the movement. 
Simultaneously, other events in 1978 helped mobilize 
a wider section of the Assamese community but equally 
reflected the depths of the preceding communalization. A 
commission was appointed to examine the employment policy 
of the'Assam Oil Company at Digboi (Dubey 1980: 65). 
There was a clash between Bengalis and Mizos in "the 
Union Territory and Silchar" (Dubey 1980: 65). Finally, a 
union conference venue, in Guwahati, was named after B. N. 
Ghosh, 'a prominent Bengali "trade unionist of all-India 
stature" (A. Guha 1980: 1706). 
Again, the portrayal of these events as ethnically 
motivated demonstrated the power of the Assamese elite. 
All political events were judged in terms of an ethnic 
relationship, in the same manner as the British colonial 
rulers had justified their rule as necessary because of 
the various "races" being intrinsically opposed. 
The Marxist contention, articulated most 
vociferously by Amalendu Guha, maintains that this 
situation was brought about by the control of the press 
by the ' "Asamiya bourgeoisie since 1978" (Guha 1988: 
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1706). Guha argues that the bourgeoisie's fear of 
economic stagnation, due to pressure from above and 
below, and the growth in organized labour, encouraged the 
consolidation of an Assamese identity to act against 
Bengali and other competitors, particularly trades 
unions, the majority of which were Bengali dominated, and 
to secure control of the state apparatus to ensure this. 
Although this thesis agrees, in so far as accepting 
that the Assamese identity is constructed for political 
ends, Guha's argument raises both theoretical and 
practical considerations. This was written in 1980 and 
not after the events of 1983 but it seems unrealistic to 
conceive that an identity can be articulated so 
vociferously from 1978, as Guha claims, such that by 
1983, indeed by 1979, the cultural cleavages were so 
deep. The notion of being Assamese clearly existed 
previous to the exploitation of the Assamese media in the 
late 1970's and the consequent "fear psychosis" (Guha 
1980: 1710) developed from a much longer-term period of 
socialization. It was the ability of elites to voice 
their concerns, rather than a conscious decision to begin 
the Assam Movement, that led to these developments 
occurring in this period. 
The second criticism of Guha's approach is that the 
Assamese middle class was vastly out-numbered by other 
ethnic groups in their control of the economy long before 
1978. That Assamese language newspapers have played a 
vital part in the Movement is certain and was 
demonstrated in the ability of Asomiya Pratidin6, in 
6 The most popular Assamese vernacular daily 
newspaper. 
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particular, to establish an anti-Congress swing in the 
1996 elections, allowing the five party alliance to 
triumph. However, to argue that the Assamese wanted to 
expel the Bengalis in 1978, to consolidate their 
position, ignores the fact that in almost all economic 
fields they were already in second place to migrants. 
Furthermore, many trades unions actually endorsed the 
aims of the Assam Movement. 
The idea that culture is in some sense floating 
above the superstructure of economic relationships 
implies a major level of gullibility of the Assamese (see 
also section 1.1). Identity creation is an evolutionary 
process and it is agreed that were the economic 
difficulties not prevalent, the purpose of articulating 
an Assamese identity would be diminished. But Guha's 
position ignores the manner in which individual Assamese 
are aware that they are Assamese and that this implies 
that they should act in a certain way. This notion was 
clearly evolving and developing for decades before 1978. 
Many commentators ignore the previous events in an 
attempt to explain the entire Movement as one of 
opposition to Muslim immigration. Jaswant Singh, a B. J. P. 
M. P., argues that the immediate cause of the Assam 
Movement was the bye-election in the Mangaldoi 
constituency of the Darrang district (J. Singh 1984: 
1062). Other writers have similarly stressed the anti- 
Muslim basis for the Movement and attributed this to 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (R. S. S. ) involvement (e. g. 
Rafiabadi 1988). The failure of the B. J. P. electorally 
suggests that the R. S. S., as well as Congress (I) 
activists, attempted to lead the Movement from the late 
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1970's and articulated similar postures to the Movement 
but that they were less cause than consequence of the 
Assam Movement (Gohain 1985: 21). 
The death of the Hiralal Patwari, M. L. S. for 
Mangaldoi, Hiralal Patwari, in March 1979, led to a 
revision of the electoral rolls by the Electoral 
Commission. Objections were raised against 70,000 voters, 
out of the 600,000 on the voting list. The resulting 
tribunal appointed by the state government upheld 45,000 
complaints (Limaye 1987: 330). 
That scrutiny of the voting lists showed that 8% of 
the names were foreigners was perceived as particularly 
disturbing in a district which had not been assumed to 
have a high immigrant population. Yet this was only the 
final spark to the growing tension, highlighted above. 
The bye-election in Mangaldoi could not be held due 
to protests over the electoral rolls, which followed both 
the Election Commissioner's report and further reports of 
large scale immigration into Assam from Bangladesh (S. 
Baruah 1986: 1192). Instead the election was postponed to 
the following mid-term election. Furthermore, the fact 
that two Muslim ministers, Zahirul Islam and A. F. Golam 
Osmani, objected to the deletion of names suggested, and 
was portrayed as, a conspiracy amongst Muslims to support 
their community. 
On June 8 1979, the A. A. S. U. sponsored a twelve hour 
bandh, or general strike, to demand the "detection, 
disenfranchisement and deportation" (S. Baruah 1986: 
1192) of foreigners. The Independence Day celebrations 
were boycotted throughout Assam (Das 1982: 65) and on 26- 
27 August 1979 the All Assam Gana Sangram Pari shad 
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(A. A. G. S. P. ) was formed in Dibrugarh to coordinate a 
state-wide movement against immigration. 
The Assam Movement, the A. A. G. S. P., comprised the 
A. A. S. U., the P. L. P., the Assam Yuvak Samaj and cultural 
movements such as the A. S. S. . It also had outside support 
from trade union movements within the state (Das 1982: 
66) and even the All India Sikh Students Federation 
(Hazarika 1995: 139). Later in 1979, the Assam 
Jatiyatabadi Dal (A. J. D. ), Plains Tribal Council 
(Progressive) and the All Assam Tribal Sangha joined. 
After its formation; 
An unprecedented mass popular upsurge followed in 
the form of sit-ins, picketings in front of 
government offices, strikes and symbolic 
disobedience of the law. (S. Baruah 1986: 1192) 
As the Janata government collapsed in New Delhi, 
mid-term elections were planned throughout India in 
The A. S. S. support of the Assam Movement eventually 
led to Saikia's government withdrawing its government 
funding due to its participation in "political", rather 
than "cultural", activities. This forced the A. S. S. down 
a more extreme path than many of its members would have 
preferred (Misra 1984b: 623). In August 1984, the A. S. S. 
responded with a resolution claiming that; 
The Asam Sahitya Sabha has throughout been working 
to promote the cause of the Assamese language, 
literature and culture as well as the Assamese 
national interest and shall continue to do so. 
Though the Sabha has been extending its support and 
cooperation to any movement built upon the basis of 
democratic, non-violent, non-communal, legal and 
non-political background in the interest of Assam, 
the Sabha has maintained its independent character 
with dignity and as such the question of the Sabha 
acting according to the direction of any party, any 
organisation or any individual simply does not 
arise. (I. Barua 1990: 129) 
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December 1979. Protests from the Congress (I) Party and 
the C. P. I. (M) reversed earlier decisions to delete the 
names of foreigners. The Government of Assam issued a 
statement on 18 September 1979 announcing that; 
The [Electoral] Commission has instructed that no 
person whose name was included in the electoral 
rolls should be eliminated on the grounds of 
citizenship as the process of establishing 
citizenship is time-consuming. The Commission 
further advised scrutiny of electoral rolls after 
the election is over. (Government of Assam: Press 
Note 88: 18 September 1979) 
The eventual reversing of this position (discussed 
in the following section) was one of the most important 
contributory factors to the signing of the Assam Accord. 
Just as the Assam Movement argued that political 
parties were irrelevant to politics in Assam, the Indian 
Government put much weight on the value of governmental 
institutions, particularly the 1980 Lok Sabha elections 
and the infamous 1983 Legislative Assembly elections. 
In the 1980 parliamentary elections polling was 
prevented in twelve of the fourteen seats, these seats 
remaining unfilled until 1983. Nomination papers could 
only be filed in immigrant dominated Cachar, the two 
districts of which were easily won by Congress (I) Party. 
The official celebrations on Republic Day, 26 January 
1980, were boycotted in favour of alternative A. A. S. U. 
programmes, despite the introduction of President's Rule 
on 12 December 1979. 
Between 1980 and 1982 there were 23 negotiating 
sessions between the central government and the leaders 
of the Assam Movement, bypassing the state government. 
The first session began on 17 January 1980, just three 
days after Indira Gandhi's return to office. This haste 
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was primarily due to an oil blockade which had begun on 
27 December 1979. Towards the end of 1982, a partial 
agreement was reached over the status of illegal 
immigrants. Those who arrived after 1971 were to be 
deported, whilst those who came between 1951 and 1961 
were to be given Indian citizenship. The status of those 
who arrived between 1961 and 1971, thought to number 
approximately 960,000 (Far Eastern Economic Review 3 
February 1983), was still undecided (S.. Baruah 1986: 
1192). Yet what agreements had been reached, were ignored 
during the following 1983 elections. 
Party political events in Assam were, to say the 
least, turbulent. The Janata Ministry led by Golap 
Borbora collapsed in September 1979. A makeshift 
coalition, comprised of factions of the Janata Party, 
lasted until December 1979 when President's Rule was 
imposed. In December 1980, a Congress (I) Party 
government, led by Anwara Taimur, came to power. Formed 
through defections to Congress from other parties, this 
government fell in June 1981, when President's Rule was 
again imposed. 
In January 1982, another Congress ministry, led by 
Keshab Gogoi, was established. This collapsed in March 
when President's Rule was yet again introduced and the 
Legislative Assembly dissolved. The Constitution did not 
allow for President's Rule to be extended beyond a year, 
which therefore meant that elections would have to take 
place by March 1983, unless the constitution itself were 
to be amended. 
However, many commentators argued, before March, 
that the situation in Assam was such that elections 
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should not have been held due to the inability of 
guaranteeing that they would be "free and fair", another 
constitutional requirement (e. g. E. P. W. 29 January 1983). 
However, at the time, just six years after the Emergency, 
the impression of the centre so blatantly imposing its 
rule on states was thought to be unacceptable. Indira 
Gandhi argued that the elections were irrelevant to the 
violence; 
There is no group, or part of India, that does not 
have special demands. Can any group, no matter what 
their demands, dictate how the process of governing 
should be carried out? The election was part of our 
democratic functioning. I do not know whether we 
would have avoided this violence had we not had 
elections. There would have been large-scale 
violence anyway. (The Times 26 February 1983) 
The E. P. W. opposed the elections, to be held on the 
basis of constitutional necessity, since the same 
provisions had been overlooked during the previous 
imposition of President's Rule; 
The Indian Constitution is a very pliable, even 
serviceable, document; and the application of its 
provisions has been even more pliable in the service 
of the party in power at the Centre. (E. P. W. 29 
January 1983) 
However, the Assam Movement's attempts to play down 
the relevance of party politics in favour of ethnic 
attachments in general meant that the political wrangling 
was seen as affecting an individual's ethnic self- 
perception. 
Indeed, it is commonly believed that Congress 
leaders in Assam between, 1980 and 1982 were chosen for 
their ethnic background, in an attempt to destabilize the 
Assamese "coalition". Anwara Taimur, for example, came 
from a "heavily East Bengali immigrant constituency and 
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was seen as a representative of immigrant interests" (S. 
Baruah 1986: 1192). Through a combination of repression 
and claims that the Assam Movement had lost its popular 
base, she gave the impression that the foreigners' issue 
had been ignored. Keshab Gogoi was thought to have been 
chosen for his Ahom origin (see section 3.3). 
The Congress (I) Party's attempts to maintain the 
importance of electoral politics was overshadowed by 
their efforts to ensure that the outcome was a Congress 
state government. Gogoi, for example, claimed 63 
supporters in the Legislative Assembly, whilst the Left 
and Democratic Front claimed 68. The choice of Gogoi as 
Chief Minister gave the impression that the Governor was 
maintaining Congress rule at the expense of any 
democratic mandate. 
The Legislative Assembly election of 1983 was fought 
on, the basis of the electoral rolls of 1978. The voting 
list therefore ignored any agreements made in the recent 
negotiations over the status of immigrants; post-1971 
immigrants were still on the roll, whilst anyone who had 
come of age in the preceding four years was excluded. The 
Assam Movement called for a boycott of the elections, 
whilst Congress elites expected east Bengali immigrants 
to show their appreciation of the centre by supporting 
them. Any ethnic accommodation that had previously 
existed, or was in the process of being constructed, was 
completely ignored. 
The violence of these elections occurred mainly in 
those constituencies containing a mixture of groups which 
supported and opposed the election. Where most either 
voted or did not vote the election was relatively calm. 
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In constituencies containing a mixture of "ethnic" 
groups, "violent confrontations took place" (S. Baruah 
1986: 1199). The most interesting point, for this thesis, 
is how groups which would provisionally be called part of 
the Assamese ethnic coalition, turned on each other, 
demonstrating the failure of elites to convince certain 
groups that support of the Assam Movement, and thus 
membership of the Assamese community, would benefit them. 
This outcome can be attributed to a policy of divide and 
rule by the Congress (I) Party, both at the centre and 
more blatantly within Assam, and to an unjustified 
assumption by Assamese elites that, for example, plains 
tribals would support their agenda on the basis of 
previous inter-group relationships. 
The constitutional privileges to certain groups 
encouraged the consolidation of these groups as distinct, 
definable and stigmatized. The inequitable economic 
situation between groups (Dutta Barua 1983b), both cause 
and consequence of cultural difference, resulted in 
large-scale violence .8 
The 1983 election resulted in a two-thirds majority 
for the Congress (I) Party, which won 90 seats. Hiteshwar 
Saikia, an indigenous Assamese, formed a cabinet which 
included three Muslims and two tribals. The turn-out in 
8 Despite over 40 battalions of paramilitary forces 
being deployed to assist the police, estimates of the 
numbers killed vary between 3000 (S. Baruah 1986: 1184) 
and over 7,000 (Hussain 1993: 10) including the massacre 
at Nellie which resulted in 1,383 Bengali Muslim 
immigrants being killed (S. Baruah 1986: 1200) by Lalung 
tribals, allegedly with the support of the R. S. S. (for 
example, The Guardian 29 March 1983). 
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the election was 10% and, out of 126 seats, voting was 
cancelled in 18 seats whilst 4 were uncontested9. 
Within two weeks of the election, martial law was 
declared throughout the Brahmaputra Valley and a 
fortnight later Saikia announced that all post-1971 
immigrants would be expelled. At the end of March, the 
A. A. S. U. called off its campaign against immigration, as 
moderates in the organization wished to assess the scale 
of violence of the past two months. Those Assamese 
peasants who had suffered during the violence refused to 
follow the lead of the A. A. S. U. and subaltern Assamese 
groups began to arm themselves. It has been in rural 
villages where the U. L. F. A. has had most support ever 
since. 
After the events of early 1983, the central and the 
local Congress (I) Party attempted to implement certain 
populist measures to try and take away support for the 
Assam Movement. For example, the spelling of the major 
city in the north-east was changed from the anglicized 
Gauhati to the more Assamese Guwahati (S. Baruah 1987: 
1203). In July 1983 a proposal was made to build a 180 
mile wall between Assam and Bangladesh. Work was started 
on the wall in 1984, but had to be stopped when 
Bangladeshi border guards fired on the Indian workers. 10 
9 In some heavily Assamese constituencies polling was 
as low as 269 voters in Dharampur (0.38 01) , 360 voters in 
Dhemaji (0.40%) and 440 in Bihpuria (0.690. In larger 
cities, such as Jorhat, Sibsagar and Guwahati East less 
than 2t voted (J. Singh 1984: 1067). 
10 The falseness of the promises made was demonstrated 
to many during the erection of the fence, stretching 100 
kilometres from the junction of West Bengal, Bangladesh 
and Assam to Dhubri in Assam. Work would take four or 
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Combined with these measures, Saikia attempted to 
break down the coalition behind the Assam Movement. The 
Bodo Sahitya Sabha was feted as an alternative to the 
A. S. S. whose funding was withdrawn. Despite this, support 
remained strong and, through strikes and boycotts of 
"official" government events, the Assam Movement disputed 
the legitimacy of Saikia's government. Rajiv Gandhi's 
election resulted in a more concessionary approach to the 
movement and the re-establishment of talks in April 1984. 
6.2 The Assam Accord and the Asom Gana Parishad 1985-1997 
The failure of non-"ethnic" institutions to survive led 
the government to back down in 1985 with the Assam Accord 
(see Appendix D). Immigrants who entered Assam between 
January 1 1966 and March 25 1971 (the date the state of 
Bangladesh was proclaimed) were to be disenfranchised for 
ten years but would enjoy all other rights of 
citizenship, requiring a change to Indian citizenship 
laws. Those who arrived after this date would be 
deported. "Immediate and practical steps" were to be 
taken to achieve these ends. 
Proof of citizenship was to be based upon three 
types of document only; 
(1) entry of name in 1971 or pre-1971 rolls, 
(2) copies of National Register of Citizens, 
(3) Citizenship certificates and Certificates of 
date of birth. (Choudhury 1985: 2146) 
However, of the 1971 electoral rolls, the state 
could produce rolls in only 77 out of 126 constituencies, 
five months but commenced just before the monsoon, when 
work would have to stop! (E. P. W. 28 April 1984) 
Furthermore, many thought it futile to build a fence 
between Assam and Bangladesh, when both share borders 
with Tripura, West Bengal, Meghalaya and Mizoram. 
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primarily due to the intransigence of pro-A. A. S. U. 
electoral officers, who disbelieved the validity of the 
electoral register as a true guide to citizenship. Thus, 
to prove citizenship in 1971 required citizenship to be 
proved much earlier. The N. R. C. had been declared invalid 
by Guwahati High Court in 1967 (see section 5.2), whilst 
the requirement for citizenship and birth certificates 
ignored the "social realities" (Choudhury 1985: 2147) of 
India. 
Furthermore, the 1983 Legislative Assembly was to be 
dissolved and a caretaker government, run by Congress 
Chief Minister Hiteshwar Saikia, was introduced until the 
forthcoming elections. A security fence was to be built 
by the border with Bangladesh, after the previous attempt 
had been called off (see above). Finally, 
"constitutional, legislative and administrative 
safeguards" were promised to "protect the cultural, 
social and linguistic identity and heritage of the 
Assamese people. " 
The signing of the Assam Accord demonstrates perhaps 
the naivety of both Rajiv Gandhi and the leaders of the 
Assam Movement. Gandhi's tendency to grant concessions to 
groups, signing accords in the Punjab and Mizoram, as 
well as Assam, and negotiating a deal with the National 
Conference in Jammu and Kashmir, resulted in other groups 
demonstrating; "their nuisance value in the hope that 
they too would be "bought off" with concessions" (Nugent 
1990: 109). 
Furthermore, it encouraged an atmosphere in which 
political or economic demands were seen to be fulfilled 
through cultural group membership. The signing of the 
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Assam Accord encouraged greater agitation by Bodo 
militants, demanding separation from Assam. The 
"farcical" Bodo Accord (Hazarika 1995: 161), signed in 
1993, similarly resulted in strengthening the position of 
more extreme elements, in this case the Bodo Security 
force, since the Accord was, yet again, impossible to 
implement. The failure of the Assam Accord similarly, 
heightened support for the U. L. F. A., whose leaders 
claimed it demonstrated both the immaturity of the 
leaders of the Assam Movement and the deviousness of the 
central government. 
After the signing of the Assam Accord, events 
followed a somewhat predictable course. The Accord was 
interpreted differently by the Assamese and the central 
government. Aroop Bordoloi, one of the Assamese leaders 
who had signed the Accord, reported that it meant that 
about 2.6 million people were to be deported (Intentional 
Herald Tribune 19 August 1985). The centre, citing 
"international obligations", forecast a much lower 
figure. 
The A. G. P., founded in Golaghat on 5 October 1985 
(B. P. Singh 1996: 189) by the leaders of the Assam 
Movement, won a landslide victory in the elections of 
December 1985. They won 64 out of 126 seats in the 
Legislative Assembly and half of the Lok Sabha seats. The 
average age of their M. L. A. s was around thirty (Nugent 
1990: 106). 
The A. G. P. message "minorities are not foreigners", 
gained support not only from the indigenous Assamese but 
also from plains tribals and tea plantation workers, who 
had traditionally supported the Congress Party. Assamese 
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Muslims were well represented on the A. G. P. list of 
candidates (Baruah 1987: 1205) and despite an occasional 
anti-Muslim bias to the Assam Movement, this community 
generally supported the A. G. P. More surprisingly, in some 
areas Bengali Muslims and Hindus supported the A. G. P.; 
Nowgong, for example, returned an A. G. P. candidate. In 
part, as with the tribals and tea workers, this was 
intended to consolidate their position through supporting 
the victorious party. Furthermore, the position of many 
Bengali Muslims within the Indian state, that is, those 
who arrived before 1966, would be legitimated by the 
implementation of the Assam Accord. " 
Again, as with the P. L. P., the A. G. P. attempted to 
predicate its legitimacy upon an inclusive community, 
based upon territory and language, rather than on notions 
of cultural separateness. Yet, although not explicitly 
stated in, for example, the aims of the A. G. P. (see 
Appendix E, particularly points 11 and 16), it is clear 
that Bengalis supporting the A. G. P. can only be in the 
Assamese community, as defined by the A. G. P., upon 
renouncing previous cultural affiliations. 
This point is reiterated in works written by the 
founder organizations of the A. G. P., in particular, the 
A. A. S. U. and the A. A. G. S. P.. Although generally 
11 Despite support for the A. G. P. being received from 
Bengali Hindus, Assamese Muslims (the Na-Asamiya) and low 
caste Assamese Hindus and Scheduled Tribes, the first two 
groups received no representation in the government. 
Although there were only six Assamese Brahmins in the 
State Assembly, five became cabinet ministers. Similarly, 
eighteen out of twenty-one high caste Assamese in the 
Assembly became ministers. Out of twenty-one Scheduled 
Tribals, only four became ministers. 
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attempting to place immigration into Assam in the context 
of India-wide "infiltration", it is clear, and 
discussions with activists confirm, that this is more to 
place the Assam Movement's grievances within the 
hegemonic secular and liberal discourse, rather than to 
argue that massive immigration is occurring throughout 
the Indian state. 
The United Minorities Front (U. M. F. ), formed in 
Hojai, Nowgong, on 10 November 1985 by disaffected 
Bengali politicians who split from Congress (I), opposed 
the implementation of the Accord but electorally trailed 
third after the A. G. P. and the Congress (I) Party. Unlike 
the A. G. P., it was only able to gain support from a much 
smaller (Bengali Muslim) power-base. 
One of the new government's first acts was to 
establish a Department of Assam Accord Implementation. 
The central government amended the Citizenship Act in an 
attempt to reassure minorities within Assam, a measure 
claimed by the A. G. P. to violate the Assam Accord. The 
difficulties of implementing the clauses of the Assam 
Accord relating to foreigners (see also section 5.1) 
coupled with the high hopes of their supporters, led 
Prafulla Mahanta, the A. G. P. Chief Minister, to state; 
"It is so tough, tougher than we had thought. People want 
us to do much, much more than we can do" (India Today 15 
March 1986). 
The Lok Sabha elections of 1989 were postponed as 
revised voting lists were still not available. Neither 
had immigrants been expelled. Nugent asks; "Was this 
another example of an unimplementable accord, or one 
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which was never intended to be implemented? (Nugent 
1990: 107) 
By 1990, the relationship between the A. A. S. U., the 
A. G. P. and the U. L. F. A. was becoming confused. Although 
the A. G. P. attempted to present a more moderate stance, 
the controlling interest of the more extreme A. A. S. U. and 
U. L. F. A. led to confusion. Samir Das asserts that the 
problems of the A. A. S. U. were that to maintain a separate 
identity for itself it had to ensure a difficult balance 
between the A. G. P. and the U. L. F. A.. To ensure 
distinctiveness from the two, criticism of the failing 
A. G. P. 12 and non-endorsement of the U. L. F. A. were 
essential. Despite the aims of the U. L. F. A. being closer 
to the A. A. S. U., the latter attempted to "take the wind 
away from U. L. F. A. 's sail" (S. K. Das 1994: 43). In 
popular perception however, these wranglings were 
disbelieved and the three organizations were assumed to 
work closely together. The Congress Party allege that the 
Assam Governor, in a report to the President of India, 
stated that; 
... the loss of faith in efficiency and the 
credibility of the government apparatus is so great 
that the thin distinction between U. L. F. A., A. A. S. U. 
and A. G. P., which existed at some stage, stands 
totally obliterated. (Quoted in Congress Party 
Manifesto 1996: 5) 
During the first five years of A. G. P. rule, little 
was done to implement the Assam Accord, partly due to the 
lack of direction of the government, but more to do with 
attempts by the centre to block the main feature of the 
12 Creating a logistical problem for the A. G. P. since 
most of its activists were A. A. S. U. cadres. 
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Accord, that relating to immigration, due to 
international pressure from Bangladesh. Although the 
A. G. P. joined the Janata Dal government at the centre in 
1989, a series of scandals, particularly the on-going 
feud between the more moderate Prafulla Mahanta and more 
extreme Brighu Kumar Phukan, the Home Minister, led to 
the imposition of President's Rule in the state towards 
the end of 1990. 
During the last years of A. G. P. rule, despite 
Phukan's two threats of resignation, after being accused 
of being in league with the U. L. F. A. by Mahanta, it was 
he, rather than the Chief Minister, who was perceived to 
be effectively in control of the A. G. P.. In 1990 Phukan 
formed his own party, the Nutan Asom Gana Parishad (New 
Assam Public Council) (N. A. G. P. ) . 
13 Other scandals emerged 
towards the end of the A. G. P. term. 14 
13 The N. A. G. P. contested the election of 1991 
separate from the A. G. P. and this split vote allowed the 
Congress Party to win the Lok Sabha seat of Guwahati 
(V. B. Singh 1994: 76). The N. A. G. P. rejoined the A. G. P. 
before the 1996 elections. Phukan was expelled from the 
A. G. P. in 1997 for alleged anti-party activities. 
14 "Other ministers 'have been involved in graft, 
drunken misbehaviour with foreign tourists and their lone 
female colleague in the Cabinet" (India Today 15 
September 1990). 
In one [scandal] the associates of a minister 
attacked a passenger on an Indian Airlines flight 
for failing to surrender his seat to the pompous 
politician. " The "state-fed" scandal involved a 
group of contractors gaining $600,000 for supplying 
foodgrains which, when delivered, were rotten. The 
investigating officer was "led aside by the Chief 
Minister and told, essentially, to keep quiet. "The 
money is for the boys" he was told. (Hazarika 1995: 
184) 
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The U. L. F. A. secessionist campaign, involving 
kidnappings and extortion, led to Operation Bajrang, a 
centrally imposed military campaign. This involved, at 
first, five brigades of the Indian Army and aimed to 
destroy U. L. F. A. 's military capability in the Brahmaputra 
Valley. 
. Towards the end of 
1990, President's Rule was again 
reimposed; the A. G. P. accused the centre of attempting to 
impose Congress (I) Party rule on the state through use 
of the army. Evidence was gathered of human rights 
atrocities being performed by, the army (India Today 31 
March 1991). The U. L. F. A. continued its campaign of 
intimidation, for example, on 22 February 1991, killing 
Manabendra Sarma, the General Secretary of the Assam 
Pradesh Congress (I) Committee. That said, some 
developmental schemes were launched and D. D. Thakur, the 
Governor of Assam, appeared to be making headway towards 
a negotiated settlement with the U. L. F. A.. The removal of 
Thakur, because he had agreed to talk to the U. L. F. A. 
leaders and guarantee them safe passage, led to the 
imposition of Loknath Mishra, a veteran politician from 
Orissa, as Governor. President's Rule was extended beyond 
May 27, when it was originally planned to end. 
The A. G. P. failure led to Congress victory in the 
elections of 1991. The choice of Hiteshwar Saikia as 
Chief minister had two effects. On the one hand his 
policies, coupled with his liberal use of the army, 
created some level of economic stability, particularly 
for, the immigrant business communities. On the other 
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hand, this economic stability was at the expense of any 
political accommodation and the divisiveness of his 
policies consolidated a caste Assamese identity further. 
The ineffectiveness of many of Saikia's policies, 
particularly towards the popular Autonomous State Demands 
Council (A. S. D. C. ), 15 galvanized opposition towards the 
Congress Party from more quarters. 
. 
Saikia attempted to use the Surrendered U. L. F. A. 
(S. U. L. F. A. ) to turn against the remaining U. L. F. A. 
members, as well as the A. S. D. C. and other political 
organizations. This followed the previous attempt of the 
A. A. S. U. leadership to use the U. L. F. A. as a leverage 
against the centre. 16 Both attempts failed and led to a 
situation in which a culture of violence, as well as a 
massive arsenal of weapons, existed throughout much of 
the state. Both the U. L. F. A. and the S. U. L. F. A. demanded 
protection money and the tea industry in particular 
is Saikia dissolved the autonomous council of this 
nationalist, Marxist party and later promised an upgrade 
for Karbi Anglong from autonomous district to an 
autonomous territory, if it withdrew its demand for an 
autonomous state, as was guaranteed in the Sixth 
Schedule. Mass protests followed and Saikia reverted to 
the previous situation. The autonomous state itself was 
achieved in 1996 (Bhattacharya 1993: 1785). This 
accommodation from the Congress Party towards the 
A. S. D. C. can be explained due to the anti-Assameseness of 
their policies and their "useful" links with the 
C. P. I. (M). 
16 Along with U. L. F. A and S. U. L. F. A., the rise of 
D. U. L. F. A. - duplicate U. L. F. A. - has been reported. The 
D. U. L. F. A. members have cashed in on the inability of 
companies to distinguish between the two "official" 
organizations but risk "elimination" by the U. L. F. A. 
(Telegraph 16 June 1996). 
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suffered, its executives working in more remote areas of 
Upper Assam. 
The apparent triumph of the moderate Mahanta over 
the more extreme Phukan enabled the five party alliance 
to contest the elections of 1996 united against the 
Congress (I) Party. That the A. G. P. did not expect such 
success in the elections is demonstrated by the fact that 
they did not nominate candidates for election in all 
constituencies, as they had in 1985. 
The primary cause of the victory was accepted by 
most to be a dislike of Congress, rather than an 
endorsement of the previous A. G. P. administration. The 
A. G. P. again gained the support of the Muslim minority, 
taking the Congress Party's traditional role as protector 
of minority groups. On one level this reinforces the idea 
that minorities are more likely to support the dominant 
party (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987: 187). In the Assamese 
case, this, along with the failure of Congress (I) to 
rehabilitate around 20,000 Muslims made homeless by Bodo 
militants in 1993, provided the support for the A. G. P.. 








the main issue on which the Muslim 
decided to vote for the A. G. P., thereby 
the traditional minority practice of 
the Congress which failed to give 
to the minorities. (The Pioneer 19 March 
A major role was played by the vernacular press, 
particularly Asomiya Pratidin which consistently 
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supported the A. G. P., and vociferously opposed Congress 
in the run up to the election. 17 
The Assamese press campaigned against both the 
alleged corruption of the Congress Party in the state and 
the role of the army, which was widely believed to have 
performed numerous atrocities. The fact that four senior 
government officials fled the state on the day that the 
A. G. P. formed the state government added to the salience 
of these claims. 18 The major concern with the centre was 
that the Assamese situation was treated as a law and 
order, rather than a political, problem. The Congress 
solution, the use of the army, was seen to exacerbate the 
problem. 
The growing political maturity of the A. G. P., their 
full acceptance by the central government, with the post 
of Cabinet Minister for Steel and Mines going to Birendra 
Prasad Baishya, and their growing opposition to the 
U. L. F. A. suggest that the A. G. P. is now attempting to 
forge a new Assamese identity, similar to that attempted 
17 The editor of Asomiya Pratidin, Ajit Kumar Bhuyan, 
was arrested on 24 August 1997 and charged under the 
Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, the Explosive 
Substances Act and complicity in the murder of Sanjoy 
Ghosh, a social activist. 
18 One of the senior officials, Deputy Inspector 
General Ashim Roy, was amongst five senior police 
officers charged with a variety of crimes, including 
racketeering with S. U. L. F. A. activists and the murder of 
one S. U. L. F. A. activist who had allegedly refused to hand 
over the policemen's share of the extorted money. The 
extortion was said to fetch at least 100,000 Rupees a 
day. Other officials claimed that the five policemen were 
victimised for being non-Assamese (Hindustan Times 8 May 
1997). 
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in the 1960's and 1970's. Rather than an exclusive caste- 
Hindu Assamese-speaking party, this reconstruction is 
aiming to create a more inclusive community of people who 
live in Assam and think of themselves as Assamese. The 
failure of the B. J. P. to achieve any political targets in 
Assam shows its inability to equate the immigration issue 
with an anti-Muslim one, although they were also hindered 
by the U. L. F. A. threat to execute any B. J. P. candidates 
in Assam, under the slogan "keep communalism out of the 
land of Shankardeva". This resulted in nearly all of the 
B. J. P. candidates taking refuge in safe houses in 
Guwahati. 
Within Assam, the mandate given to the A. G. P. by the 
elections of 1996, is disputed. Instead the A. G. P. vote 
demonstrates to many an extreme loathing of Congress, as 
well as the ability of the U. L. F. A. cadres to ensure a 
high voting turn-out from rural areas. 
In some senses the election of the A. G. P. to power 
in the Legislative Assembly in 1985 marks the "Moment of 
Arrival" (Chatterjee 1986: 131) for the Assam Movement. 
The Assamese cultural identity had secured enough support 
to be electorally viable. However, this increase in 
numerical support has inevitably led to a decline in 
intensity. 
For any ethnic/nationalist identity the moment of 
achievement of either an independent state or greater 
freedom within a federal system marks the end of the 
stage in which cultural identity can be the only 
consolidating force. Attempts by parties attempting to 
represent the nation during an independence struggle, 
such as the Congress Party in India, will inevitably need 
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to adapt after achieving their nationalist goal to deal 
with different cleavages. The situation in Assam in 1985 
was no different. The establishment of economic goals in 
the manifestos of 1985 gave the impression that the 
economy could be run in a manner beneficial for the 
Assamese ethnic group. The fact that outside constraints 
such as the Constitution and the entrenched power of non- 
Assamese interests in controlling the Assamese economy 
meant that these targets were unviable. 
The failure of the A. G. P. to deliver any benefits of 
indigenous rule, coupled with their attempts to use the 
U. L. F. A. as a tool to prise more from the centre, led to 
a situation in which the U. L. F. A. vision of the future 
became more popular than that of the A. G. P., particularly 
with many subaltern rural Assamese. There is a general 
consensus amongst the urban Assamese middle class that 
the individual members of the U. L. F. A. have, like the 
leaders of the A. G. P., become steadily more interested in 
their own well-being than in that of the Assamese people. 
6.3 The United Liberation Front of Assam 
Although closely linked to the Assam Movement, and 
founded in response to the same grievances, unconstrained 
by constitutional requirements, the U. L. F. A. was able to 
articulate a separate notion of community, and a 
different response, to the Assam Movement. 
Symbolically founded in the historic stadium of the 
Ahorn kings (Bezbaruah 1997: 181) in Sibsagar on 7 April 
1979 (S. K. Das 1994: 71), the U. L. F. A. criticized the 
economic backwardness of Assam through a pseudo- 
Marxist/nationalist perspective. The emphasis on 
"foreigners" by the Assam Movement was felt to be 
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tangential to the main problem, that of weak leadership 
by the Assamese middle class in response to non-Assamese 
colonialism. An independent Assamese state was held to be 
the only long-term solution to the problem of Indian 
colonialism. 
Those who founded the U. L. F. A. included Arobindo 
Rajkhowa, who had previously led the Asom Jatiyabad 
Chattra Yuva Pari shad, student wing of the A. J. D. 
(Hazarika 1995: 167). Dormant until the 1983 election, 
its leaders then discussed tactics with the Assam People 
Liberation Army, also founded in 1979. The two 
organizations merged in 1985. 
That economic backwardness is felt to be an 
important cause of the need for the Assamese to protest 
is demonstrated by Bishnu Jhoti Burgohain, one of the 
founders of the U. L. F. A., who argues; 
All the Indian people have come here for business. 
Whatever money they make they send back to their own 
country. They treat Assam as an Indian colony. The 
indigenous people don't get anything. (B. B. C. 
Correspondent 19 April 1997) 
The main targets of the U. L. F. A. have been non- 
Assamese businessmen, who have failed to adopt to 
Assamese "culture", 19 and politicians, in particular from 
the Congress Party, who are seen to have participated in 
"colonial" practices, in particular the "illegal" 
elections of 1983. Assamese businessmen, despite being 
opposed to the Marxist ideas of the U. L. F. A., have not 
19The people from the Marwari community came to Assam 
long before Independence but even after forty-two 
years they did not learn the Assamese language, the 
Assamese culture and the Assamese philosophy of life 
(Babulal Moore, quoted in S. K. Das 1994: 74-75). 
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been targeted as they are seen to be sympathetic with the 
wider aims of the Assamese community. Many have 
benefitted from the outflow of non-Assamese businessmen 
in the light of the U. L. F. A. 's policies. 
Whereas the A. G. P. had to reach an accommodation 
with the centre, the U. L. F. A. was able to demand, and 
enforce, those demands originally made by the Assam 
Movement, but which the A. G. P. in power was unable to 
deliver. Links between the two are clearly ambiguous but, 
in large part, the demands made by the U. L. F. A. are those 
with which the A. G. P. would agree, but which it cannot 
argue as forcefully. Despite the distinction between the 
two organizations, to most non-Assamese they are 
synonymous. Debabrata Sarma, Secretary of the United 
Reservationist Minority Council of Assam, founded in 
1986, accused the U. L. F. A. of being an; "ultra- 
nationalist, militant stream of the Assam Movement" 
(Quoted in S. K. Das 1994: 77). Major military crackdowns 
on U. L. F. A., Operation Bajrang in 1990, and Operations 
Cloudburst and Rhino in 1991, have been enforced by 
Congress state governments, and the A. G. P. has appeared 
to be more lenient with its attitude towards the 
U. L. F. A.. The apparent attempted imposition of K. P. S. 
Gill, former hardline Director General of the Police in 
the Punjab, as an advisor to the Government of Assam 
resulted in senior A. G. P. officials pressurising Prafulla 
Mahanta to prevent this (Times of India 29 August 1997). 
Operation Rhino severely dented the military 
capabilities of the U. L. F. A. and followed a period during 
which their "good works" in villages, building dams and 
repairing roads, for example, were legitimized by 
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attendances by; "wives of police officials, and in one 
case, the Deputy Commissioner" (Hazarika 1995: 175). 
1990 proved to be the high point for the U. L. F. A.. 
As the A. G. P. government proved to be incapable of 
delivering the major promises of the Assam Accord, the 
deportation of foreigners, so the U. L. F. A. worked as an 
almost parallel government, at least in the Brahmaputra 
Valley and Upper Assam, with support from those members 
of the Assamese community which were more peripheral to 
the high-caste dominated A. G. P.. 
Although the U. L. F. A. remains important, 
particularly affecting the economy of the state through 
its extortion campaign targeting non-Assamese 
businessmen, in popular perception the moralistic 
overtones to its independence struggle are generally seen 
to be less than genuine (Hazarika 1995: 175). The opulent 
lifestyle of the U. L. F. A. "boys" was apparently revealed 
when those who accepted the government's offer of 
surrendering demanded substantial financial resources 
from the state and continued to extort money to 
supplement their incomes. 
That said, the extortion that did occur, in the case 
of tea gardens estimates assume that in the early 1990's 
the larger gardens paid 2,000,000 Rupees (Hazarika 1995: 
187), was generally supported as a measure to prevent 
money flowing out of the state. The election of the 
A. G. P. in 1996 was in part based upon a promise to end 
the conflict: 
The A. G. P. manifesto also has a commitment to 
confiscate all clandestine weapons within a period 
of three months and to bring down factional 
terrorism with an iron hand. (The Sentinel 26 June 
1996) 
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The obvious problem for the A. G. P. was that, by 
cracking down on the U. L. F. A., attention was diverted 
from the -core issue for which it had been elected; the 
implementation of the Assam Accord. Many non-Assamese had 
supported the A. G. P. on the assumption that because of 
the closer links of the A. G. P. to the U. L. F. A., a more 
peaceful settlement could be achieved than were a 
Congress government to be elected. 
As the "Tata Tea Scandal" developed during 1997, it 
became clear that initial estimates of the size of 
protection money paid were vastly under-stated. In all, 
it was alleged that all of the militant outfits in the 
northeast were benefitting by 30,000,000 Rupees, with the 
U. L. F. A. alone receiving 15,000,000 Rupees from tea 
estates, oil drilling companies and oil refineries, 
including some which were government owned (Indian 
Express 12 September 1997). The resulting difficulty for 
the A. G. P. government is that a softer line towards the 
U. L. F. A. would appear to confirm widespread suspicions of 
the relationship between the two organizations. Taking a 
harder line would be unpopular amongst those members of 
the A. G. P. who value that relationship. 
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6.4 Assessment 
This work has attempted to deconstruct the historical 
background which led to these events, focusing around 
identity as the unit of political mobilization. The 
historical developments discussed previously both caused a 
communal consciousness to develop and then reinforced it 
through political and economic institutions. 
When this Assamese identity existed, that is, was 
recognized as a primary marker of self-identity, elites 
were able to manipulate this, sometimes consciously, 
sometimes not, for political purposes. However, the 
construction of the Assamese identity in opposition to 
other identities has in some senses inevitably led to the 
rise of the U. L. F. A.. The high-caste Assamese who lead the 
A. G. P. had to gain support from other groups to attempt to 
regain political supremacy within the state. Although they 
have achieved this political power, their failure to 
fulfil those policies which articulating an Assamese 
identity had been assumed to ensure, encouraged the 
development of more vociferous and chauvinistic versions 
of this identity. 
Furthermore, as has been demonstrated, one of the 
most important external perceptions of the northeast has 
been its heterogeneity. Both unity and division have been 
enforced through this depiction, particularly as political 
structures have been established to perpetuate what was 
thought to be historical truth. 
Thus the events of the 1980's were both a recognition 
of external influence and a manifestation of elite power, 
within the system which was externally created. Cultural 
artifacts which caused feelings of 
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division; both physical, such as Satras, and non- 
tangible, such as language, were reinforced by the Assam 
Movement through the articulation of Ahom myths. Pictures 
of Lachit Barphukan and the belief that the Assamese are 
more Thai than Indian, for example, were used to try to 
gain contemporary political ends through reference to 
historical ideals, despite the Ahorns emphasizing their 
difference from the Movement. 
These feelings of difference were felt in relation 
to "foreigners"; strictly speaking Bengali Muslims, but 
as A. K. Das, a self professed Assamese patriot, claims; 
The Bengalee (sic) dominated Cachar district did not 
accept the movement against non-Indians since almost 
all foreigners are Bengalees. (Das 1982: 73) 
Implying, though not explicitly stating, that all 
Bengalis are foreigners. Indeed, Das accepts that 
"assimilated" Bengalis joined' the Assam Movement but, 
upon assimilating, they became less Bengali, and more 
Assamese. 
The weakness of the Assamese is felt to be greater 
since their adversaries are themselves not a "martial 
race". The acceptance by both Bengalis and Assamese of 
British racial stereotypes demonstrates the pervasiveness 
of those ideas that empower one group in relation to 
another. The Assamese elite are quick to portray the 
Bengalis as non-martial, the Bengalis to portray the 
Assamese as indolent. 
The economic disparity between the "indigenous" 
Assamese and the more prosperous immigrants, reflects 
this dichotomy. Those groups economically backward 
relative to the Assamese are "allowed" to join the 
coalition, hence tea planters and tribals are accepted as 
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Assamese. Bengali Muslims have, at times, been accepted, 
as neo-Assamese, na-Asamiya, but their numerical size, 
rather than their economic status, articulated 
particularly by the B. J. P., have made them the main 
threat to the Assamese. This also reflects the 
powerlessness of the Assamese elite to target Indian 
migrants, within the internal political structure, such 
that the more extreme elements, such as the U. L. F. A., are 
able to increase their support, through targeting non- 
Assamese businessmen and thereby achieving aims intended 
by the original movement, but which the constitutionally 
bound A. G. P. has been unable to deliver. 
This inability to overcome the more obvious threat 
to Assamese culture has enabled a more extreme path to be 
taken by the U. L. F. A., targeting wealthy migrants, 
particularly tea planters, but equally Marwari and 
Bengali businessmen in Assam. The situation in Nagaland, 
where taxes are paid to parallel governments, is distant, 
but not far-fetched. 
Constructed cultural differences aid an 
understanding of these processes. Notions of cultural 
difference, perceived by outsiders, based upon certain 
cultural markers, reinforced through political 
institutions and by relative economic backwardness, have 
caused a feeling of resentment. which, if not managed, was 
always liable to cause ill-feeling towards immigrants. 
The change in Congress Party organization from the late 
1960's allowed the explicit articulation of these 
notions, which increased in salience after state 
reorganization. These events resulted in an overlap of 
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elite and subaltern economic interests, which the 
articulation of cultural separateness could encourage. 
The difficulty now is that the use of identity, 
constructing notions of being Assamese against being a 
(tautological) foreigner, is that politically the A. G. P. 
has articulated this against support of, in particular, 
the Congress (I), and the C. P. I. (M), due to their use of 
Bengali Muslim voters and derogatory marks made by Jyoti 
Basu, Chief Minister of West Bengal, at the start of the 
Assam Movement. 20 This has affected the possibility of 
political accommodation with either party, as was 
demonstrated in 1996, when the A. G. P refused to join any 
government at the centre in which the Congress (I) Party 
had any inside involvement. 
Although cultural markers are manipulated, and 
identities constructed, this cannot occur instantly. Re- 
inventing a non-exclusionary northeastern identity cannot 
occur until the structural economic disparity with 
migrants is remedied. The disintegration of the colonial 
state of Assam into new states, union territories and 
autonomous districts, has reinforced a specific Assamese 
identity at the expense of a northeastern one and has 
failed to ally these localized identities to the Indian 
20 "He made snide remarks about Assamese women taking 
jam sandwiches and tea as if they were going on picnics, 
rather than Satyragraha. " (A. K. Das 1982: 83) Amalendu 
Guha disputes this popular impression, claiming that 
Basu; 
expressed nothing but goodwill for the Assamese 
people and concern about what would happen if the 
West Bengal bound exodus were to attract serious 
proportions. (A. Guha 1980: 1707) 
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national identity because of the vast number of 
distinctive self-identifying parochial groups against 
which community membership has been constructed. 
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Conclusion 
The Assamese case study has provided an example of how 
problems within an otherwise successful post-colonial 
state, India, can arise in peripheral regions in which 
the national identity has failed to replace and, through 
methods of governance, implicitly encouraged smaller- 
scale, localized identities. The ability of these 
identities to be articulated as a perceived method of 
resolving, primarily economic, problems has been argued 
to show less their primordiality than their 
instrumentalism in that they are perceived to be the most 
effective channels through which such imbalances can be 
remedied. 
The utility of such identities owes much, as Chapter 
Four has demonstrated, to British rule. Equally 
important, however, has been the post-Independence 
emphasis on communities, as argued in Chapter Two. Once 
the belief that communitarian action will gain social 
goods is in place, the necessity to construct the 
community becomes paramount. Chapters Five and Six have 
demonstrated the specific events which have helped in the 
consolidation of an Assamese identity, whilst Chapter 
Three described the means by which historic myths have 
been utilized to define membership of the group. 
One apparent implication of this work is that the 
attempted empowerment of localized identities (Subaltern 
Studies) is misplaced. However, it is not the intention 
to give pre-eminence to elite action and to suggest that 
subaltern individuals lack their own agency. Gramscian 
notions of hegemony and the importance of socialization 
provide essential assumptions for this thesis. Throughout 
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the study, Assamese elites are seen to have attempted to 
enforce particular conceptions of Assamese society onto 
the subaltern for their own benefit. However, not only do 
these elites act within and through a belief-system 
encouraged by India-wide elites but the success of the 
identities articulated has varied dependent upon the 
compatibility of the elite aims with those of subaltern 
groups. 
The colonial perception that India was comprised of 
discrete communities resulted in the implementation of 
certain policies and attitudes, as argued by Said (1995) 
and Inden (1990). However, this study has supported more 
recent revisionist arguments (in particular, Bayly 1996) 
that these attitudes were neither all pervasive nor were 
they always unwillingly enforced onto colonial subjects. 
Bayly argues that the communal characterization of Indian 
society demonstrates the weakness, as much as the 
strength, of the colonial state (Bayly 1996: 370) and 
these ideas commonly derived from the prevailing pre- 
colonial attitudes. In the Assamese case, it is clear 
that an initial colonial misunderstanding of Assamese 
society resulted in the construction of a particular 
characterization of the Assamese people which empowered 
new elites particularly given the proximity to 
politically "wayward" Bengal. The subsequent utilization 
of certain colonial conceptions of Assamese society 
demonstrates not a lack of agency amongst indigenous 
elites but that these ideas provided a meaningful 
platform upon which to secure widespread support. 
In the same manner as the beliefs underpinning 
colonial rule necessitated either acceptance or rejection 
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by native groups, so Assamese elites have either 
supported or opposed the assumptions of Indian leaders, 
in large part necessary to gain mass support. Hence, for 
example, when the Assam Movement began; "Most of the 
A. A. S. U. /A. A. G. S. P. offices often had garlanded framed 
photographs of Gandhiji" (Hussain 1993: 139). Control of 
signs and symbols was vital but most of the signs and 
symbols towards which Assamese subaltern groups felt an 
affiliation were Indian symbols. 
What then does this imply about the agency of the 
subaltern in Assam? Despite the thesis tracing the 
construction of a particular Assamese identity, and 
attributing the success of this identity to its 
assimilation into "mass consciousness", the thesis does 
not imply that individuals lack agency. Rather, it was in 
the interests of subaltern groups to articulate this 
particular Assamese identity in an attempt to secure 
control of social goods. Being Assamese and articulating 
this identity vociferously represents neither a 
primordial essence, the identity was relatively recently 
constructed, nor a false consciousness; being Assamese 
represented a much more coherent method by which to gain 
social goods than articulating an ideological position or 
membership of a particular social class. 
The problem, however, of political actions being 
determined by identity and cultural affiliation is that 
identity politics is predicated on the assumption of 
division. That is, the existence of "us" implies and 
requires "them", against which the group can be 
contrasted and without which the existence of "us" is 
inconceivable and meaningless. It is impossible to be 
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Assamese without some characterizable and stigmatizable 
Other; Bengalis, Muslims, Marwaris and so forth. Thus, 
although being Assamese is positive for those individuals 
within this categorization, it is simultaneously negative 
in its connotations for relationships with non-Assamese. 
Some generic points can be taken from the Assamese 
case to explain the "success" of cultural/ethnic 
organisation within the post-colonial world. The ability 
of colonial powers to divide societies along cultural 
lines derived in part from scientific assumptions that 
these divisions represented some primordial difference. 
Colonial categorization, reinforced by systems of 
governance, at times deepened existing differences and at 
other times created new divisions. 
The post-colonial nation-building project attempted 
to reduce these differences but the colonial granting of 
rights to the leadership of certain groups ensured 
opposition to the imposition of a more egalitarian 
system. Ethnic sub-nationalist movements generally 
occurred in those societies in which the post-colonial 
elite were seen as representative of a different 
community during the period of colonial rule. 
Why though do these movements articulate political 
demands through the language of cultural difference? The 
answer is clearly dependent upon the context but the 
pervasiveness of western nationalist discourse is clearly 
important. The belief that nationality is essential for 
individual fulfilment implies that anti-systemic protest 
requires the construction of new identities, replacing 
the official state-nationalism with localized, cultural 
sub-nationalisms. 
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In the Assamese case then, the argument of the 
thesis can be summarized in the following manner. A 
specific Assamese-speaking, Vaishnavite-Hindu elite, 
accustomed to political power within the state of Assam, 
found this control diminishing during the late 1960's and 
early 1970's. This occurred because of changes in the 
structure of the dominant Congress Party at national 
level and due to a reliance by some Congress activists in 
the state of Assam on the votes of illegal immigrants. 
Regaining this political power required mass 
support, given the democratic framework. Utilizing 
distinctions conceived by the British, this elite 
articulated a conception of Assamese identity beneficial 
to. themselves. It was not the first time that particular 
ideas, such as resistance to Moghul rule, were discussed 
but it was the most vociferous and "political" use of 
these images. Based upon cultural difference, 
particularly language and religion, drawing on historical 
ideas that defined the community and specified ways of 
acting and highlighting alternative conceptions of the 
Assamese by other groups, this identity was reinforced. 
On its own however, this was not enough. The 
Assamese identity was only "successful" because of the 
integration of long-standing subaltern political demands 
into the characterization of the Assamese community. 
Thus, for example, the resentment of Assamese-speakers 
towards the land appropriation by Bengali-speaking 
Muslims became an essential feature of an Assamese 
identity. This was reinforced and given intellectual 
legitimacy through being placed within a historical 
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tradition which included various comments of colonial 
enumerators in the early twentieth century. 
The events of the late 1970's which led to the Assam 
Movement, were only possible after this Assamese identity 
had permeated into both subaltern and elite 
consciousness. This is not because the events in 
themselves were implausible before but that their 
explanation in terms of ethnic conflict could not occur 
before the respective identities had become entrenched as 
the main explanatory political variables of the region. 
A consistent Assamese critique of the Indian 
government's response to the situation in Assam 
throughout the 1980's and 1990's was to argue that it was 
treated as a "law and order", rather than a political, 
problem. In a similar vein, the criticism could be 
levelled at Assamese elites that they have explained 
"normal" events as representative of ethnic problems. 
Contemporary interpretations of ethnic problems as 
signs of primordial identities perhaps result from the 
apparent similarity of events under colonial rule and 
after Independence. That the Assamese identity as 
conceptualized by colonial rulers and contemporary 
Assamese elites is completely different has been 
demonstrated in this thesis. Yet without the initial 
colonial classification, the contemporary use of the 
category would be impossible. The category, once 
established, clearly gains its own momentum and the 
development of the U. L. F. A. demonstrates how differing 
solutions can be presented to similar initial demands. 
What then are the implications of this study with 
regard to the position of Assam within the Indian union? 
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The most important point of this thesis is that cultural 
categories can never be removed as potential markers for 
a political movement. In the first place, any religious 
or linguistic difference which exists is available to be 
used to create difference with another group. Only 
complete homogeneity, an impossibility, could remove this 
potential. The creation by colonial rule of a number of 
categories, some discrete, others over-lapping, provided 
divisions within which these cultural differences can be 
located. Particular problems can be "managed" 
successfully in the short-term, pro-actively, through 
grants perhaps, or reactively, through military force. In 
the long-term, however, as long as a structure exists in 
which the articulation of difference is rewarded, 
political demands may be made using the medium of 
cultural distinctiveness. If, for example, the 
contemporary demands of the Assamese were satisfied, this 
does not prevent another group, in a few generations 
time, making different demands on the basis of their 
Assameseness and, in all likelihood, incorporating the 
story of the Assam Movement into their use of myth. This 
group would not represent a reawakening of an Assamese 
identity; instead it would be a separate and discrete 
political movement. 
Thus the only long-term solution is to create an 
environment which does not encourage the articulation of 
separate identities. If sub-national cultural identities 
are expressed, then the benefits of demonstrating the 
national identity must be seen to be greater than the 
localized identity. Clearly, to a large extent, this is 
theoretical. However, within the Indian state, the 
264 
emphasis on linguistic and religious division as a means 
of gaining social rights implies the opposite to this. 
Control of signs and symbols is thus essential for 
the state to enforce its legitimacy. In the short-term 
however, there would be major difficulties in directly 
countering the myths articulated by the Assam Movement. 
Any attempt to emphasize the integral position of Assam 
within the Indian state would fail to reduce the 
importance of Assamese culture in the politics of Assam. 
Firstly, it would re-emphasize the importance of the 
Assamese as a group, through articulating myths regarding 
"their" role in all-Indian history. Secondly, attempts 
have been made to do this through, for example, the image 
of Assam as a microcosm of India as a whole. The problem 
though, when certain belief-systems have been 
established, is that Indian attempts to demonstrate the 
importance of Assam to India, merely highlights how 
different the Assamese are. Biharis, for example, are not 
continuously told how vital they are to the Indian state. 
There is no need. 
Furthermore, attempts also failed because the 
salience of an Indian identity was too far removed from 
the realities of life in the northeast, as lived by many 
Assamese. Historically, the necessities for true 
integration; bridges, railways and so forth, were only 
achieved through long struggles. The articulation of myth 
is only a useful political device when it reflects some 
part of an individual's everyday existence and does not 
just appear to be abstracted rhetoric. Locating Assam 
within the Indian mainstream will be disbelieved if 
social and economic realities counter the claims. 
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However, in the long-term, the use of new myths is 
essential for enforcing the primacy of an Indian identity 
in the northeast. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the 
environment in which this takes place must be conducive. 
The primary grievances within Assam relate to the control 
of economic resources, resulting from immigration and 
resulting in relative economic backwardness for the 
Assamese group. The impression that Assam, due to its 
agricultural productivity and natural resources would 
benefit financially through independence exists within 
the, northeast. Because of this, some degree of 
empowerment of these resources to the Assamese group, 
however defined, is essential. The problem is that those 
individuals who would be most likely to benefit from any 
restructuring would be from the non-Assamese business 
communities within the state. 
The argument throughout the thesis though has 
suggested that. the demands of the Assam Movement 
represent a political, rather than a cultural, project. 
The solution, as demanded by Assamese elites, must also 
be political. The ability of the Indian central 
government to refuse investment projects in Assam due to 
the "security problem" overlook the fact that investment 
will, ' eventually, reduce the discontent, manifesting 
itself in the actions of the U. L. F. A.. 
Rural development projects, as demanded in the aims 
of the A. G. P. (see Appendix E) and as performed at times 
by the U. L. F. A. need to be implemented by government. 
similarly large-scale industrial projects, or the 
recently built I. I. T. College in Guwahati, would serve 
the same purpose. These projects represent more powerful 
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symbols of central government involvement in Assam. 
Attempts by the centre to reinterpret history to 
demonstrate the involvement of the northeast in 
mainstream society have been demonstrated to be, at best, 
spurious. Utilization of the past supports the claims of 
the Assam Movement. If the future will see Assam, and the 
entire northeast, as a de facto, as well as de jure, part 
of the Indian state then economic advancement is the key. 
The most difficult issue to resolve is clearly that 
of illegal immigration. Constructing more inclusive 
identities is clearly a long-term project. Repatriation 
is somewhat theoretical given that there are no states 
which would accept the immigrants. However, some change 
is necessary not just to satisfy the Assam Movement but 
to develop the economy of the state. It is clear that 
illegal immigration enables lower wages to be paid and 
therefore marginalizes the indigenous Assamese who prefer 
to fall back on small-holdings than work for very low 
wages. 
This thesis has argued that illegal immigration is 
used as a metaphor for all immigration. It is the 
economically powerful legal immigrants who are of more 
concern to the Assam Movement. The role of rural economic 
development recurs, since the belief that the Assamese 
are lazy encourages employment of non-Assamese. In the 
same manner as the image of the Bengalis as non-martial 
persisted until the Bangladesh War of 1971, so successful 
rural development projects would be a symbol of what the 
Assamese could achieve and would dispel myths of 
indolence. 
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The alliance of regional parties within the United 
Front central government should encourage these 
developments. Despite Congress Party dominance having 
originally been based upon a recognition of regional 
diversity, a more tacit acknowledgement of federalism, as 
under the present system, may do much to emphasize the 
political integration of Assam into the Indian 
mainstream. Despite much of the preceding argument 
apparently supporting Selig Harrison's case (1960) for 
the Balkanization of India, there are neither theoretical 
nor practical reasons why this should occur. 
There is clearly a need to recognize diversity 
within India but simultaneously to recognize that 
diversity cannot directly lead to unity. The necessity is 
for cultural divisions not to be given direct political 
significance. Thus, the present success of regional 
political parties, such as the A. G. P., could eventually 
reduce the power of cultural symbolisms if the parties 
are geographically inclusive rather than culturally 
exclusive. Thus it is necessary to reemphasize the 
territorial rather than the linguistic basis for being 
Assamese. There are signs that the A. G. P., to ensure its 
continued dominance, is attempting to redefine itself in 
this mould. Its success or failure will determine the 
future development of India. 
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Appendix A 
Linguistic and Religious Divisions in Assam 
Changing borders and the difficulties of accepting 
linguistic claims have made the raw census information 
hard to evaluate and widely disbelieved. Rather than 
attempt to deconstruct the census reports to establish 
the composition of the Assamese speaking community, this 
appendix will demonstrate the selective use of census 
information by various authors to argue their case. 
1891 1961 
Assamese 1,403,000 6,730,000 
Other Indigenous 
Languages 423,000 680,000 
Migrant Languages 624,000 1,775,000 
The popularity of Sons of the Soil amongst supporters of 
the Assam Movement is due to Weiner's assessment of the 
composition of Assamese speakers in the 1961 Census. This 
suggests that the "native" Assamese are in a minority. 
Comparing population growth rates from 1891, prior to 
large-scale immigration, with the India-wide rate of 
population growth and analyzing religious and' Scheduled 
Tribe allegiances, Weiner classifies Assamese speakers in 
1961 thus; 
Hindus native to Assam 2,806,000 
Bengali Muslims 2,200,000 
Migrants and descendants 
(exclusive of Bengali Muslims) 1,465,000 
Assamese tribals 259,000 
(Weiner 1978: 137-138) 
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Estimates of the Number of Foreigner's in Assam 
Assessing population growth rates from 1951, and basing 
the 1981 population on Census Population Projection (low) 
and voter registration (high), A. K. Das suggests the 
following figures for the number of foreigners in Assam; 
Year Assam Assam's Population Foreigners 
Population including Indian 
immigrants and some 
foreigners 
1951 8,028,856 8,028,856 0 
1961 10,837,329 9,954,175 883,154 
1971 14,625,152 12,243,618 2,381,534 
1981 (estimates) 
low 19,890,000 15,059,646 4,830,354 
average 21,399,000 15,059,646 6,339,354 
high 22,908,000 15,059,646 7,848,354 
(A. K. Das 1982: 327-330) 
Distribution of Population by Major Religions, India and 
Assam, 1961-1971 
Religion % Variation in Pop Difference in % Growth 
between India and 
Assam 
India Assam 
Hindu 23.69 37.18 +13.49 
Muslim 30.84 31.00 +0.16 
Christian 32.62 44.87 +12.25 
Susanta Dass compares the variation in population 
increase between religious groups in India and Assam. 
Dass thereby concludes that "the apprehension of 
infiltration of Bengali Muslims between 1951 and 1971 is 
not statistically valid" (S. K. Dass 1980: 859). 
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Given the higher than average growth of the Assamese 
language, Hussain concludes that fears about the Assamese 
language declining are very over-stated (Hussain 1993: 
244). 
Note: Dass provides perhaps the best example of the 
difficulty in interpreting census data in the region. In 
the 1951 Census Report some inhabitants of Goalpara 
insisted on recording their mother-tongue as Goalparia; 
As a result, 4,088 persons (2,562 males and 1,526 
females) returned their mother tongue as Goalparia. 
There being no such language in existence, these 
persons were included under Assamese as directed by 
the Registrar General, after consulting the state 
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Select Economic Indices 
The following examples are neither conclusive nor 
sufficient. They do, however, demonstrate the manner by 
which feelings of neglect are justified. 
Year Per Capita Income 
India Assam 
1950-1951 469.7 520.1 
1960-1961 550.1 505.4 
1970-1971 632.8 534.7 
1980-1981 696.8 569.4 








Investment in Irrigation 







(A. K. Das 1982: 238) 
India Assam 
Road Length/100 square kms. 49.90 72.59 
Railways/100 square kms. 48.90 16.40 
Per Capita Electricity consumption (kWT)111.68 31.59 
Per Capita Bank Deposits 353 150 
(B. P. Singh 1996: 10) 
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Language 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Assamese 102 90 110 140 
English 6,910 5,425 6,010 6,125 
Bengali 1,212 1,027 1,304 1,920 
Hindi 2,450 2,708 2,856 2,700 
(S. K. Das 1994: 66) 
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Appendix D 
The Assam Accord, 1985 
(Memorandum of Settlement) 
1. Government have all along been most anxious to find 
a satisfactory solution to the problem of foreigners in 
Assam. The All Assam Students Union (A. A. S. U. ) and the 
All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (A. A. G. S. P. ) have also 
expressed their keenness to find such a solution. 
2. The A. A. S. U. through their memorandum dated 2nd 
February, 1980 presented to the late Prime Minister, 
Smti. Indira Gandhi, conveyed their profound sense of 
apprehension regarding the influx of foreign nationals 
into Assam and the fear about adverse effects on the 
political social, cultural and life of the State. 
3. Being fully alive to the genuine apprehensions of 
the people of Assam, the then Prime Minister initiated 
the dialogue with the A. A. S. U. /A. A. G. S. P.. Subsequently, 
talks were held at the Prime Minister's and Home 
Minister's levels during the period 1980-83. Several 
rounds of informal talks were held during 1984. Formal 
discussions were resumed in March, 1985. 
4. Keeping all aspects of the problem including 
constitutional and legal provisions, international 
agreements and national commitments and humanitarian 
consideration, it has been decided to proceed as follows: 
5.1 For purpose of detection and deletion of foreigners, 
1.1.1966 shall be the base date and year. 
5.2 All persons who came to Assam prior to 1.1.1966 
including those amongst them whose names appeared on the 
electoral rolls used in 1967 elections, shall be 
regularised. 
5.3 Foreigners who came to Assam after 1.1.1966 
(inclusive) and up to 24.3.71 shall be detected in 
accordance with the provisions of the Foreigners Act, 
1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunal) Order 1964. 
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5.4 Names of foreigners so detected will be deleted from 
the electoral rolls in force. Such persons will be 
required to register themselves before the Registration 
Officers of the respective districts in accordance with 
Registration of Foreigners Act 1939 and Registration of 
Foreigners Rules, 1939. 
5.5 For this purpose, Government of India will undertake 
suitable strengthening of the government machinery. 
5.6 On the expiry of ten year following the date of 
detection, the names of all such persons which have been 
deleted from the rolls shall be restored. 
5.7 All persons who were expelled earlier, but have 
since re-entered illegally into Assam shall be expelled. 
5.8 Foreigners who came to Assam on or after March 25, 
1971 shall be detected, deleted and expelled in 
accordance with law. Immediate and practical steps shall 
be taken to expel such foreigners. 
5.9 The Government will give due consideration to 
certain difficulties expressed by the AASU/AAGSP 
regarding implementation of Illegal Migrants 
(Determination by Tribunals) Act 1983. 
6. Constitutional, legislative and administrative 
safeguards, as may be appropriate, shall be provided to 
protect, preserve and promote the cultural, social and 
linguistic identity and heritage of the Assamese people. 
7. The Government take this opportunity to renew their 
commitment for the speedy, all-round economic development 
of Assam, so as to improve the standard of living of the 
people. Special emphasis will be placed on education and 
science and technology through establishment of national 
institutions. 
8.1 The Government will arrange for the issue of 
citizenship certificates in future only by the 
authorities of the Central Government. 
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8.2 Specific complaints that may be made by the 
A. A. S. U. /A. A. G. S. P. about irregular issuance of Indian 
Citizenship Certificates (ICC) will be looked into. 
9.1 The international border shall be made secure 
against future infiltration by erection of physical 
barriers like walls, barbed wire fencing and other 
obstacles at appropriate places. Patrolling by security 
forces on land and riverine routes along the 
international border shall be adequately intensified. In 
order to further strengthen the security arrangements, to 
prevent effectively future infiltration, adequate number 
of check points shall be set up. 
9.2 Besides the arrangements mentioned above and keeping 
in view security considerations, a road all along the 
international border shall be constructed so as to 
facilitate patrolling by security forces. Land between 
border and the road would be kept free of human 
habitation wherever possible. Riverine patrolling along 
the international border would be intensified. All 
effective measures would be adopted to prevent 
infiltrators from crossing or attempting to cross the 
international border. 
10. It will be ensured that relevant laws for prevention 
of encroachment of government lands and lands in tribal 
belts and blocks are strictly enforced and unauthorised 
encroachers evicted as laid down under such laws. 
11. It will be ensured that the relevant law restricting 
acquisition of immovable properties by foreigners in 
Assam is strictly enforced. 
12. It will be ensured that Birth and Death Registers 
are duly maintained. 
13. The All Assam Students Union (A. A. S. U. ) and the All 
Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (A. A. G. S. P. ) call off the 
agitation, assume full co-operation and dedicate 
themselves towards the development of the country. 
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14. The Central and State Government have agreed to: - 
(a) Review with sympathy and withdraw cases of 
disciplinary action taken against employees in the 
context of the agitation and to ensure that there is 
no victimisation; 
(b) Frame a scheme for ex-gratia payments to next 
of kin of those who were killed in the course of the 
agitation; 
(c) Give sympathetic consideration to proposal for 
relaxation of upper age limit for employment in 
public services in Assam, having regard to 
exceptional situation that prevailed i n holding of 
academic and competit ive examinations, etc. in the 
context of agitation in Assam; 
(d) Undertake review of detention cases, if any, as 
well as cases against persons charged with criminal 
offenses in connection with the agitation except 
those charged with commission of heinous offenses; 
(e) Consider withdrawal of prohibitory orders/ 
notification in force, if any; 
15. The Ministry of Home Affairs will be the nodal 
Ministry for the implementation of the above. 
Government has agreed to the following: 
(a) Election Commission will be requested to ensure 
preparation of fair electoral rolls; 
(b) Time for settlement of claims and objections to 
be extended by 30 days, subject to this being 
consistent with the election rules; and 
(c) Election Commission will be requested to send 
Central Observers. 
In order to accelerate the industrial and educational 
development, the Government of India has agreed: 
(a) To establish an oil refinery in Assam. 
Government will render all possible assistance in 
terms of institutional and Bank finance to 
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facilitate the establishment of a refinery in the 
Private Sector. 
(b) Central Government will render full assistance 
to the State Government in their efforts to reopen: - 
(i) Ashok Paper Mill. 
(ii) Jute Mills. 
(c) An I. I. T. will be set up in Assam. 
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Appendix E 
The Aims and Objectives of the A. G. P. 
1. Establishment of a progressive society free from 
exploitation and based on a political equality, economic 
development and social justice. 
2. To work hard for the achievement of secularism, 
democracy and socialism, to strive for peace, progress 
and social harmony and integration and to promote these 
causes among the people. 
3. To secure more rights for the State in a real 
Federal Union. 
4. Full utilisation of Assam's natural resources in the 
interest of all round benefit for the people and on that 
basis to strive for strengthening the state's economic 
foundations. 
5. Protection of forests and reserved area and adoption 
of measures for cultivation of fallow lands and increase 
productivity. 
6. To provide for full protection of the interests of 
local candidates in all matters of employment. 
7. Restructuring of the state's plan so that the 
benefits of a planned economy serve the interests of the 
poorest sections of society and thus ensure maximum 
welfare for the people of Assam. 
8. Protection of local peasantry and workers by 
revising land laws and policy relating to industry. 
9. Equal opportunities for all in the field of 
education, introduction of employment oriented 
educational courses and ensuring autonomy in the field of 
higher education. 
10. Strengthening understanding and goodwill among 
different ethnic groups and sections of people, and 
adoption of all measures for the development of all 
indigenous languages, art and culture. 
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11. Extension of health care facilities to the poorest 
sections also through decentralisation of public health 
service measures. 
12. To accelerate the pace of rural development by 
making improvement in the field of transport and 
communication. 
13. Promotion of the scientific temper in the society in 
order to keep pace with future industrial development and 
for all this, to lay emphasis on science and technology. 
14. In order that national and international problems 
could be faced appropriately, to seek to extend 
cooperation with all democratic secular and such other 
parties as are opposed to regional imbalance and respect 
the legitimate rights of small nationalities; such 
cooperation would depend on the merits of the issues. 
15. To seek to build up unity in action with all like 
minded parties of the north-eastern states for facing 
problems of common concern. 
16. To adopt all measures to realise in practice the 
constitutional safeguards provided in the Constitution 
for all comparatively backward people including S. C. /S. T. 
categories irrespective of their habitation, in hills or 
plains areas. 
(cited in Hussain 1993: 303-304) 
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Appendix F 
Premiers/Chief Ministers of Assam 
Mohammed Saadulla (Assam Union Muslim League) 1937-1938 
Gopinath Bardoloi (Congress) 1938-1939 
Mohammed Saadulla (Muslim League) 1939-1946 
Gopinath Bardoloi (Congress) 1946-1950 
Bishnu Ram Mehdi (Congress) 1950-1957 
Bimala Chaliha (Congress) 1957-1970 
Mohendra Choudhury (Congress) 1970-1972 
Sarat Sinha (Congress) 1972-1978 
Golap Borbora (Janata) 1978-1979 
Jogen Hazarika (Janata) 1979 
President's Rule 1979-1980 
Anwara Taimur (Congress) 1980-1981 
President's Rule 1981-1982 
Keshab Gogoi (Congress) 1982 
President's Rule 1982-1983 
Hiteshwar Saikia (Congress I) 1983-1985 
Prafulla Mahanta (A. G. P. ) 1985-1990 
President's Rule 1990-1991 
Hiteshwar Saikia (Congress I) 1991-1996 
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